"Paquistão 1947-2007: 60 anos perdidos" in Courrier International

Le concept d’Etat-nation s’étant imposé il y a plus de deux cents ans, on peut dire que le Pakistan, qui a fêté son soixantième anniversaire le 14 août dernier, est plutôt immature. Il traverse d’ailleurs une grave crise sécuritaire, identitaire et politique. L’insécurité qui y règne provient des conditions mêmes de la naissance du pays, qui a eu lieu par césarienne [avec la partition du sous-continent] et dans le sang. Sa crise d’identité résulte de sa tentative de couper le cordon ombilical avec le reste de l’Asie du Sud laïque pour se tourner vers le Moyen-Orient islamique. Quant à ses problèmes politiques chroniques, ils sont dus à l’héritage d’un appareil d’Etat colonial relativement développé où la représentation de l’armée et de la bureaucratie a primé sur la consolidation de la nation. Le résultat a été la création d’une “nation-Etat” au-dessus du peuple, alors que les Etats-nations se construisent habituellement dans l’autre sens, le peuple formant d’abord une nation, puis un Etat.

La nation-Etat pakistanaise a cherché à se légitimer et à s’affirmer en s’appuyant sur une idéologie religieuse. Elle a tenté d’imposer une identité unique à la population dans le but de faire disparaître les anciennes et multiples “identités secondaires” léguées par l’Histoire, c’est-à-dire l’appartenance ethnique, la langue, la classe sociale et la région d’origine. Les Etats-nations traditionnels, comme l’Inde, se fondent au contraire sur les principes du pluralisme et de la démocratie laïque, où l’unité est une reconnaissance plutôt qu’une négation de la diversité religieuse, linguistique, ethnique et sociale. Une nation-Etat construite sur la base d’une identité religieuse – qui, par définition, sème l’exclusion, la division et l’intolérance parce qu’elle introduit une différence entre “nous” et “eux” – est plus encline à des crises de violence qu’un Etat-nation démocratique, laïc et pluraliste.

Au Pakistan, la question de la nation-Etat et de l’Etat-nation est rendue plus difficile par une grande contradiction contenue dans l’identité religieuse du pays. L’islam transcende l’Etat-nation, car il exige d’être loyal à une communauté transnationale de croyants, ce qui mine le sentiment de loyauté envers un Etat national délimité par des frontières géographiques et doté d’une souveraineté politique restreinte. La tentative du Pakistan pour se forger un “nationalisme islamique” est donc un contresens. De plus, en soixante ans, cette idéologie unique dominante a conduit à l’implantation d’une culture politique autoritaire, à un démembrement violent [avec la sécession du Pakistan-Oriental, devenu le Bangladesh en 1971], à des guerres régionales débilitantes [avec l’Inde notamment], à des révoltes internes, à des conflits religieux et à une course aux armements qui s’est avérée si onéreuse qu’elle a empêché la grande majorité des Pakistanais de bénéficier des retombées du développement économique.

Comment sortir de l’ornière ? Il faut d’abord non pas davantage mais moins de religion d’Etat, afin que le Pakistan devienne pluraliste, laïc, pacifique et viable. Cela n’est d’ailleurs pas incompatible avec un renforcement du sentiment religieux au niveau personnel. Pour y parvenir, nous devrons remanier les programmes scolaires, sensibiliser les médias et supprimer toutes les références à un destin religieux unique dans la Constitution. Nous devrons également insister pour que l’armée et la bureaucratie servent les civils avant tout. Nous devrons en outre soutenir les élans du peuple vers une plus grande démocratie et vers le constitutionnalisme libéral, et demander le départ définitif des militaires et des religieux qui occupent des postes au gouvernement. Enfin, les relations de notre Etat avec ses voisins devront se fonder sur une coexistence pacifique et sur les échanges plutôt que d’être guidées par des ambitions territoriales ou religieuses. Comment cela se traduira-t-il dans la pratique ? Le président Pervez Musharraf [qui dirige le pays depuis 1999] devra renoncer à cumuler ses fonctions avec celles de chef d’état-major et ordonner aux militaires de quitter la politique. Des élections libres et régulières devront rendre le pouvoir à des partis politiques démocratiques, pluralistes, réformateurs et favorables à la séparation de l’Etat et de la religion. En fait, le Pakistan ne doit pas seulement choisir entre la modération religieuse et l’extrémisme, ou entre le contrôle civil et le contrôle militaire. Il doit surtout s’interroger sur les relations que peuvent entretenir nation plurielle et Etat indivisible. S’il reste embourbé dans une identité et une idéologie religieuse uniques, il ne pourra jamais vivre en paix et ne sera jamais démocratique, et cela quels que soient ses dirigeants. Mais, si les civils et les militaires parviennent à un consensus sur ce sujet, tous les autres problèmes pourront être réglés.

Ce consensus est-il envisageable ? Malheureusement, les sentiments antioccidentaux et le choc des civilisations occupant actuellement plus de place dans le cerveau des gens que les idées de démocratie, de société civile, et même que la situation économique, cette éventualité semble peu probable. Dans ces conditions, tout accord sur le partage du pouvoir entre Pervez Musharraf et Benazir Bhutto [ancien Premier ministre et dirigeante d’un parti d’opposition, elle serait convenue avec le président de devenir le prochain chef du gouvernement à l’issue des prochaines élections, fin 2007, en échange de son soutien au régime actuel] ne pourra jamais apporter les modifications dont l’Etat a besoin. Le Pakistan semble donc condamné à subir encore de nombreuses épreuves.
http://www.courrierinternational.com/article.asp?obj_id=76666
JPTF 2007/08/22

Malásia: "Guerra do Islão ao pecado obscurece luzes brilhantes numa nação dividida entre culturas" in Times, 18 de Agosto de 2007

Over a drink of green coconut at what used to be called the Passionate Love Beach until his Islamist party came to power and scrapped the name, state minister Takiyuddin Hassan outlines the victories in the war on sin.

To the south, in Kuala Lumpur, the capital, celebrations are starting for Malaysia’s 50th year as an independent state. Its proud achievements are modern universities, a buoyant economy and a respected place in the world as a moderate Islamic nation.

Mr Hassan’s party boasts a different set of achievements: banning mini-skirts, chastising unmarried couples and renaming Kota Bharu’s favourite beauty spot. They also closed down nightclubs, banned nearly all bars except a few Chinese restaurants, where no Muslims are allowed, and refused to let a proposed cinema open unless there were separate sections for men and women.

In a sign of their clout, the American pop diva Gwen Stefani has agreed to wear traditional costumes in her Malaysian concert next week after conservative Muslim youths protested at the “indecent dressing and obscenity” of her skin-baring act. An Islamic opposition party demanded that her show next Tuesday should be cancelled.

As it celebrates 50 years of independence on August 31, Malaysia is once again debating just how Islamic it should be. Older Malays bemoan a younger generation that has become puritanical, self-righteously declining to attend social functions where alcohol is served. Headscarves, rare 20 years ago, are worn by almost all Malay women now, although often in combination with tight jeans.

As for Mr Hassan, a moderate who was once a lawyer, he is proud of his party’s achievements in Kota Bharu. He says that it has kept the rustic capital of Kelantan state upright and clean-living. The biggest building in the city is a gigantic headquarters decorated with concrete Korans where the moral enforcement department is based. Its bearded officials spend much of their time prowling parks in Kota Bharu in search of amorous young sinners.

Mr Hassan is sensitive about the mocking nickname of “Taleban lite” sometimes levelled at his party from Kuala Lumpur, where bars do a roaring trade and the cinemas are full of dating couples. Yet he is sure that the moral example set in Kota Bharu will some day win over his lax compatriots to the south. “Malaysia is a Muslim state. We hope we can change the mindset of our people in Kuala Lumpur so they can live according to Islamic principles too,” he said. Not all parties agree.

Some fear that assertive Islam threatens to upset the delicate balance between the 60 per cent Malay Muslim majority and the nonMuslim ethnic Chinese and Indian minorities, which have managed to coexist, sometimes uneasily, since the troubled birth of the country in 1957, at a time of civil war and ethnic tension.

At the time many feared that the new nation was doomed to failure. It has instead built a strong economy and an imperfect democracy, dominated for 50 years by the United Malays National Organisation, which has survived without the coups or upheavals that have plagued her neighbours.

Ronnie Liu, of the Democratic Action Party, said: “Socialising between Malays and the other ethnic groups is much rarer than it used to be. You go into coffee shops and restaurants now and they no longer cater to an ethnic mix of customers. It wasn’t like that before.” Some nonMuslim Chinese and Indians feel increasingly treated like second-class citizens. They complain, usually privately, that Islamic religious schools are much better funded than theirs and that a system of affirmative action favours Malays when it comes to university places.

Islam has always had a prominent place. It is the official religion of Malaysia and the Constitution states that anyone born Malay is Muslim.

The debate over the parameters of its role, an old argument in Malaysia, was given a new outing when Najib Razak, the Deputy Prime Minister, broke a taboo to declare that the nation was an Islamic one. He said: “We have never been secular because being secular by Western definition means separation of the Islamic principles in the way we govern the country.”

The Council of Churches of Malaysia afterwards accused him of stirring up racial tension.

Minority religions are particularly worried about a series of apostasy rulings. Chinese or Indians who want to marry a Malay must convert to Islam, causing great problems if they divorce or are widowed and want to return to the religion of their birth.

In a notorious case this year a Malay woman called Lina Joy attempted to have Malaysia’s courts recognise her conversion to Christianity, but failed and was hounded and fled into hiding. Some hardliners have even called for the execution of apostates.

Every state has a religious department with Saudi-style moral enforcers and nowhere are they more active than in Kota Bharu, a city of mosques along a muddy river that bustles during the day but falls silent at nightfall.

Unmarried couples found sharing hotel rooms are hunted down by the enforcers. Couples caught sitting too close together on park benches are fined 2,000 ringgit (£285) in the city’s shariah court under a provision called khalwat ” loosely translated as “close proximity”. Couples have been forced into marriage after being caught together and moral enforcers sometimes pick on foreigners.

NonMuslims as well as Malays also sometimes fall foul of the enforcers in Kuala Lumpur and elsewhere and there are claims that instead of being paragons of Islamic virtue the enforcers are prone to bribery and have recruited vigilantes into their ranks.

In Kota Bharu the enforcers declined to speak to The Times. Mr Hassan explained: “They are worried about being made to look like fools. It could damage the image of Islam if their work is portrayed in the wrong light.”

Nurhayati Kaprawi, of Sisters in Islam, a group that has spoken out against khalwatand the enforcers, said that many of their raids followed anonymous tip-offs. She said that they frequently terrorised people by barging into homes in the middle of the night.

Ms Kaprawi said: “They say they want to implement Islam but the truth is they are really smearing Islam. If they are not stopped they really could become like the Taleban.”
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/asia/article2280503.ece
JPTF 18/08/2007

"Islamistas pretendem reintroduzir o califado" in BBC, 12 de Agosto de 2007

Some 80,000 Islamists have met in the Indonesian capital, Jakarta, to press for the re-establishment of a caliphate across the Muslim world. The Islamist group Hizb ut-Tahrir - which organised the conference - said it had been the largest gathering of Muslim activists from around the world. However, the group is illegal in many countries and key speakers have been stopped from entering Indonesia.

A caliphate - or single state for Muslims - last existed in 1924.
Hizb ut-Tahrir regards this as the ideal form of government, because it follows what it believes are the laws of God as set out in the Koran, rather than laws designed by man. The groups says it seeks to set up a caliphate by non-violent means - but many experts see it as ideologically close to jihadist groups.

It is banned in most of the Middle East and parts of Europe.
The BBC's Lucy Williamson in Jakarta says that of the estimated 80,000 people packing the stadium hired for the event, the overwhelming majority were women, who have travelled from across Indonesia to attend. If the audience turnout was impressive, not so the speakers lined up to address the crowd, our correspondent adds. One by one, over the past few days, seven of the delegates invited to speak have dropped out.

Barred
Hizb ut-Tahrir says at least two of its foreign activists - one from Britain and another from Australia - were barred by the Indonesian government. Key speakers were barred from travelling to Indonesia. The group's spokesman Muhammad Ismail Yusanto said: "The organising committee deplores the deportation because they came to Indonesia... to give their good advice for the progress of Islam, for the progress of this country." Controversial Indonesian cleric Abu Bakar Ba'asyir was also scheduled to address the conference, but organisers asked him not to attend after police raised security concerns. Hizb ut-Tahrir - or Liberation Party - was founded in Jerusalem in the 1950s by Palestinian religious scholar Taqiuddin an-Nabhani. Today it has a mainly clandestine following in the Middle East, a large presence in Central Asia - where hundreds of its members have been jailed - and active supporters in the West, including London, which is believed to be one of its main bases. Many experts see it as ideologically close to jihadist groups, and suspect its commitment to peaceful means is purely tactical.
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/6942688.stm
JPTF 2007/08/12

"Esperança e Desepero num Iraque Dividido" in Der Spiegel online, 10 de Agosto de 2007

The Iraq war came within a hair of returning to Ramadi in early July. The attackers had already gathered four kilometers (about 2.5 miles) south of the city, on the banks of the Nasr canal. Between 40 and 50 men dressed in light uniforms were armed like soldiers and prepared to commit a series of suicide bombings. They had already strapped explosive vests to their bodies and loaded thousands of kilograms of explosives, missiles and grenades onto two old Mercedes trucks. But their plan was foiled when Iraqis intent on preserving peace in Ramadi betrayed them to the Americans.

Army Units of the 1st Battalion of the 77th United States Armor Regiment -- nicknamed the "Steel Tigers" and sent from an American base in Schweinfurt, Germany -- approached from the north and south. But the enemy was strong and they quickly realized that in order to defeat it, they needed air support. Before long, Apache combat helicopters, F-18 Hornet and AV-8 Harrier jets approached, the explosions from their guns lighting up the night sky on June 30.
The "Battle of Donkey Island," named after the wild donkeys native to the region, lasted 23 hours. The Americans forced the enemy to engage in trench warfare in the rough brush, eventually trapping them in the vast riverside landscape. It wasn't until later, after the soldiers lost two of their own and killed 35 terrorists, that they realized the scope of the disaster they had foiled.

Three of the captured attackers, who claimed to be members of al-Qaida in Iraq, revealed their plan to plunge Ramadi into chaos once again by staging multiple attacks in broad daylight. By unleashing a devastating series of suicide attacks on the city, they hoped to destroy the delicate peace in Ramadi and bring the war back to its markets, squares, streets and residential neighborhoods.

Two weeks after the battle, Ian Lauer is walking through Ramadi's western Tameem neighborhood, the edges of which melt into the vast Syrian Desert. Lauer, a captain, is in charge of Charlie Company. He hasn't forgotten the Battle of Donkey Island. The members of his company have just emerged from four armor-plated Humvees and are now strolling toward a nearby mosque.

"A few months ago, you couldn't have taken a single step here without getting shot at," says Lauer, a fair-skinned 30-year-old who still seems oddly pale under his suntan "We couldn't leave our fucking camp without being fucking shot at," he says. "Now it's peaceful and it's fucking great."

The Turning Point
In October, 90 "incidents" were reported in Tameem, an area no larger than a few city blocks in Berlin. Twenty of those incidents involved attacks on US troops by gangs of insurgents. Wherever the Americans went they were shot at from apartment buildings, three times with rockets and four times with rocket-propelled grenades. Sixteen remote-controlled bombs exploded along the neighborhood's streets, 14 homemade explosive devices were found and defused, snipers attacked the occupying troops twice and one hidden car bomb was found, ready for use. And so the story continued: throughout November, December, January and February.

By March, however, the number of incidents reported in Tameem had dropped to 43, including only four direct attacks with rifles and pistols and one rocket attack. There were no bombings, snipers, rocket-propelled grenades or car bombs. And the leaders of the region's 23 powerful clans were finally meeting with US commanders for "security conferences," while the imams from the city's mosques met with the military's chaplains.

The Iraqis in Ramadi, almost all Sunnis, had been worn down by chronic violence. Many had been victims of kidnappings or blackmail at the hands of mafia-like terrorist groups. They had finally come to the realization that, in the long run, the Americans were less of a threat and offered more hope than the fanatical holy warriors from Iraq and abroad.

Families began sending their sons to join the new Iraqi police force and military and fathers ran for municipal offices. They began cooperating with US military officials, turning in bombers and revealing their weapons caches, all while going about their daily lives, running their businesses, working as contractors, shipping agents and garbage collectors. Teachers returned to their classrooms, doctors began treating patients again and store owners restocked their shelves. Iraqis were now building the barbed wire barriers around the city, constructed to force travelers through checkpoints. Iraqis even manned the checkpoints as the Americans -- the Iraqis' former enemies -- retreated to the background, watching over as the city made a fresh start.

Since June, Ramadi residents have only known the war from televison. Indeed, US military officials at the Baghdad headquarters of Operation Iraqi Freedom often have trouble believing their eyes when they read the reports coming in from their units in Ramadi these days. Exploded car bombs: zero. Detonated roadside bombs: zero. Rocket fire: zero. Grenade fire: zero. Shots from rifles and pistols: zero. Weapons caches discovered: dozens. Terrorists arrested: many.

An Irritating Contraction
Ramadi is an irritating contradiction of almost everything the world thinks it knows about Iraq -- it is proof that the US military is more successful than the world wants to believe. Ramadi demonstrates that large parts of Iraq -- not just Anbar Province, but also many other rural areas along the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers -- are essentially pacified today. This is news the world doesn't hear: Ramadi, long a hotbed of unrest, a city that once formed the southwestern tip of the notorious "Sunni Triangle," is now telling a different story, a story of Americans who came here as liberators, became hated occupiers and are now the protectors of Iraqi reconstruction.

It's Friday, the Muslim day of rest. The city is practically asleep, the air filled a powder-fine sand the soldiers like to call "moon dust." Though still morning, it's 115 degrees Fahrenheit (46 degrees Celsius) outside. In the afternoon, the Iraqi national soccer team will play against Australia in the Asian Cup and win the match, 3:1. Sporting victories, of course, are something Iraqis haven't had much time to think about in the past four years. Shots will be heard in the city after the final whistle, bullets of joy fired off into the blue sky, salutes to a new Iraq.
The square in front of the mosque, a trash-covered wasteland between ruined rows of houses, fills up with people at the end of Friday prayers. Children hang on the American soldiers like grapes on a vine, plucking at their trousers, vying for their attention, for a glance, a piece of candy, a dollar, gazing up at the big foreigners as if they were gods.

The Americans run into acquaintances in the crowd. After being stationed in the city for 10 months, they have become a familiar sight. Bearded men greet the soldiers with hugs and kisses, and passersby hand them cold cans of lemonade. "Thank you, Mister," "Hello, Mister," "How are you, Mister?" they say. They talk about paint for schools and soccer jerseys, and they invite the Americans over for lunch. The Iraqis pose for photos with them, making "V's" for "victory" with their fingers.

Lauer's unit arrives at the home of Ali Chudeir, a charming 30-year-old construction company manager in need of a good dentist. His English is good, but only, he says, because his father practically pounded five new vocabulary words into his head each day as a kid. Bodyguards armed with Kalashnikov rifles lurk around his front door. Chudeir still doesn't fully trust the newfound peace that has come to town. The terrorists, he warns, could return. They are still lurking outside the city, randomly attacking people, he says. "This will continue for a long time. That's why the Americans should stay here longer."

It's clear that Lauer and Chudeir have become friends. They have a lot in common: Both are 30 and have children, Lauer three and Chudeir four. When the Iraqi heard that his American friend was shot in the back at the Battle of Donkey Island, he says, "My family and I wept and prayed for him." The bullet that had hit Lauer stopped just in time to spare his life. It ripped a hole in his T-shirt, but produced nothing more serious than a large bruise thanks to the Kevlar vest he was wearing. But Lauer doesn't like to talk about it, saying only, "I'm a lucky bastard."

Five American officers sit on sofas in front of Chudeir's desk, behaving as if they were on leave, their guns leaning carelessly against a wall, their bulletproof vests removed as they watch Arab MTV on television. Anyone who has satellite TV in Iraq can receive up to 200 stations, including Egyptian Koran channels and Saudi Arabian religious broadcasts, "Pulp Fiction" and "Star Wars" on movie channels, Japanese game shows and English animal series. Five or six news stations are on the air 24 hours a day, while others broadcast European football matches, shows about makeup, cooking, Bollywood movies and luxury car commercials -- mirages of a more carefree life beyond Iraq.
Dinner arrives and it's a true feast, with a spread of kebabs and large pieces of roast chicken, salad and rice with coriander leaves. Chudeir serves sumptuous meals whenever the Americans come to visit, not only because he is a good host, but also because he is grateful to his American friends. Thanks to the American engineers, he says, the city has up to 10 hours of electricity a day now. "We have never had this in all of Ramadi's history. In the end, we will live like civilized people."

As his friends leave, Chudeir waves goodbye with both arms while other neighbors to the left and right do the same. Once again, passersby make the "V" for "victory" sign, greeting the soldiers, "Hello, Mister. How are you?" They're like scenes from another country, another city, a different movie.
Ver artigo integral em http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,499154,00.html
JPTF 2007/08/11

"Al-Manar TV: difundindo a guerra do Hezbollah" in Asharq Alawsat, 7 de Agosto de 2007

Beirut, Asharq Al-Awsat- Al Manar television channel, known as Hezbollah’s mouthpiece, has a strong and constant presence in the homes of the party’s supporters.The channel’s headquarters were the first target during the Israeli bombing of south Beirut at the start of the war last summer, as they were the final target before the ceasefire came into effect.

“The war broke out and ended with a blow for Al Manar,” said Mohammed Afif, the political news director of the channel.” However, the channel’s crew considers its continuous transmission despite the intense shelling to be “part of the victory.”

Al Manar television channel, which draws up the “ideological agenda” for Hezbollah's supporters, was transformed into a secret cell during warfare.

During the war, the station’s crew operated from numerous secret broadcast centers that were undetected by Israeli surveillance technology. Batul Ayyub, a young anchorwoman for the channel and the only woman who was part of this “secret press” said, “On the way [to an incognito broadcast center] I initially felt very scared. I would feel worried for a moment but then I just got on with my work.”

And yet, the channel continues to operate and despite the repeated destruction of the channel’s headquarters, it still remained at the forefront during the war. “We have taken precautionary measures to prevent attacks on Al Manar's image," said Afif. The channel’s news director spoke about the prompt steps taken by the station’s management to seek alternatives following the destruction of its headquarters. He acknowledged that there had been previous preparations made months in advance due to the fact that, “the whole region was simmering and that the signs of war had clearly manifested.”

Regarding these measures, his only comment was, “This is part of the secrets of war.” He added that, “we quickly built a temporary studio that we moved into after the main headquarters were bombed. We then assembled a team that was ready to get to work.”

After the first attack on the channel’s headquarters shortly following the bombing of Beirut international airport last July 13, the station’s management decided to downsize its personnel to the point of letting go of its administrative employees, only retaining a select few of those working in the reporting and news field.

Although the building collapsed to the ground after a missile attack on July 17, there were no casualties among the channel’s personnel, said Afif. When asked how it was possible for a building to get thoroughly ravaged while the people inside remained unharmed, he said, “When al Sayyid [Hassan Nasrallah] declared it a divine victory, some were questioning if that was a reasonable claim. This alone [the lack of injuries] is a sign of divine intervention.”

Afif stated that Al Manar station was capable of resuming its transmission from secret locations throughout the duration of the military operations by using “superior misleading and camouflage methods and tactics that I cannot disclose.”

“It was a boost of confidence for the public,” he continued, “that Al Manar TV continued its broadcast despite the bombing in the southern neighborhoods in Beirut. Amidst the fierce fighting, the anchorman used to present the news with a smile. This raised the people’s morale,” he said.

During this past war, Al Manar TV played a mobilization role in which it assembled the ranks of Hezbollah supporters who were exposed to intense shelling and deportation. Additionally, the channel had mastered the tactics of psychological warfare through placing the emphasis on Israeli casualties and the Lebanese civilians who had been killed, repeatedly airing the footage and sparing no details. The conspicuous absence of images of Hezbollah’s casualties and the complete sabotage of the channel’s headquarters has prompted some in the Western media to question if the war was taking place between a visible party and an invisible other.

Still, Al Manar TV remains a main source of news for other media outlets. The crux of its role depends on the frequent speeches delivered by Hezbollah’s Secretary-General, Hassan Nasrallah, who is the party’s official spokesman and who is the one to enumerate its achievements, comment on its military operations, rally the public and refute the arguments of his critics. Frequently, television stations interrupt their broadcast to air Nasrallah’s speeches live on Al Manar TV.

“The coordination between myself and al Sayyid [Hassan Nasrallah] was related to the timing of the broadcast of the videotape. Most of the time it was broadcast immediately [upon recipient], even if it was at a late hour. At this point, no time was deemed to be late as we had constant viewers both day and night, amidst the relentless shelling,” said Afif.

“During the first phase, I used to inform journalists that we were going to air al Sayyid’s speech, but towards the end we used to just put an ‘breaking news’ logo onscreen,” he explained. Afif believes that the station’s peak viewing hours, “has granted us huge media power,” he said.

He added that there was no special technique entailed in airing the secretary-general’s speeches, however he pointed out that, “the danger was that the broadcast of these speeches coincided with the attacks on Al Manar’s main building, which was razed to the ground several times.”

Quoting Israeli media sources is almost a tradition at Al Manar; the channel’s eight newscasts throughout the day often include Israeli broadcasts. In the daily coverage of last summer’s war, the channel habitually used to broadcast live coverage taken from Israeli channels on the statements issued by Hezbollah leadership that were in conformity with the party’s maneuvers and the movements of the fighters.

According to Afif: “Other media outlets were more capable of broader field coverage, as we were subjected to attacks, in addition to facing a huge logistical problem. However, we were the source of the accurate news and the international news agencies quoted us,” furthermore pointing out that they had “minute-by-minute coordination with the resistance leaders.”

He added that, “Al Manar’s credibility was never shaken during the war. Everything we have covered regarding the destruction of tanks, missile launches and the course of the battle was 100 percent true. It was actually less than what had taken place on the ground.”

“I cannot present evidence for that [claim] but the Israelis have admitted it and confirmed our information,” continued Afif. Furthermore, he does not deny the mobilization role undertaken by Al Manar, “through the images, clips, ‘rallying’ songs, Quranic recitation, prayers and the broadcast of Nasrallah’s speeches, in addition to the mobilization undertaken by preachers in mosques, all which lacked prejudice towards the events, news and their credibility.”

Al Manar channel’s director boasted that in the duration of the war, the channel was the only one to have a correspondent posted at the border area, which witnessed the advance of the Israeli army and confrontations with Hezbollah fighters. Afif described Ali Shuaib, the channel’s correspondent, as “courageous” and negated that he had received any military training or that he had been in contact with [Hezbollah] fighters. “He is simply a correspondent and does not perform any other tasks,” he affirmed.

Regarding station correspondents he said, “They do not receive special training for military operations, but they have descended from a generation that was part of the resistance operation in the south [of Lebanon]. Some of them have reported in Iraq and Afghanistan and are experienced in war coverage.” He added that these reporters “belong to the region and are saturated with the culture and environment in which they work. This gives them precedence over others.”

Discussing the dualism experienced by Al Manar’s crew at the time of the war: “We were required to operate as a television station responsible for relating news to the rest of the world, while taking precautionary measures to ensure that the buildings were concealed, in addition to the protection of our correspondents and the transmission of our footage. The war proved our success.”

He continued, “We were aware of the magnitude of the risks threatening us and what it meant that our station buildings were under attack  but we also knew what the silencing of Al Manar would mean.”

But the transformation of Al Manar from a media channel accessible to the public into a secret network that operated from hidden studios was additionally accompanied by a transformation on the level of the crew, despite the limited numbers that resumed their work under these circumstances. These reporters resembled activists in jihadi organizations, as some leading figures among the field have recounted.

Marwan Abdul Sattar, director of operations of the channel’s transmission said, “It was a unique human experiment. We were in an incredibly brutal environment. Most of us are married with children, but we still felt that we had contributed to a part of the victory, since the absence of Al Manar would have meant a decline in the public morale (especially those in the areas under heavy attacks).”

He added that during the war, the station set up three locations for live transmission, which he upholds was the most difficult task. “Our correspondents did not appear in these live broadcasts in accordance with the importance of the news, but rather in accordance with the security situation.” Abdul Sattar stressed that the correspondents were not in contact with fighters when reporting on their movements.

Bilal Dib, the head of Al Manar’s satellite broadcast who was also part of the war crew said, “I feel affiliated to this institution and I am wholeheartedly devoted to it during critical times. There is no need to call in employees because they come in on their accord.” He elaborated that, “it has a family atmosphere since there are no leaders and subordinates. Sometimes I head down to the station when I am on holiday.”

Dib, who is a young media graduate said that “risk was not an element of concern for us,” after admitting that they were exposed to numerous dangerous situations when being transported from one secret location to another.

Abdul Sattar refuted that they had received any training, however said that, “if, for example, the unlikely event of an Israeli air attack were to target one of our broadcast locations, we would know how to defend ourselves.”

Regarding the channel’s elaborate operation mechanism, Dib said, “Even we did not know our location; none of us possesses full information on this matter.”

“On my wedding anniversary, I left the location to have breakfast with my wife. Upon returning everyone asked me where I had been, and when I explained they said, ‘how could you consider your anniversary under such circumstances?’”

“We were calm [during these times],” he concluded. He added that they were continuously in touch with their families but admitted that it was “no easy feat.”

Batul Ayyub, the only female on the team and Al Manar’s anchorwoman and moderator, recounted that she used to conceal herself by wearing a traditional gulf cloak. Her husband was the one to transport her to the agreed upon destinations. “I used to hear the sound of missiles launching while I was presenting the news bulletins. I had to keep smiling onscreen; I used to smile on the outside while feeling petrified on the inside.”

She revealed that she used to bid her family goodbye everyday before departing, as it may have been the last time she would see them, adding that they had been an incredible source of morale support. “My mother used to ask me where I was and I would say that I was in a safe place. My daughter would tell me how proud of me she was and would ask me to pass on her regards to al Sayyid [Hassan Nasrallah] every day before I left,” she recounted.

"The female element was necessary to soften the circumstances; viewers could see an anchorwoman announcing the victory of the resistance with a smile in her face,” she said. She added that working under such circumstances broke the traditional barriers, “I felt as though I was with family and my colleagues treated me like a sister. I got used to seeing my colleagues and my boss in their sleep clothes; it was as though we were at home,” she said.

However, Al Manar was not simply occupied with reporting on the news and airing speeches, during the war the channel hosted approximately 120 guests. Ziyad Jaafar was the entitled with the coordination with guests and transporting them to the desired location. “We would meet the guest somewhere and transport him/her in an enclosed car so that they would not know our destination. We would usually use side streets and alleyways and follow misleading routes to ensure that our destinations remained secret,” he said.

Likewise, Hezbollah resort to the same tactics when transporting journalists to interview figures from the party’s leadership. Reporters are taken to an underground garage then transported using a small enclosed van to the meeting place. Upon arrival, they also enter through an underground garage, making it impossible to identify the place.

“One of the guests was frightened to death on his way to the studio. It was at night and we were surrounded by darkness. I held his hand to find it was icy. I asked him, ‘Are you alright, sir?’ to which he replied, ‘of course, of course,’” Jaafar revealed.

Launched in 1991 with limited broadcast hours, Al Manar TV gradually increased its air time, and in 2002 added satellite broadcast to its standard transmission. And yet the channel was not among the five television channels to be granted official licensing by the Lebanese government under the audio-visual media law issued in 1996. In July 1997, Al Manar was granted the license by virtue of being a ‘resistance channel’, along with three other channels that were saved from being closed down.

Al Manar TV presents itself online as a channel, “that adopts an open unifying discourse,” in addition to “adopting an objective policy that aims at building a better future for the Arab and Muslim generations by emphasizing the tolerance values inherent in Islam and the propagation of the necessity of dialogue.”

In 2004, the channel was banned both in the US and France in 2004, the former listing it as a terrorist organization [State Department's Terrorist Exclusion List (TEL)], while the latter accused it of inciting anti-Semitism sentiments and hatred. Al Manar TV station regarded this decision to ban it as politically motivated and illegal. Furthermore, the station was banned in Spain and the reception of its transmission faced obstacles in Canada, Australia, South America, and the Netherlands.

In the post-war political crisis, the channel, which constitutes the mouthpiece for the resistance, transformed into becoming a platform for the opposition after having become the chief propagandist against Fouad Siniora’s government and the parties loyal to it.

Regarding the channel’s transformation into a platform for the opposition, Afif said, “[it’s transformation into a] platform has inflicted damage [on Al Manar] but it has not harmed its credibility. We are keen on reporting accurate news. For example, we criticize Saad Hariri [the head of the Future parliamentary bloc] and issue critical statements against him but we never distort any news related to him.”

The events taking place in Lebanon today are “very regretful,” according to Afif who also added that, “the media outlets did not create the political crisis, but rather reflected it to a large extent. We dealt with the matter from a national unity that is sacred [to us] and [we view] sectarianism as a red line. We did our best to avoid getting embroiled in the political conflict.”

“Al Manar’s position does not lie in the country’s political division, although it praises itself on being an oppositional channel. It is true that we always present accurate news, however the channel has provoked a segment of viewers who have, unfortunately, stopped watching it.”
http://www.asharqalawsat.com/english/news.asp?section=5&id=9821
JPTF 2007/08/09

"Os perigos de armar os sauditas" in Der Spiegel Online, 31 de Julho de 2007

On Monday, the Bush administration officially announced its plan to provide advanced weapons worth billions to friendly states in the Persian Gulf in order to curb growing Iranian influence in the region. Washington plans to sell $20 billion worth of satellite-guided bombs, and fighter and naval upgrades to Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Oman, Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates over the next 10 years. A further $13 billion is pledged to Egypt, and Israel will remain, with $30 billion in arms aid, the greatest recipient in the Middle East of American largesse. The German government's coordinator for transatlantic relations voiced his concerns regarding the plan in a radio interview on Tuesday. "I don't see the point of arming the Gulf States and Saudi Arabia with more weapons," said Karsten Voigt. "The region is not suffering from a lack of weapons, but from a lack of stability." German editorial writers agreed, pointing to Saudi links to the insurgency in Iraq and international terrorism.

The conservative Die Welt writes:
"With its plans for weapons shipments worth billions to the Gulf states, Washington has now made it official: The democratization of the Middle East is no longer the focus of American foreign policy. In the name of limiting Iran's influence and restoring stability in the region, the US is returning to a Cold War strategy: The enemy of my enemy is my friend." "But doubts about whether this strategy is prudent in the case of Saudi Arabia can be heard beyond Israel and Europe. Many within the US administration are also convinced that international Islamic terrorism is something akin to the Saudis' exported civil war. Why else would half the foreign fighters traveling to Iraq be Saudis? And of the 19 men responsible for the 9/11 terror attacks, 15 were from Saudi Arabia. From Cologne to Karachi, Saudi embassies very openly operate Wahhabite Koran schools -- the most rigid, backward and dangerous form of Islam." "The strategy's effectiveness is very doubtful. In the 1980s, people placed their bets on Osama bin Ladin, the Taliban and Saddam Hussein when it came to dealing with the Soviets and Iran. Today we are struggling with the bloody consequences of those strategies. Courting Saudi Arabia is unwise and dangerous."

The left-wing Die Tageszeitung writes:
"The only thing the Bush administration has left to offer after six and a half years in power is a mixture of fear, helplessness and panic. Out of acute desperation, the US government now wants to provide help and weapons deals over the next 10 years to the countries that are best able to launch a new arms race in the region. No one can seriously believe that the already weapons-satiated Mideast can be satisfied or held in check by yet more weapons." "If Congress approves the plan, the Bush government's already appalling foreign policy record will only get worse. The only clearly identifiable victor would be the US defense industry -- which, incidentally, has considerable influence in Washington." Center-left Süddeutsche Zeitung uses the weapons deal to look at a broader worsening of relations between the US and Riyadh: "No other country in the Middle East is further from the democratic ideals preached by the US than Saudi Arabia. Mildly put, the human rights situation doesn't meet Western standards." "And beyond political realism, the (current) king is far less pro-American than his brother, who ruled before him ... The cooling of relations was most obvious when Abdallah described the US presence in Iraq at the last Arab Summit in Riyadh as an 'illegal foreign occupation.' Last fall, the king warned he would attack in Iraq if a civil war were to ensue after a withdrawal of US troops. But that's not the only point of irritation. Washington is also displeased about the Saudis' desire to create a nuclear partnership with Pakistan even if, as the Saudi's claim, it would be limited to the exchange of information."
http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,497428,00.html
JPTF 1/08/2007

Para onde vai a Turquia?

As eleições do passado domingo deram uma clara maioria absoluta ao AKP-Partido da Justiça e Desenvolvimento, do actual Primeiro-Ministro Erdogan. Este, todavia, ficou abaixo dos 2/3 de deputados necessários para eleger o Presidente da República no Parlamento (no futuro será provavelmente eleito por sufrágio universal directo) e alterar a Constituição. Contudo, um resultado desta dimensão representa também uma importante vitória do AKP, no braço de ferro com os militares e o establishment secularista. Paradoxalmente, apesar de ter passado de 34,3% dos votos nas eleições de 2002 para 46,5% nestas últimas, no novo Parlamento vai ter menos 23 deputados que no anterior (340, contra 363 em 2002)... A explicação é uma fasquia de 10% da Lei Eleitoral, a pensar nos partidos curdos, muito questionável do ponto de vista da democraticidade do sistema eleitoral, que impede formações políticas com votações inferiores de terem qualquer representação parlamentar. (Nas anteriores eleições, cerca de 45% dos votos expressos não elegeram qualquer deputado!) De forma engenhosa, o DTP-Partido da Sociedade Democrática, um partido étnico curdo, conseguiu eleger 24 deputados, tendo-se estes candidatado formalmente como independentes, contornando assim a fasquia eleitoral dos 10% (os curdos tiraram as devidas ilacções das eleições de 2002, onde com 6,2% da votação e mais de 2 milhões de votos, não elegeram qualquer deputado...). Outra nota importante vai para a reentrada do MHP-Partido da Acção Nacionalista, de Devlet Bahçeli no Parlamento, com 14,3% dos sufrágios (8,3% em 2002). Trata-se de um partido da direita, no passado mesmo de extrema direita, ligado a actividades de milícias para-militares (os «Lobos Cinzentos»), de perfil marcadamente nacionalista, que fez campanha a favor da intervenção militar turca no Norte do Iraque e contra a UE. Esta ascensão também não é propriamente um dos resultados mais tranquilizantes (aparentemente, O MHP está também disposto a viabilizar a eleição do candidato presidencial do AKP, Abdullah Gül, no novo Parlamento). Por último, um olhar sobre o mapa geográfico-eleitoral mostra que a excepção a esta vaga pro-islamista/conservadora/nacionalista – representada pelo CHP-Partido Republicano do Povo, um partido de tipo social-democrata originalmente fundado por Mustafa Kemal e cujo actual líder é Deniz Baykal –, que nestas eleições obteve 20,6% dos votos (19,4% em 2002), só surge residualmente vencedora nas cidades costeiras do Mediterrâneo e na parte geograficamente europeia (ocidental) da Turquia. Num país que afirma olhar para o Ocidente como modelo e ter como objectivo a adesão à UE, a geografia eleitoral tem um mapa curioso. Aparentemente, o secularismo kemalista (ou o que resta dele), está a ser varrido do imenso território da Anatólia por uma avassaladora vaga de transformação vinda do Oriente (culturalmente conservadora e ideologicamente «islamista-capitalista», prometendo mais Islão e mais prosperidade material da UE). Esta já chegou às portas da Turquia mediterrânica ocidental. Resta saber quando e onde irá parar.
JPTF 2007/07/25

"Protestos anti-nucleares após o acordo Sarkozy-Kadhafi" in Libération, 26 de Julho de 2007

Colères et mises en cause. Le mémorandum sur le nucléaire signé pa Nicolas Sarkozy pendant sa visite à Tripoli a suscité jeudi des protestation d’associations et de partis de gauche en France, qui ont critiqué un décision «irresponsable» ouvrant la voie au nucléaire militaire. «Cet accord pose un énorme problème de prolifération nucléaire et se situe dans la droite ligne de la politique française d’exportation irresponsable de sa technologie nucléaire», a estimé Greenpeace France dans un communiqué. Officiellement, la fourniture éventuelle d’un réacteur nucléaire à la Libye n’a qu’un objet strictement civil, le dessalement de l’eau de mer. Sarkozy a affirmé qu’il n’y avait «aucun lien» entre cet accord et la libération des infirmières bulgares, après laquelle il a accepté de se rendre en Libye. «De qui se moque-t-on? La motivation profonde des Etats à accéder au nucléaire a toujours été un enjeu de pouvoir», écrit Greenpeace, citant l’Inde et le Pakistan, la Corée du Nord et l’Iran ainsi que le Brésil. Le réseau d’associations Sortir du nucléaire a dénoncé un «subterfuge»: «Sous prétexte d’aider la Libye à réintégrer le concert des nations, le président français vient de signer un accord pour livrer un réacteur nucléaire au dictateur libyen Kadhafi». Selon le réseau écologiste, «nucléaire civil et militaire sont indissociables», et «livrer du nucléaire civil à la Libye reviendrait à aider ce pays à accéder tôt ou tard à l’arme atomique».

«Cynisme sans limite» de Sarkozy
Du côté de l’opposition, le Parti socialiste a demandé que «toute la lumière soit faite» sur les accords passés avec Mouammar Kadhafi. «Pourquoi autant de précipitation pour signer un protocole d’accord sur le nucléaire civil, sachant que la Libye possède d’immenses gisements de pétrole et de gaz, et que la Libye peut exploiter l’énergie solaire à grande échelle?, a déclaré un dirigeant du PS, Faouzi Lamdaoui. Le nucléaire civil peut être exploité à plus ou moins long terme pour développer des applications militaires.» Il a aussi souhaité que le chef de la diplomatie française Bernard Kouchner vienne s’exprimer devant l’Assemblée nationale sur les conditions de la libération des soignants bulgares, en notant que le ministre paraissait «singulièrement absent dans cette négociation». Mardi, le ministre des Affaires étrangères sera entendu par les députés. Un porte-parole du Quay d’Orsay a assuré pour sa part que le mémorandum signé avec la Libye n’était pas un «accord de circonstance» et respectait l’objectif de non-prolifération nucléaire. Les Verts s’en est pris au «cynisme sans limite» de Nicolas Sarkozy, l’accusant de «jouer avec le feu» en signant un accord avec un «régime non-démocratique». Pour le député vert Noël Mamère, Sarkozy «fait prendre des risques à la planète» en fournissant un réacteur nucléaire au colonel Kadhafi, «patron d’un régime terroriste». «C’est un troc tout simplement, c’est un accord passé sur le dos de la libération de ces infirmières bulgares», conclu «avec un dictateur qui avait faussement accusé ces femmes d’avoir inoculé le sida à des familles libyennes.»
http://www.liberation.fr/actualite/politiques/269245.FR.php
JPTF 26/07/2007

"Putin acusa o Reino Unido de ‘pensamento colonial‘" in Telegraph 24 de Julho de 2007

Vladimir Putin today accused Britain of insulting the Russian people with "colonial thinking" by demanding the extradition of the main suspect in the killing of the former KGB agent Alexander Litvinenko. In an escalation of the war of words with Britain, the Russian president angrily dismissed attempts to force Moscow to hand over Andrei Lugovoi so he can stand trial in the UK. In televised remarks during a meeting of pro-Kremlin youth organisations, Mr Putin said: "They are making proposals to change our constitution which are insulting for our nation and our people. "It's their brains, not our constitution, which need to be changed. What they are offering to us is a clear remnant of colonial thinking." Mr Putin's belligerent comments to a domestic audience are in contrast to his statement to an international press conference last week when he played down the dispute between the two countries, describing it as a "mini-crisis". Yesterday Gordon Brown renewed his demand for Russia to extradite Mr Lugovoi, describing the situation as "intolerable". The Prime Minister insisted Russia had a "responsibility" to hand the suspect over. Mr Litvinenko, who on his deathbed accused Mr Putin of ordering his assassination, died in agony 23 days after he was poisoned by a dose of polonium-210 that was 200 times the lethal level. The murder in London last November has sparked the most severe diplomatic row between the two powers in decades. Last week the British Government expelled four Russian diplomats, prompting Mr Putin to retaliate by ejecting the same number from the UK embassy in Moscow. Speaking during his first monthly press conference as Prime Minister yesterday, Mr Brown said it was "very important" that the world understood the seriousness of the situation. He said: "You cannot have people assassinated on British soil, and then discover that we wish to arrest someone who is in another country, and not be in a position to do that. "We cannot tolerate a situation where all the evidence is that not only was one person assassinated, but many other were put at risk. "We want the Russian authorities to recognise, even at this stage, that it is their responsibility to extradite for trial the Russian citizen who has been identified by our prosecuting authorities." Russia last week also imposed a visa ban on British officials and said that it would cease to co-operate with London in the war on terrorism. But although Moscow’s response was robust, it came at the lower end of the spectrum of possible retaliation. There had been fears the Kremlin would eject a greater number of British diplomats - a move that could have forced Britain into taking additional steps. Mr Lugovoi denies any involvement in the murder, claiming that he has been set up by British secret services.
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2007/07/24/wputin124.xml
JPTF 2007/07/24

Islamistas-conservadores do AKP vencem eleições legislativas na Turquia, com 46,5% dos votos e maioria absoluta de 340 deputados

"Turquia: Durão Barroso adverte que Turquia não está pronta para aderir à UE tão cedo" in Jornal de Notícias, 22 de Julho de 2007

O presidente da Comissão Europeia, Durão Barroso, advertiu, em entrevista hoje publicada num jornal grego, que a Turquia não está pronta para a aderir à União Europeia, "nem amanhã, nem depois de amanhã". "Sejamos honestos. A Turquia não está pronta para ser membro da UE, nem a União está pronta para aceitar a Turquia como membro. Nem amanhã, nem depois de amanhã", afirmou Durão Barroso, em entrevista ao jornal grego Kathimerini, citada pela agência Reuters. Contudo, apesar de considerar que a Turquia não está preparada para entrar na União Europeia, o ex-primeiro-ministro português pediu aos 27 que continuem as negociações. "Gostaria de pedir que a França e todos os Estados-membros não mudem a decisão que tomámos e continuem as negociações", afirmou Durão Barroso, referindo-se ao facto de o presidente francês, Nicolas Sarkozy, se opor à entrada da Turquia na União. As declarações do ex-primeiro ministro português surgem no dia em que mais de 42 milhões de turcos foram chamados às urnas para eleições legislativas antecipadas. As projecções sobre os resultados das eleições legislativas na Turquia apontam para uma vitória do AKP, no poder, com cerca de 50 por cento dos votos, segundo a CNN turca. Quando estão contados mais 25 por cento dos boletins, as sondagens dão como vencedor o partido do primeiro-ministro Recep Tayyip Erdogan, com uma percentagem que vai dos 46.88 aos 51.3 por cento, o que lhe garante a continuidade no poder, com maioria absoluta no parlamento. As eleições legislativas, a que concorrem 14 partidos políticos e 699 candidatos independentes aos 550 lugares no Parlamento, foram antecipadas pelo primeiro-ministro Recep Tayyip Erdogan, que é também o líder do AKP, um partido de direita, liberal na economia e pró-islamista.
http://jn.sapo.pt/2007/07/22/lusa/turquia_durão_barroso_adverte_turqui.html
JPTF 2007/07/22

"As duas faces da Turquia" cartoon premiado de Cristina Sampaio publicado no Expresso, 20 de Abril de 2006

Livro: "O Islamista. Porque aderi ao Islão radical na Grã-Bretanha, o que eu vi dentro e porque o abandonei", Ed Husain, Londres, Penguin Books, 2007

Ed Husain's story of how a young London Muslim was turned into a potential jihadist, The Islamist, is a wake-up call for Britain, says Anushka Asthana

Launched in the week of the verdicts in Britain's longest terror trial, The Islamist could not be more timely. Operation Crevice revealed an underworld of young Muslim men ready to kill. Ed Husain's memoir exposes some of the mind games that led them there.

His journey from theatre-loving schoolboy to Islamic fundamentalist begins in primary school in the 1980s, where he plays with 'Jane, Lisa, Andrew, Mark, Alia, Zak' and learns about Islam from his family and a spiritual guide he called 'Grandpa'. His father, a devout Muslim opposed to Islamist views, ignores the advice of Husain's teachers not to send his son to Stepney Green, an all-boy, all-Muslim secondary school, a decision he will later regret.

Soon, Husain identifies himself not as British or Asian, only Muslim. He describes his journey towards fanaticism as gradual, first coming across Islamism in the school textbook Islam: Beliefs and Teachings by Ghulam Sarwar, which says: 'Religion and politics are one and the same in Islam.' Enticed by its teachings and encouraged by a close friend, Brother Falik, Husain becomes drawn towards Islamism and the formation of the caliphate, a transnational Islamic state with a central foreign policy of jihad.

Husain names people he says share these ideas, including members of the Muslim Council of Britain and leaders of the East London Mosque, where, for the first time, he feels he belongs. Here, he begins to believe in a divided world in which the only side that matters is the Muslims. Husain's is a disturbing picture. Attempts by his distraught parents to change his mind are a 'test from God'. When his father makes him choose between Islam and the family, Husain runs away.

By the time he attends Tower Hamlets College, he has become leader of the influential Islamic society, bringing hardline homophobic and anti-semitic speakers in to lead debates such as 'Hijab: put up or shut up'. Husain turns to the more militant Hizb ut-Tahrir: successful, articulate professionals reinforce his nascent views. He spends two years involved with a Hizb cell. Friends who disappear to training camps later become key figures in al-Qaeda.

In the end, it is Islamism's disregard for Islam itself that moves him to reject fundamentalism. 'True faith had not touched my heart in a decade,' he says.

Husain is appalled at the way unelected and unaccountable Islamist groups are portrayed by the media as representative. This captivating, and terrifyingly honest, book is his attempt to make amends for some of the wrongs he committed. In a wake-up call to monocultural Britain, it takes you into the mind of young fundamentalists, exposing places in which the old notion of being British is defunct.
http://books.guardian.co.uk/reviews/politicsphilosophyandsociety/0,,2073365,00.html
JPTF 2007/07/15

Livro: "Os Últimos Dias da Europa. Epitáfio para um Velho Continente" de Walter Laqueur, Nova Iorque, St. Martin´s Press, 2007

Recensão por Gerard Baker no Wall Street Journal

If you've heard the celebratory noises coming out of European capitals of late, you could be forgiven for thinking that, as with Mark Twain's prematurely recorded demise, reports of Europe's death may have been greatly exaggerated. For a continent in the supposed grip of demographic implosion, economic stagnation, political paralysis and existential anomie, the news has been oddly cheerful recently.

In the past year, the rate of economic growth in the eurozone has actually overtaken that of the U.S. The market capitalization of companies quoted on European stock exchanges has surpassed American corporate worth for the first time ever. London has edged ahead of New York in most categories as global financial capital. The euro, closely watched in Europe as a barometer of continental self-respect, is close to its highest level ever against the dollar.

Even Europe's infamous political stasis may be giving way to a hint of dynamism. In Germany, Chancellor Angela Merkel's coalition government has defied the odds and pulled off small but important economic reforms. In Nicolas Sarkozy, the French have elected a man so committed to recasting the country's economy that he is widely viewed among the liberal elites as a dangerous radical.

All this could not have come at a more opportune moment. The European Union's leaders are in the midst of lengthy celebrations to mark the 50th anniversary of the founding of the European Communities. At the same time, the gloom that enveloped the EU after the French and Dutch rejected its beloved constitutional treaty two years ago has been replaced by a restrained optimism that the show might just be put back on the road this summer.

Is it possible, then, that the writers who have spent the past few years predicting Europe's collapse could be wrong? The short answer is: no. Even a corpse has been known to twitch once or twice before the rigor mortis sets in. The longer answer is provided by Walter Laqueur in "The Last Days of Europe," one of the more persuasive in a long line of volumes by authors on both sides of the Atlantic chronicling Europe's decline and foretelling its collapse.

Unlike the Euro-bashing polemics of a few of those authors, Mr. Laqueur's short book is measured, even sympathetic. It is mercifully free of references to cheese-eating surrender monkeys and misplaced historical analogies to appeasement. The tone is one of resigned dismay rather than grave-stomping glee. This temperate quality makes the book's theme--that Europe now faces potentially mortal challenges--all the more compelling. The demographic problem is by now so familiar that it hardly bears restating. Mr. Laqueur notes that the average European family had five children in the 19th century; today it has fewer than two, a trend that will shrink the continent's population in the next century on a scale unprecedented in modern history.

The failure of Europeans to reproduce makes it vulnerable to internal schism. Too often Europe has reacted to the growing threat posed by extremists among its minorities with a tolerance and self-criticism that has bordered on capitulation. Meanwhile, social tensions increase, not least because of high emigration to Europe from Muslim countries and high birth rates among Muslim populations. No one has yet found a good way of integrating those populations into mainstream European society.

Even as the challenge from fanatical Islam has intensified, at home and abroad, Europeans have found new ways to abase themselves before it. Two years ago it was the Danish cartoons affair, in which too few politicians and opinion leaders defended the rights of the Danish newspaper that published them; last year it was the collective European cringe in the wake of the pope's mildly assertive remarks about the disconnect between Islam and reason; this year it has been the embarrassing spectacle of humiliated British servicemen fawning in front of their Iranian captors.

In the economic field, Europe is celebrating a growth rate of 2.5% annually; in the U.S. a similar pace is regarded as a crisis. Meanwhile unemployment remains brutally high and productivity stagnant. Mr. Laqueur notes that Europeans sometimes embrace their economic sluggishness as part of their "soft power" appeal: all those 35-hour weeks, long vacations and generous social benefits. But the long-term cost of their welfare states--and their confiscatory tax rates--may eventually make such luxuries unaffordable.

Mr. Laqueur ponders whether Europe will really surrender to these adverse trends or finally resist. He is not optimistic. Perhaps Europeans will find ways to bolster their birth rates. Perhaps they will stiffen in the face of an escalating terrorist threat. Perhaps Muslims will assimilate better into Europe's democratic and tolerant societies. Perhaps the pro-American sensibilities and the pro-growth nimbleness of Eastern European countries will drive the rest of the Continent out of the ditch of stagnation and pacifism. Perhaps. But then again, as Mr. Laqueur observes, museums are filled with the remnants of vanished civilizations. Abroad, the U.S. has long surpassed Europe in power, influence and economic dynamism; Asia may do so before long. At home, a profound demoralization has set in, induced in part by the continent's ruinous past century.

It was a century in which unimaginable violence sapped the regenerative energies of a wearied people; in which the seductive falsehoods of twin totalitarian ideologies undermined moral self-confidence; in which a flaccid relativism replaced the firm ethical boundaries of religious belief. It was also a century, we now see, in which the luxuries of rapid economic growth produced a false sense of security that cannot be sustained in a global age. Not dead yet, maybe. But even Mark Twain succumbed eventually to the obituary writers.
http://www.opinionjournal.com/la/?id=110010144
JPTF 2007/07/12

Livro: "O Crepúsculo do Ocidente. Demografia e Política" de Jean-Claude Chesnais, Paris, Robert Laffont, 1995

La grande fracture du monde n'est ni politique ni économique, elle est démographique. L'humanité, dit Jean-Claude Chesnais, est divisée en deux parties. La première regroupe les nations dont la fécondité n'atteint pas le niveau de remplacement des générations: l'ensemble de l'Europe (500 millions d'habitants), l'ex-URSS (290 millions), les pays anglo-saxons d'outre-mer (Etats-Unis, Canada, Australie, Nouvelle-Zélande, 300 millions), le Japon et quelques nations en voie d'industrialisation rapide (290 millions). Soit un peu moins de 1,4 milliard d'individus. L'autre partie, qui compte 4,3 milliards d'âmes, regroupe les pays à fécondité forte.

Tout l'ouvrage est bâti sur cette opposition, ses causes historiques, ses multiples conséquences et les moyens d'y faire face. On découvre, au fil des pages, pourquoi la baisse la plus brutale de la fécondité s'est produite dans les sociétés machistes avancées de l'Europe du Sud, où les femmes, en progression scolaire et sociale rapide, n'ont trouvé aucun cadre institutionnel (allocations familiales, crèches, etc.) qui leur permette de concilier activité professionnelle et maternité.
On constate, à travers notamment le cas de la Suède, que les politiques familiales sont parfaitement efficaces quand elles sont bien conçues. On mesure la menace de déséquilibre qui guette l'Allemagne, où la réunification n'a apporté qu'un répit temporaire: de plus en plus dépendants de l'immigration, nos voisins devront progressivement remplacer le droit du sang par le droit du sol, sous la pression de communautés allogènes avides de reconnaissance civique.

Quant à la France, elle doit dans ce domaine, dit l'auteur, renoncer aux mythes entretenus par la démagogie: non, l' immigration-zéro n'est ni possible ni souhaitable; non, l'immigration ne creuse pas les déficits publics, elle n'aggrave pas le chômage. Le vrai problème qu'elle pose est culturel: l'islam est la deuxième religion en France - comme en Italie, en Espagne, au Royaume-Uni, en Belgique. Il est temps que les pays européens apprennent à établir avec lui des relations cohérentes et constructives. Essai à thèse, fortement argumenté, en faveur d'une politique à la fois ouverte et nataliste, ce livre peut aussi figurer au rayon des ouvrages de référence comme un excellent précis de démographie mondiale. Gérard Moatti

Futuribles
Dans cet ouvrage, Jean-Claude Chesnais invite le lecteur à une réflexion de type spenglérien sur le déclin de l'Occident, un déclin où la démographie atone d'une "Europe stérile mais opulente et à forte protection sociale" joue la partition du premier violon. Tout au long des 10 chapitres de l'ouvrage, l'auteur effectue un vaste tour d'horizon de la récession démographique des principaux pays européens ou de peuplement européen : la France, l'Angleterre et l'Allemagne, l'Europe de l'Est et l'ex-URSS, les États-Unis, le Canada et l'Australie. Le paradoxe qui ressort de cette lecture est que ce sont aujourd'hui les vieux bastions chrétiens d'Europe du Sud, catholiques : Italie, Espagne, Portugal..., ou orthodoxes : Grèce, Serbie, Bulgarie..., où l'essoufflement démographique est le plus dramatique.

Ce sont pourtant ces pays-mêmes qui seraient dans la ligne de mire, ayant à faire face à l'islam et à son exubérance démographique laquelle, du détroit de Gibraltar à celui du Bosphore, sur l'autre rive méditerranéenne, cherche un exutoire pour ses populations en surnombre. Le chapitre 11 de l'ouvrage : "La fracture méditerranéenne et les grandes migrations de demain" est d'ailleurs consacré à ce déséquilibre qui s'impose comme l'un des principaux enjeux du troisième millénaire. D'essence démographique, ce fossé qui se creuse entre une rive et l'autre de la Méditerranée ne pourra que générer une lame de fond qui risque de faire vaciller les fragiles édifices économiques, politiques et civilisationnels de l'Occident.
JPTF 2007/07/14

"A crescente divisão étnica da Grã-Bretanha" in BBC one, 7 de Maio de 2007

Panorama visits Blackburn in Lancashire to investigate how increased separation and segregation between Muslim Asians and whites is dividing communities. Blackburn presents a stark example of a difficult, national problem. For all the hopeful talk about "integration", "multiculturalism" and now "cohesion", the reality on the ground appears to be that Britain's Muslim Asian community and its white community have few points of contact, and that the white majority often feel they share little in common with the growing Muslim Asian minority. Of course there are hopeful exceptions, but Blackburn - where Muslim Asians on the last census made up 24% of the population and whose local council takes the issue very seriously - demonstrates clearly what the problem is. Anyone who goes to Blackburn's town centre, and takes a look around, will see that whites and Muslim Asians are sharing the shopping centre and that everyone is behaving perfectly courteously to each other. So what's the problem? Well, look a bit more carefully, and you'll see that they are both here doing their shopping - but they're not shopping together. They're nearly always shopping separately. And that's the typical pattern here.

Defined areas
There's very little casual, social association between whites and Muslim Asians. There's an obvious geographical separation. The risk is of separate communities, and of people breathing the same air but walking past each other. The areas originally settled in the 60s by immigrants from Pakistan and India are clearly defined. And in the other parts of town where the communities appear to be "mixed", there's little actual mixing. Ted Cantle reported to the Home Office on "parallel lives" after the riots in Burnley, Oldham, and Bradford in 2001 (there were none in Blackburn). He says of the town: "There is not just simply residential segregation, but there is separation in education, in social, cultural, faith, in virtually every aspect of their daily lives, employment too."

Complex factors
Blackburn's MP Jack Straw, a senior member of the government, puts it like this: "The risk is of separate communities, and of people breathing the same air but walking past each other." The problem that Panorama observes cannot be simply dismissed as "racism", although there will be racists, inevitably, on both sides. What differentiates the communities is not just skin colour but a more complex combination of race, religion, and language and culture, and these factors added together are a recipe for social separation. And the phenomenon of so-called "white flight" is one result.

'White flight'
Blackburn's original Pakistani and Indian immigrants came to the town seeking work in the 60s in what was then the booming cotton industry. Many of them spoke little English and they settled together in the town, buying the cheap terraced housing they could afford. So this then became an "Asian" area. And as their numbers have expanded they've become more prosperous and moved to other areas. But many whites have moved out in response. This is "white flight". As some Asians see the process, when they seek to integrate and live with whites the whites avoid them. Then, to add insult to injury, they complain that Asians don't integrate. An Asian talks about taking chocolates round to his white neighbours, who then avoid making eye contact with him. "I don't know," he says, "I find that a little odd." And Jack Straw says: "It's been striking in the last 10 months or so the number of Asian people who... have expressed resentment to me about how they feel they've been treated when they've moved into white schools, or moved into white areas."

Controversial issue
But as some whites see it, these new Asian neighbours bring too much change to the areas they move into. I fear that my children will end up living like apartheid in South Africa. Asian Blackburn resident. Local pubs close, different food is sold in the shops, and at school many of the pupils now come from homes where the language spoken may not be English. Meanwhile more and more young Muslim women, not just in Blackburn, are wearing the veil - an issue already controversial and made even more so when Mr Straw described it last year as "visible statement of separation and of difference". A white man, living in the same area, sums up the concerns many whites feel: "We're slowly getting swallowed up, and we're losing our identity. "We should work more together," he says, "and keep the place as it is - English."

'Small pockets'
And, as Ted Cantle makes clear, separation and segregation is not just a problem for places like Blackburn."It exists as a problem, to some degree or other, throughout the country, and it may be in small pockets and neighbourhoods within larger cities like London and Birmingham and therefore not quite so evident. "It might be whole boroughs or whole cities, but to some degree or another it exists. There is some degree of separation or segregation in most towns and cities." Panorama deals openly in this programme with a topic many in both communities have been too nervous to discuss, although it's a discussion which the local council in Blackburn has itself promoted with its "100 Voices" dialogues. The prospect, otherwise, is of even greater separation. A white Blackburnian says, regretfully: "You'll end up with Muslim Asian towns, you'll end up with white British towns." An Asian Blackburnian agrees: "I fear that my children will end up living like apartheid in South Africa."
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/panorama/6631541.stm
JPTF 2007/07/12

"Eurabia?" in The New York Times, 4 de Abril de 2004

por Niall Ferguson

In the 52nd chapter of his Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, Edward Gibbon posed one of the great counterfactual questions of history: If the French had failed to defeat an invading Muslim army at the Battle of Poitiers in AD 732, would all of Western Europe have succumbed to Islam?

“Perhaps,” speculated Gibbon with his inimitable irony, “the interpretation of the Koran would now be taught in the schools of Oxford, and her pulpits might demonstrate to a circumcised people the sanctity and truth of the revelation of Mahomet.”

When those words were published in 1788, the idea of a Muslim Oxford could scarcely have seemed more fanciful. The last Muslim forces had been driven from Spain in 1492; the Ottoman advance through Eastern Europe had been decisively halted at the gates of Vienna in 1683.

Today, however, the idea seems somewhat less risible. The French historian Alain Besancon is one of a number of European intellectuals who detect a significant threat to the continent’s traditional Christian culture. The Egyptian-born writer Bat Yeor has for some years referred to the rise of a new “Eurabia” that is hostile in equal measure to the United States and Israel. Two years ago, Pat Buchanan published an apocalyptic book, titled The Death of the West, prophesying that declining European fertility and immigration from Muslim countries could turn “the cradle of Western civilization” into “its grave.”

Such Spenglerian talk has gained credibility since 9/11. The 3/11 bombings in Madrid confirm that terrorists sympathetic to Osama bin Laden continue to operate with comparative freedom in European cities. Some American commentators suspect Europeans of wanting to appease radical Islam. Others detect in sporadic manifestations of anti-Semitism a sinister conjunction of old fascism and new fundamentalism.

Most European Muslims are, of course, law-abiding citizens with little sympathy for terrorist attacks on European cities. Moreover, they are drawn from a wide range of countries and Islamic traditions, few of them close to Arabian Wahhabism. Nevertheless, there is no question that the continent is experiencing fundamental demographic and cultural changes whose long-term consequences no one can foresee.

To begin with, consider the extraordinary prospect of European demographic decline. A hundred years ago—when Europe’s surplus population was still crossing the oceans to populate America and Australasia—the countries that make up today’s European Union accounted for around 14 percent of the world’s population. Today that figure is down to around 6 percent, and by 2050, according to a United Nations forecast, it will be just over 4 percent. The decline is absolute as well as relative. Even allowing for immigration, the United Nations projects that the population of the current European Union members will fall by around 7.5 million over the next 45 years. There has not been such a sustained reduction in the European population since the Black Death of the fourteenth century. (By contrast, the United States population is projected to grow by 44 percent between 2000 and 2050.)

With the median age of Greeks, Italians, and Spaniards projected to exceed 50 by 2050—roughly one in three people will be 65 or over—the welfare states created in the wake of World War II plainly require drastic reform. Either today’s newborn Europeans will spend their working lives paying 75 percent tax rates or retirement and “free” health care will simply have to be abolished. Alternatively (or additionally), Europeans will have to tolerate more legal immigration.

But where will the new immigrants come from? It seems very likely that a high proportion will come from neighboring countries, and Europe’s fastest-growing neighbors today are predominantly if not wholly Muslim. A youthful Muslim society to the south and east of the Mediterranean is poised to colonize—the term is not too strong—a senescent Europe.

This prospect is all the more significant when considered alongside the decline of European Christianity. In the Netherlands, Britain, Germany, Sweden, and Denmark today, fewer than 1 in 10 people now attend church once a month or more. Some 52 percent of Norwegians and 55 percent of Swedes say that God does not matter to them at all. Although the social and sexual freedoms that matter to such societies are antithetical to Muslim fundamentalism, their religious tolerance leaves these societies weak in the face of fanaticism.

What the consequences of these changes will be is very difficult to say. A creeping Islamicization of a decadent Christendom is one conceivable result: While the old Europeans get even older and their religious faith weaker, the Muslim colonies within their cities get larger and more overt in their religious observance. A backlash against immigration by the economically Neanderthal Right is another: Aging electorates turn to demagogues who offer sealed borders without explaining who exactly is going to pay for the pensions and health care. Nor can we rule out the possibility of a happy fusion between rapidly secularized second-generation Muslims and their post-Christian neighbors. Indeed, we may conceivably end up with all three: situation 1 in France, situation 2 in Austria, and situation 3 in Britain.

Still, it is hard not to be reminded of Gibbon—especially now that his old university’s Center for Islamic Studies has almost completed work on its new premises. In addition to the traditional Oxford quadrangle, the building is expected to feature “a prayer hall with traditional dome and minaret tower.”

When I first glimpsed a model of that minaret, I confess, the phrase that sprang to mind was indeed “decline and fall.”
http://nytimes.com/
JPTF 2007/07/11

Visões da "Eurabia" nas revistas britânicas The Economist e The Spectator (2006)

"Al-Qaeda ameaça retaliar o Reino Unido devido à condecoração de Salman Rushdie" in BBC News, 10 de Julho de 2007

Osama Bin Laden's deputy, Ayman al-Zawahiri, has threatened to retaliate against Britain for giving a knighthood to novelist Salman Rushdie. The 20-minute audiotape was posted on a website used by Islamic militants. A Downing Street spokesman said: "We will not allow terrorists to undermine the British way of life." Sir Salman's book The Satanic Verses sparked protests by Muslims around the world and led to Iran issuing a fatwa in 1989, ordering his execution. In a 20-minute recording, the al-Qaeda second-in-command said the group was preparing a "very precise response" to the British knighthood. Addressing Prime Minister Gordon Brown, Zawahiri said: "I say to Blair's successor that the policy of your predecessor drew catastrophes in Afghanistan and Iraq and even in the centre of London." In the speech, entitled Malicious Britain and its Indian Slaves, Zawahiri was quoted as warning Mr Brown: "If you did not learn the lesson then we are ready to repeat it, God willing, until we are sure you have fully understood." The former Egyptian surgeon, who is believed to be the architect of the al-Qaeda ideology, said Britain's award for Indian-born Sir Salman was an insult to Islam. The UK Foreign Office said in response to the tape that the author's knighthood was a reflection of his contribution to literature. "The government has already made clear that Rushdie's honour was not intended as an insult to Islam or the Prophet Muhammad," said a spokesman. The Foreign Office said it would maintain efforts to thwart terrorists. "We will continue to tackle the threat from international terrorism as a priority in order to prevent the risk of attacks on British interests at home and overseas, including from al-Qaeda," a spokesman said.
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/6289110.st
JPTF 2007/07/10