março 31, 2010

Eleições em Itália: Liga do Norte aumenta implantação no Piemonte e em Venezia


La Ligue du Nord, parti gouvernemental et parfois d’opposition, a fortement progressé lors des élections régionales italiennes (+134% en Vénétie). Elle va peser dans la coalition du gouvernement Berlusconi.

Longtemps considérée comme la lubie d’un homme politique fantasque, Umberto Bossi, la Padanie est devenue une réalité. Les élections régionales italiennes de dimanche et lundi ont donné lieu à un raz de marée de la Ligue du Nord. Quelques chiffres compilés par l’Istituto Cattaneo de Bologne suffisent à prendre la mesure du phénomène. Par rapport à 2005, le parti populiste fondé et dirigé par le Senaturfait une percée remarquable en Vénétie (+134%), dans le Piémont (+83%) et en Lombardie (+61%). Même dans des régions plutôt rouges comme l’Emilie-Romagne, elle fait un bond de 165%. Au plan national, la Ligue du Nord fait plus que doubler son score de 2005 et passe à 12,7% des suffrages.

Basculement au Piémont

Dans les treize régions où les Italiens votaient, le parti populiste qui est un allié important dans la coalition du gouvernement de Silvio Berlusconi, a obtenu 2,75 millions de voix contre 1,38 million en 2005. Ce triomphe offre pour la première fois à la Ligue du Nord deux présidences de région (Vénétie et Piémont).

Professeur d’histoire de la pensée politique à l’Université de Bologne, Carlo Galli relève que la victoire léguiste au Piémont, région ouvrière abritant le siège de Fiat, constitue un basculement majeur: «Cette région, dans laquelle se trouvait l’une des deux capitales de l’Italie, a échappé à la gauche pour tomber dans les mains de forces politiques qui n’ont pas la culture politique républicaine. A l’approche de l’anniversaire de l’Unité italienne (2011), le pays est en crise.» [...]

Ver notícia no jornal Le Temps

Cartoon de Hic para o jornal El Watan

março 29, 2010

‘Duplo atentado suicida no metro de Moscovo‘ in The Moscow Times


Two female suicide attackers hit Moscow's metro in coordinated rush-hour attacks Monday morning that left at least 38 people dead and more than 70 injured.

Federal Security Service director Alexander Bortnikov said the bombs were filled with bolts and iron rods. Many of the injured were reported to be in grave condition, making it likely that the death toll would rise.

The attack was the deadliest in the city in six years and the first to involve a double attack on the metro, resembling tactics commonly used by al-Qaida Muslim extremists.

Officials were quick to blame insurgents from the predominantly Muslim North Caucasus. "Preliminary evidence suggests that the attacks were carried out by terrorist groups linked to the North Caucasus," Bortnikov said at an emergency Kremlin meeting chaired by President Dmitry Medvedev.

He said the remains of two women found at the sites of the attacks pointed to suicide bombers.

No one had claimed responsibility for the attacks by Monday evening.

An emotional Medvedev promised mourners at the Lubyanka metro station, the site of the first explosion, on Monday evening that those responsible for the attacks would be killed.
"We'll find them, and we'll eliminate them all, the same way we eliminated everyone who organized the Nevsky Express explosion," he said.

Past Metro Bombings
Aug. 31, 2004: A female suicide bomber blows herself up outside the Rizhskaya station, killing 10 people. A little-known Islamic group supporting Chechen rebels claims responsibility. The woman's identity was never confirmed.

Feb. 6, 2004: A suicide bomber from the North Caucasus sets off explosives during morning rush hour on a train traveling between the Avtozavodskaya and Paveletskaya stations, killing more than 40 people
and wounding more than 100.

Feb. 5, 2001: Explosives placed under a bench on the platform of the Belorusskaya station go off, wounding 15 people.

Jan. 1, 1998: A homemade bomb explodes in a vestibule of the Tretyakovskaya station, wounding three people.

June 11, 1996: A homemade bomb explodes on a train in a tunnel between the Tulskaya and Nagatinskaya stations, killing four people. [...]

Ver notícia no The Moscow Times

março 28, 2010

‘Bruxelas escolheu Tripoli em vez de Berna‘ in Tribune de Genève


«Le réveil est dur pour la Suisse, parce l'Europe a fait son choix: entre Tripoli et Berne, elle a choisi Tripoli», estime le chercheur Hasni Abidi, spécialiste du monde arabe.

l réagit à la levée des restrictions à l'octroi de visas de la Libye et de l'Union européenne, annoncée hier.

«S'il n'y a pas de garantie pour le retour de Max Göldi, si son cas n'a pas été évoqué de manière sérieuse, et non pas seulement orale, lors des négociations, il s'agit d'un lâchage de l'Europe», estime M. Abidi, directeur du Centre d'études et de recherche sur le monde arabe et méditerranéen (CERMAM) à Genève.

Le chercheur fait allusion aux négociations menée par l'Allemagne et la présidence espagnole de l'Union européene (UE) pour résoudre la crise des visas, initiée par Berne en réaction à l'enlèvement par la police libyenne des deux Suisses retenus en Libye.

«J'ai été surpris par le communiqué de la présidence de l'UE. Ils sont allé au-delà de ce que les Libyens espéraient. Il y a des excuses, mais aussi l'engagement que cela ne se reproduira pas», s'étonne M. Abidi.

Le chercheur relève parallèlement que que le communiqué du Conseil fédéral cette semaine «était plutôt positif: 'nous sommes prêt à lever la liste (les 150 à 188 personnalités libyennes - selon les sources - interdits d'espace Schengen), si Tripoli laisse aux Européens l'accès au territoire libyen'», disait le texte des autorités helvétiques mercredi, «alors que la liste était déjà levée», souligne enore l'expert.

Enthousiasme prématuré
L'enthousiasme du président espagnol José Luis Rodriguez Zapatero et de la présidente de la Confédération Doris Leuthard vendredi était exagéré, juge encore l'expert. «Ils avaient oublié la capacité d'instrumentalisation politique de la part des Libyens».

Il ne faut toutefois pas se détourner de l'UE pour autant, la Suisse doit continuer de demander à Bruxelles ne pas l'abandonner. Berne a rendu service à l'UE en débloquant la «liste noire», au tour de l'Union d'aider la Suisse à aboutir la libération de son otage, ajoute Hasni Abidi.

Retenu depuis bientôt deux ans en Libye, Max Göldi est emprisonné près de Tripoli, où il purge une peine de quatre mois de prison pour «séjour illégal».

http://www.tdg.ch/bruxelles-choisi-tripoli-berne-2010-03-28

março 25, 2010

‘Como Kadhafi tem criado armadilhas à Suíça‘ in Tribune de Genève


Comment un régime autocratique comme celui du colonel Muammar Kadhafi parvient-il à déstabiliser une démocratie séculaire comme la Suisse et à semer la discorde entre les pays membres de l’Union européenne (UE)? C’est une des questions essentielles que pose la crise entre Berne et Tripoli. Personne n’aurait imaginé en été 2008 que l’arrestation du fils du «Frère Guide» aurait une portée européenne.

Plusieurs facteurs ont mené à l’impasse actuelle. Un choc culturel entre un régime autocratique à la logique clanique et une démocratie séculaire et paisible. Une Suisse divisée. Une guerre de succession à Tripoli.

Retour sur un fait divers qui s’est transformé en crise diplomatique internationale.

«Œil pour œil, dent pour dent!»
L’affaire Kadhafi n’a cessé de diviser les Suisses. Dès l’arrestation, le 15 juillet 2008, d’Hannibal et d’Aline Kadhafi, soupçonnés d’avoir maltraité des employés. Le couple est libéré sous caution deux jours plus tard. Les méthodes policières font d’emblée débat. Berne avait pourtant averti par courriel qu’étant donné les conséquences politiques éventuelles, les agents de police seraient bien inspirés de prendre «toutes les précautions d’usage lors de cette intervention». Ce qui ne fut pas fait, à en croire les conclusions du rapport du professeur Lucius Caflisch. Si aucun acte illégal n’a été commis, le couple a été traité de manière «inutilement humiliante» et le déploiement de 20 policiers est jugé «excessif». Alors que Berne admet que l’intervention aurait pu être plus nuancée, le Conseil d’Etat genevois refuse de s’excuser. Les classes politiques nationale et cantonale s’entre-déchirent. Berne et Genève se regardent en chien de faïence.

Le clan Kadhafi, pour sa part, fait front commun. Aicha, la sœur d’Hannibal, accourt à Genève et annonce le tarif: ce sera «œil pour œil, dent pour dent! Le plus injuste est celui qui a commencé!» [...]

Ver notícia no Tribune de Genève

Kadhafi: ‘Se a Suíça estivesse situada na nossa fronteira iríamos combate-la‘ in Le Temps


Extraits du discours de Mouammar Kadhafi à Benghazi diffusé sur Al-Jazira le 25 février 2010:

«Nous n’abandonnerons pas le djihad […] Le djihad est un devoir religieux et une [forme] d’autodéfense. C’est la défense de la religion, la lutte pour Allah, la défense du prophète Mahomet, du Coran, des mosquées, de la mosquée Al-Aqsa et de notre indépendance. Alors que le terrorisme, nous le rejetons tous. Nous rejetons également la confusion entre djihad et terrorisme. Cela doit être clair. Le terrorisme perpétré par Al-Qaida et par les escouades de la mort qu’Ayman Al-Zawahiri prétend diriger… est une forme de crime. C’est une maladie mentale […]

Quiconque détruit les mosquées d’Allah sous les yeux de musulmans mérite de voir lancé le djihad contre lui. Si la Suisse était située à notre frontière, nous la combattrions pour avoir détruit les mosquées d’Allah. Le djihad contre ceux qui détruisent les mosquées d’Allah et leurs minarets est le vrai djihad et non du terrorisme […]

Qu’est-ce que «mener le djihad avec ses biens et son âme»? […] C’est mener le djihad contre la Suisse, le sionisme et l’agression étrangère, avec ses biens si on ne peut le faire avec votre âme. Est-ce du terrorisme? Pas du tout.

Le [sens du mot] djihad doit être clair. Le combat sacré des Palestiniens, c’est du djihad. Ce n’est pas du terrorisme. De même que le ciel diffère de la terre, le combat des Palestiniens diffère du terrorisme […]

Tout musulman qui achète des produits suisses est un infidèle. Dites-le à tous les musulmans du monde […] La Suisse est un pays infidèle et immoral qui détruit les mosquées. Il faut déclarer le djihad contre la Suisse par tous les moyens possibles. Boycottez la Suisse, ses produits, ses avions, ses bateaux et ses ambassades. Boycottez cette communauté infidèle et immorale qui attaque les mosquées d’Allah […]

Ver notícia no Le Temps


março 22, 2010

‘Sondagens mostram que alemães se opõem à ajuda à Grécia‘ in Financial Times


Fierce German resistance to helping crisis-hit Greece has emerged in a Financial Times opinion poll that strengthens the hand of Angela Merkel, the chancellor, before a possible European showdown this week over financial aid for Athens.
Germans overwhelmingly opposed offering financial support to Greece as it struggles to control its public sector deficit and are strikingly more hostile than other Europeans, including the British, the FT/Harris poll showed. Almost a third of Germans believed Greece should be asked to leave the eurozone.
Further highlighting flagging support for the euro, some 40 per cent of Germans also thought Europe’s biggest economy would be better off outside the single currency – a significantly higher level of scepticism than in France, Spain or Italy.
The results follow a warning on Sunday by Ms Merkel against raising “false expectations” in financial markets of a eurozone bail-out package for Greece.
In an interview on German radio which appeared to put her at odds with José Manuel Barroso, European Commission president, she insisted that Greece had not asked for money and no decision had been taken.
[...]
Ver notícia no Financial Times

março 20, 2010

‘O momento da verdade para o euro‘ in Der Spiegel


Greece's financial difficulties have exposed numerous weaknesses which threaten Europe's common currency. Now, policy makers and economic experts are trying to find ways to stabilize the euro. Spiegel Online takes a look at the proposals.

French Economics Minister Christine Lagarde seems to be itching for a fight. At the beginning of the week, she triggered indignation in Berlin when she blasted Germany's trade surplus in an interview with the Financial Times. The fact that Germany exports more than it consumes domestically hurts the country's European neighbors, Lagarde griped.

On Wednesday, she added more fuel to the fire. Speaking to the French radio station RTL, she said that when an economic union such as the euro zone faces difficulties, "everyone" should contribute to the solution. Countries with a deficit, she said, ought to reduce it, while those with a trade surplus cannot "stand on only one leg." "For instance, perhaps Germany could reduce its taxes a little to stimulate domestic spending," the minister suggested.

Germany's Christian Democratic Chancellor Angela Merkel reacted coolly. "We will not give up our strengths in those areas where we are strong," she said in German parliament on Wednesday. The chancellor may have shown recent interest in the long-shunned concept of a "common economic government" for Europe. But she would like it to be pegged to Europe's economic success stories, not those countries which are lagging behind.

But it is precisely the less competitive countries that pose the biggest problem for the euro zone. The disastrous budget situation in Greece has highlighted the common currency's weaknesses in recent weeks and similar situations in Spain, Ireland, Italy or Portugal could aggravate the situation even further.

Competitive Discrepancies

Critics warn that the euro zone is about to face a crucial test. Since the introduction of the common currency, they argue, the countries within the zone have grown further and further apart instead of growing together into a single economic zone, partly because there are no longer any currency fluctuations to offset competitive discrepancies.

The community now consists of countries like Germany and Finland on the one side, with large current account surpluses, and countries like Greece and Portugal on the other, with massive deficits. The latter, unable to keep up with the continent's powerhouse economies, lived on credit for years, partly as a result of low interest rates.

The logical conclusion would be a common economic policy for the entire EU. But this is an idea that meets with fierce resistance, since hardly any country is willing to relinquish control over its own budgetary and industrial policies.

So what can the community do to avert crises like the one that happened in Greece in the future? What should happen in the event of the worst-case scenarios become reality? Spiegel Online clears up the most important questions surrounding the future of the Euro. [...] Ver notícia completa no Der Spiegel.

março 17, 2010

Cartoon de Chapatte para o International Herald Tribune

A Turquia quer projectar os seus interesses na Europa através da diáspora in Der Spiegel


Leaders of Turkish descent across Europe recently received an invitation to a fancy event in Istanbul, all expenses paid. But what sounded innocent enough appears to have been an attempt by Ankara to get members of the Turkish diaspora to represent Turkish interests abroad. Turkish-German politicians have reacted angrily to the brazen lobbying.

The invitation that numerous Turkish-German politicians received in February sounded enticing: Lunch in a five-star hotel in Istanbul, travel expenses included. The session was titled: "Wherever One of Our Compatriots Is, We Are There Too."

Around 1,500 people of Turkish descent from several European countries accepted the tempting offer. Among the speakers at the event, which took place at the end of February, were businesspeople, NGO representatives and a member of the Belgian parliament of Turkish descent. But the meeting, which has sparked outrage among Turkish-German politicians, was more than a harmless gathering of the Turkish diaspora.

The event was organized by the Turkish government, which is led by the conservative-religious Justice and Development (AKP) party, in an attempt to send a clear message to the participants that they should represent Turkey in other countries. Turks living abroad should take the citizenship of their new home country -- not, however, with the intention of becoming an integrated part of that society, but so they can become politically active, said Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who spoke at the event. Erdogan also compared Islamophobia with anti-Semitism in his speech and said that countries which oppose dual citizenship are violating people's fundamental rights. (Germany, for example, generally does not allow its citizens to hold dual nationality.)

'Crime Against Humanity'

Participants in the session told SPIEGEL ONLINE that the Turkish prime minister then repeated a sentence which had already sparked fierce criticism when he said it during a 2008 speech in Cologne: "Assimilation is a crime against humanity." And even stronger language was apparently used by one representative of the Turkish government. According to Ali Ertan Toprak, the vice chairman of the Alevi community in Germany, who was present at the lunch, one speaker went so far as to say: "We need to inoculate European culture with Turkish culture."

The language in the invitiations already suggested the attitude of the Turkish government toward Turkish-German politicians. Ankara perceives them as being its own. Invitations sent in the name of Turkish Labor Minister Faruk Celik to German Bundestag members were addressed as "my esteemed members of parliament" and Erdogan was referred to as "our prime minister."

Turkish-German politicians and religious representatives in Germany are now voicing sharp criticism of Ankara. "It was very clearly a lobbying event on the part of the Turkish government," said Toprak. He said that he himself was shocked about how openly the Turkish government had expressed its view that Germans of Turkish descent should represent Turkey's interests. "If members of the (conservative) Christian Democratic Union who oppose EU membership for Turkey had been there, they would have got a lot of material for their arguments," Toprak says.

Highly Problematic

Canan Bayram, a member of the Berlin state parliament, said she only attended the meeting because, as an integration spokeswoman for the Green Party in the city, she felt she needed to see what an event like this was like. Of course she covered her own travel and accommodation expenses, she said. "It was important to me that I make it clear that, as a member of a German state parliament, I do not allow the Turkish government to pay my expenses." Sirvan Cakici, a member of the Bremen state parliament for the Left Party who attended the Istanbul meeting, also emphasized that she paid for her expenses herself.

"The Turkish government should pay more attention to the interests of Turks in Turkey, rather than trying to exploit Turkish-Germans as their ambassadors," said Vural Öger, a former member of the European Parliament who was also at the lunch.

Other Turkish-German politicians turned down the invitation because they saw it as highly problematic right from the beginning. "It was clear that this was purely a lobbying event on the part of the Turkish government. As a German politician, I did not belong there," says Özcan Mutlu, a member of the Berlin state parliament for the Greens. "We are not an extended arm of the Turkish government." Memet Kilic, a member of the federal parliament with the Green Party, also declined to take part for similar reasons.

'Unacceptable'

It is not, in fact, the first time that the Turkish government has sought contact to Turkish-German politicians. After the 2009 parliamentary elections, Turkish-German Bundestag members received congratulatory calls from the AKP government. And in October 2009, the Turkish government invited German parliamentarians to an AKP party congress in Ankara.

Ekin Deligöz, a member of the Bundestag for the Greens, says she has in the past received numerous invitations from the Turkish government, which she has turned down out of principle. "I refuse to represent the interests of the Turkish government simply because I was born in Turkey."

Turkish-German politicians feel that, in principle, it is acceptable if the Turkish government tries to seek contact with Bundestag members of Turkish descent. "After all, we act as a kind of bridge," says Kilic. "It's the most normal thing in the world." He adds that it is "unacceptable," however, if Ankara openly says that politicians of Turkish descent should act as a mouthpiece for Turkish interests.

Sevim Dagdelen, a Bundestag member for the Left Party who turned down the invitation to attend the February event, talks of a "parallel foreign policy" on the part of the Turkish government. "I don't want to be part of it," she says. "I find it regrettable and cause for concern that other German politicians are apparently taking part."

http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,druck-684125,00.html

março 11, 2010

‘A Suécia vai reconhecer o genocídio arménio‘ in The Local


Though the motion to recognize the genocide of Armenians and other ethnic groups - Chaldeans, Syrians, Assyrians and Pontian Greeks - had the backing of members of five of the seven Swedish parliamentary parties, the vote's outcome was uncertain to the last as the parliamentary Committee on Foreign Affairs had recommended its rejection.

But with four centre-right politicians ignoring the recommendation and choosing to vote with the opposition, the resolution was eventually passed by a single vote.

Turkey immediately elected to recall its ambassador to Sweden, Zergün Korutürk, who said she was "very, very disappointed" by the vote.

"I'm disappointed and somewhat surprised because I expected the parliament to adopt the normal position that it is not the job of parliamentarians to decide whether or not a genocide has taken place.

"That is a questions for historians, and for researchers to examine before reaching a conclusion," she told news agency TT.

Zergün Korutürk added that Sweden and Turkey had enjoyed excellent relations over the last decade but that this was now certain to change.

"Everything is going to regress. This is going to have a drastic impact on our bilateral relations," she said.

Speaking to The Local prior to the vote, Left Party foreign policy spokesperson Hans Linde expressed his view that the time had come for Sweden to take a stand on the issue.

"Firstly, to hinder any repeat and to learn from history. Secondly, to encourage the development of democracy in Turkey - which includes dealing with their own history. Thirdly, to redress the wrongs committed against the victims and their descendants," Linde said.

The foreign affairs committee, in its comments on the motion, had argued for an open debate on the issue. It also stated that the persecution of the Armenians and other ethnic groups in 1915 would have constituted genocide according to the definition adopted by the United Nations in its 1948 genocide convention if it "had it been in force at the time."

But the committee stated that it does not consider it parliament's role to rule on human rights issues and that this should instead be addressed by "open research, open access to facts, and free debate."

Sweden's Minister of Foreign Affairs Carl Bildt agreed with the committee's position in comments on his blog on Thursday. Under the heading "Don't politicize history," Bildt wrote:

"A politicizing of history in this way risks undermining ongoing reconciliation processes, plays into the hands of those opposing normality in Armenia and reform in Turkey... and creating new tension in Swedish society."

The committee concluded in its comments that the Turkish government has in recent years made some movement on the issue, with conferences arranged on the subject as well as broader media debate.

The Swedish parliament has voted on the issue before, even approving a report in 2000 recognizing the disappearance of as many as 2.5 million Armenians, Chaldeans, Syrians, Assyrians and Pontian Greeks from April 1915 as genocide. But the recognition was later withdrawn "on a technicality", Hans Linde told The Local.

"The parliament also voted against recognition (by 245 to 37) in 2008. The difference this time is that the Social Democrats have changed their position," he said.

Carl Bildt claimed in his statement that the Social Democrat parliamentary group was forced to change standpoint on the issue as a result of a party congress vote, arguing that there are "several that feel deep unease over this."

According to Sweden's Living History Forum, most researchers are now in agreement that the massacres constituted genocide according to the accepted 1948 UN definition. The exception to this is Turkish researchers. The Turkish government has never recognized the events as a genocide and it is illegal in Turkey to claim that it occurred.

The Living History Forum is a Swedish public authority which works with issues on tolerance, democracy and human rights from both a national and international perspective.

The Local has made attempts to contact the foreign policy spokespersons at the Centre and Liberal (Folkpartiet) parties for a comment.

http://www.thelocal.se/25468/20100311/

março 04, 2010

‘Comissão do Congresso dos EUA reconhece o genocídio arménio‘ in BBC


A US congressional panel has described the killing of Armenians by Turkish forces during World War I as genocide, despite White House objections.

The resolution was narrowly approved by the House Foreign Affairs Committee.

Turkey, a key US ally, responded by recalling its ambassador in Washington for consultations. It has fiercely opposed the non-binding resolution.

The White House had warned that the vote would harm reconciliation talks between Turkey and Armenia.

The resolution calls on President Barack Obama to ensure that US foreign policy reflects an understanding of the "genocide" and to label the World War I killings as such in his annual statement on the issue.

It was approved by 23 votes to 22 by the committee.

Within minutes the Turkish government issued a statement condemning "this resolution which accuses the Turkish nation of a crime it has not committed".

The statement also said the Turkish ambassador was being recalled for consultations.

A Turkish parliamentary delegation had gone to Washington to try to persuade committee members to reject the resolution.

'Too important'

In 2007, a similar resolution passed the committee stage, but was shelved before a House vote after pressure from the George W Bush administration.

During his election campaign Mr Obama promised to brand the mass killings genocide.

Before the vote, committee chairman Howard Berman urged fellow members of the committee to endorse the resolution.

"I believe that Turkey values its relationship with the United States at least as much as we value our relations with Turkey," he said.

The Turks, he added, "fundamentally agree that the US-Turkish alliance is simply too important to get side-tracked by a non-binding resolution passed by the House of Representatives".

In October last year, Turkey and Armenia signed a historic accord normalising relations between them after a century of hostility.

Armenia wants Turkey to recognise the killings as an act of genocide, but successive Turkish governments have refused to do so.

Hundreds of thousands of Armenians died in 1915, when they were deported en masse from eastern Anatolia by the Ottoman Empire. They were killed by troops or died from starvation and disease.

Armenians have campaigned for the killings to be recognised internationally as genocide - and more than 20 countries have done so.

Turkish officials accept that atrocities were committed but argue they were part of the war and that there was no systematic attempt to destroy the Christian Armenian people.

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/8550765.stm

‘Alemanha aconselha Grécia a vender ilhas para saldar dívidas‘ in Diário Económico


"O Estado grego deve desprender-se de forma radical das suas participações em empresas e também vender terrenos, como por exemplo, as suas ilhas desabitadas", sugere Frank Schäffler, membro da comissão parlamentar de finanças, citado pelo jornal "Bild".

O liberal argumenta ainda que a chanceler Angela Merkel "não deve prometer ajudas" à Grécia.

A chanceler democrata-cristã reune-se amanhã em Berlim com o primeiro-ministro grego, Yorgos Papandreu, num encontro em que abordará a situação financeira da Grécia, entre outros assuntos.

Para o democrata-cristão Josef Schlarman, Atenas deve evitar a todo custo a falência, recorrendo, para isso, a qualquer medida que permita obter capital.

"A Grécia possui edifícios, empresas e ilhas desabitadas, que poderão ser usados para o pagamento das dívidas", afirma.

Atenas aprovou ontem um plano de choque com o qual pretende economizar aproximadamente 4,8 mil milhões de euros para sanear a economia grega, que já acumula uma dívida superior a 110% do Produto Interno Bruto (PIB) e um défice de 12,7%.

As medidas contempladas pelo Executivo grego incluem o congelamento de pensões, a redução de salários dos funcionários públicos e a subida de impostos.

http://economico.sapo.pt/noticias/alemanha-aconselha-grecia-a-vender-ilhas-para-saldar-dividas_83177.html

‘A república do medo na Turquia‘ in Wall Street Journal


por Soner Cagaptay

Last week's arrests in Turkey of dozens of high-ranking military officers mark the country's latest step toward authoritarianism. Neither Europe nor the United States can afford to ignore Turkey's transformation.

Since coming to power in 2002, the ruling Islamist Justice and Development Party (AKP) and ultra-conservative Fethullah Gulen Movement have gained significant leverage over the police and media. Emulating Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, the AKP has made selective use of the legal code to effectively silence the country's two largest independent media groups.

Dogan, which owns about half of the media outlets in the country, faces a record $3.5 billion fine on delayed tax payments. Liberal media mogul Mehmet Emin Karamehmet has been sentenced to 12 years in jail on charges related to dealings at his bank for which he was earlier acquitted. Editors now think twice before running stories critical of the government.

Until recently, the judiciary and the military were able to keep government excesses in check. That apparent equilibrium between Islamists and secularists was shattered a few weeks ago, when Gulenist papers published a 5,000-page memo allegedly written by military officers planning a coup.

U.S. diplomats I have talked to and Turkish analysts say that if the military really had planned to overthrow the government, it would have hardly written it down in a detailed 5,000 page document. The idea that the military would bomb Istanbul's historic mosques and shoot down its own planes to precipitate such a coup—as the alleged memo describes—is simply outlandish. The military denies any plans for toppling the government and says much of the document is actually taken from a 2003 war game exercise. It says that the incriminating elements detailing the alleged coup were added to the document.

For the past two years, the Turkish military has been the target of illegal wiretaps and accusations that it is plotting against the government. The question is whether the military will tolerate the assault or strike back, as it has done in the past when it thought the secular nature of the state was threatened.

The Islamist government has also targeted Turkey's other secular bastion—the judiciary. Last month, a Gulenist prosecutor arrested a secular prosecutor in Erzincan. He was officially charged with belonging to an ultranationalist gang known as Ergenekon, which the Gulenists and AKP claim is trying to overthrow the government. Whether that's true or not, there is no doubt the arrest solved a lot of problems for the government. Before his arrest, the Erzincan prosecutor was investigating alleged connections between Gulenist fund raising and Chechen and Hamas terrorists. He was also looking into the armed activities of Ismailaga, a radical Islamist movement.

The Gulenists and the AKP are further targeting the courts by appointing a disproportionate number of Gulenist jurists, thus eroding the secular nature of the judiciary. And the courts seem to have been wiretapped as well. According to media reports, the police have bugged over 130 top judges and prosecutors, as well as the high court of appeals. This is not that hard to believe, given that the justice minister admitted in 2009 that the police have wiretapped 70,000 people.

What is the way forward for Turkey? A military coup isn't the answer and a court ban against the AKP would likely backfire, boosting the party's popularity. The next general elections are scheduled for 2011, but by that time the cards might be stacked too much in favor of the governing parties. That's why the West should press for elections that are free and democratic. The next elections won't be fair if the Turkish media are not independent and if Turks fear that they live in a police state that wiretaps its judiciary and citizens.

Hoping to win Ankara's support for tougher Iran sanctions and more troops in Afghanistan, the U.S. and Europe have so far been hesitant to criticize the AKP-led government. The "pragmatists" fail to realize that an illiberal and Islamist Turkey will be increasingly opposed to Western policies.

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704187204575101820058883004.html

‘Geert Wilders vencedor nas eleições municipais holandesas‘ in NRC Handelsblad

In the first test of public opinion since the collapse of prime minister Jan Peter Balkenende's coalition government last month, Wilders's populist Party for Freedom (PVV) led in the city of Almere and was second in The Hague, the only two municipalities where Wilders chose to compete.

The fall of the Dutch cabinet and the upcoming campaign for parliamentary elections overshadowed Wednesday's municipal elections. The actual results for the nearly 400 municipal councils hardly seemed to matter. All interest was focused on the implications for the upcoming parliamentary race.

If voters had elected a new parliament on Wednesday, the PVV would have won between 24 and 27 seats in the 150 seat parliament. In one poll, it would be the largest single party.

That would make it tough for Balkenende's Christian democratic CDA to forge a strong coalition without Wilders. Months of talks between parties, and the resulting policy vacuum, could threaten a fragile economic recovery and cast doubt on the scope of planned budget cuts. Dutch coalition governments are usually made up of two or three parties, but polls show the next coalition will likely need four or more parties to reach a majority in parliament.

The popularity of Wilders, who compares Islam to fascism and the Koran to Adolf Hitler's book Mein Kampf, has dented the image of the Netherlands as a country that has often portrayed itself in the past as a bastion of tolerance.

"The leftist elite still believes in multi-culturalism, coddling criminals, a European super-state and high taxes," Wilders told cheering supporters at a rally in Almere after polling ended on Wednesday. "But the rest of the Netherlands thinks differently. That silent majority now has a voice," he said.

In Almere, the PVV won 21 percent of the vote to Labour's 18 percent, the preliminary results showed. In The Hague, the PVV had 8 seats -- second to Labour with 10 seats. After counting 93 percent of the votes, experts put turnout in the local elections at 56 percent.

Balkenende, now heading a caretaker government, saw his coalition collapse on February 20 after his centre-right CDA failed to persuade its Labour Party partners to extend the Netherlands' military mission in Uruzgan, Afghanistan. The 1,600 Dutch troops serving with Nato there are now likely to withdraw this year as planned.

Both CDA and Labour lost compared to the last local elections in 2006, but Labour appeared to have benefited from its stance over Afghanistan. "The Labour Party is back," party leader Wouter Bos told supporters. "We were declared dead and buried, but with our struggle, humility and ideals we have come back."

Besides Geert Wilders' party, the big winners in Wednesday's elections were right-wing liberals VVD and left-wing liberals D66.

http://www.nrc.nl/international/article2496799.ece/Geert_Wilders_is_major_winner_in_Dutch_polls

março 03, 2010

‘O pecado original da Europa‘ in Wall Street Journal


Europeans are blaming financial transactions arranged by Wall Street for bringing Greece to the brink of needing a bailout. But a close look at the country's finances over the nearly 10 years since it adopted the euro shows not only that Greece was the principal author of its debt problems, but also that fellow European governments repeatedly turned a blind eye to its flouting of rules.

Though the European Commission and the U.S. Federal Reserve are examining a controversial 2001 swap arranged with Goldman Sachs Group Inc., Greece's own budget moves, in clear breach of European Union rules, dwarfed the effect of such deals.

Predicaments of the sort Greece is facing—years of overspending, leaving bond investors worried the country can't pay back its debts—weren't supposed to happen in the euro zone. Early on, countries made a pact aimed at preventing a free-spending state from undermining the common currency. The pact required countries adopting the euro to limit annual budget deficits to 3% of gross domestic product, and total government debt to 60% of GDP.

But an examination of budget reports to the EU shows Greece hasn't met the deficit rule in any year except 2006. It has never been within 30 percentage points of the debt ceiling.

Greece has revised its deficit figures, always upward, every year since 1997—often considerably. Several times, the final figure was quadruple what was first reported. Late last year, the Greek government set in motion its current crisis by increasing its 2009 budget-deficit estimate, initially 3.7% of GDP, to nearly 13% of GDP.

Those revisions far exceed the impact of controversial derivative transactions Greece used to help mask the size of its debt and deficit numbers. The 2001 currency-swap deal arranged by Goldman trimmed Greece's deficit by about a 10th of a percentage point of GDP for that year. By comparison, Greece failed to book €1.6 billion ($2.2 billion) of military expenses in 2001—10 times what was saved with the swap, according to Eurostat, the EU's statistics authority.

The Greek problem has shown that EU financial institutions don't have enough teeth or expertise to rein in renegade member states, said Jean-Pierre Jouyet, chairman of France's stock-market watchdog and former chief of staff to a president of the European Commission, Jacques Delors. "We need new tools to manage these disequilibriums, because a pact without sanctions is not enough," said Mr. Jouyet.

Constantine Papadopoulos, secretary-general for international economic affairs at the Greek foreign ministry, said Greece entered the euro zone legitimately. "The notion that Greece 'cheated' to get into the euro zone is one of those notions that has stuck in people's minds in Europe and, being the well-crafted piece of propaganda that it is, is extremely difficult to reverse," he said.

Mr. Papadopoulos, a member of the now-ruling Socialist party, said most of the revisions took place because an incoming New Democracy government in 2004 retrospectively revised the way it dealt with military spending. That, he said, had an impact on the recorded budget deficit for the past years of the Socialist government. But Eurostat deemed those revisions necessary, since Greece had "widely underestimated" its military spending.

The Aegean country wasn't alone in breaking the euro zone's rules: A majority of other euro-zone members also failed to meet the debt and deficit requirements at least once over several years, the reports show.

The euro's launch, with 11 founding members in 1999 and Greece joining 18 months later, amounted to a deliberate political gesture by European leaders: Membership in the fledgling currency should be as broad as possible. Italy and Belgium were allowed in with the first group despite well exceeding the debt threshold—a decision that spurred some controversy.

Bringing in Greece, the ancient "cradle of democracy," was symbolically important. In any case, by the late 1990s Greece was being billed as a great economic turnaround story and few eyebrows were raised.

Greece's current crisis—which has weakened the euro and sown concerns about the debt levels of some other European countries—shows Europe's political ambitions for a broad euro are clashing with economic realities. It also suggests Greece's economic success was partly a mirage created by misreported economic statistics.

This is a consequence of a weakness that economists and historians say was built into the common currency at birth: the lack of a coordinated fiscal policy to go with monetary union. From the beginning, the euro has been replete with unresolved tensions, says David Marsh, author of "The Euro," a 2009 book chronicling the birth of the currency. The currency union was seen by some politicians as a way to pull the EU toward political union; others, mainly in Germany, emphasized the need for fiscal and monetary rectitude.

Once a country is in the currency, little can be done to a wayward member because the euro's architects built in no real means of enforcement.

That's in part because of a compromise made in a 1996 European summit in Dublin that placed the decision whether to levy fines on errant governments with other EU governments. That was a victory for Jacques Chirac, then French president, over German Chancellor Helmut Kohl, who wanted the fines to be automatic. Since then no country has been fined.

Willem Buiter, chief economist at Citigroup and a former member of the Monetary Policy Committee of the Bank of England, described the 1996 agreement aimed at enforcing the debt and deficit rules as "a paper tiger."

"It is ineffective, because for a while it created the illusion that there were sticks and carrots capable of changing the fiscal behavior of the member states, when in reality there were neither," he wrote in a new research report.

The lax attitude to fiscal rules began early. Eager to get the euro in place in the late 1990s, EU leaders decided 1997 would be the key year. If everyone could meet the targets for that year, the currency could be launched.

The 60% debt goal was simply out of reach—Belgium, for instance, had debt equaling 131% of GDP in 1995. The countries agreed excess debt was acceptable, so long as it appeared to be shrinking. (The euro zone as a whole has never met the 60% debt limit.)

Instead, Europe tried to stand firm on the annual deficits. That triggered a busy year of one-off boosts to government coffers. Countries sold mobile-phone spectrum licenses. France got a payment of more than €5 billion for assuming future pension obligations from the soon-to-be-privatized France Télécom. Germany tried, but failed, to revalue its gold reserves.

Buoyed by these maneuvers—and helped by the tech boom—11 of the 12 countries made the 3% goal for 1997. With much fanfare, the euro was born as the clock ticked from 1998 to 1999, though notes and coins didn't begin circulating for another three years.

With much less fanfare, countries later revised their numbers: Of the original 11 entrants that qualified on the basis of their 1997 data, three—Spain, France and Portugal—later revised their 1997 deficit figures to above 3%. France's budget revision, to 3.3%, wasn't made until 2007.

Greece didn't make the first wave. Its 4.0% deficit in 1997 missed by too much. Even then, technocrats doubted Greek statistics. But in late 1999, eager to keep the euro zone on track, the EU overlooked those concerns. The figures for 1998 appeared better, and European governments agreed that Greece had met the fiscal goals.

They cited a cut in its deficit to 2.5% of GDP in 1998 and a projection of 1.9% for 1999, and saluted Greece for reducing its debt. "The deficit was below the Treaty reference value in 1998 and is expected to remain so in 1999 and decline further in the medium term," the governments proclaimed in December 1999.

None of that turned out to be true. In March 2000, Eurostat said a new accounting standard pushed Greece's 1998 deficit up to 3.2%. Later, in a 2004 report, Eurostat added nearly €2 billion to the original 1998 deficit—largely because Greece had wrongly deemed subsidies to state entities as equity purchases, a device Portugal would later use. In the end, the 1998 figure stood at 4.3%, well above the euro-zone entry criterion.

It got worse. Eurostat found that Greece barely recorded any expenditure on military equipment for years, routinely overestimated tax collections, didn't record hospital costs in the state health system and counted EU subsidies to private entities in Greece as government revenue.

In the face of an economic downturn, others joined the Greeks. France and Germany breached the deficit limit in 2002, 2003 and 2004, setting the example that even the bloc's economic powerhouses didn't have to play by the rules. In 2003, the Netherlands and Italy did too. "When Germany and France got into difficulty, there was not a strong reaction from the European Union," says Jean-Luc Dehaene, a former Belgian prime minister. Finance ministers decided on the response, and "they tend to make a political decision," he says.

Of the 12 early members of the euro, all but Belgium, Luxembourg and Finland have overrun the budget rule at least once. Finally, under political pressure, the norms were softened in 2005 to allow the deficit limit to be breached in an economic downturn.

That was after the tragicomic tale of Greece's 2003 deficit. In March 2004, Greece reported that its 2003 deficit had been €2.6 billion, or 1.7% of GDP. Eurostat put in a footnote calling the figure "provisional," but it was still well below the euro-zone average of 2.7%.

Any Greek celebration was short-lived. Two months later, under pressure from Eurostat, Greece put out new figures. The 2003 deficit was now 3.2%, thanks in part to overestimated tax receipts and EU subsidies. Four months after that, it was up to 4.6%: Greece had failed to include some military expenses, overestimated a social-security surplus, and low-balled its interest expenses. Another revision in March 2005 kicked it up to 5.2%. Later that year, it became 5.7%. What had been reported 18 months earlier as an €2.6 billion deficit was now €8.8 billion.

In short, says Vassilis Monastiriotis of the London School of Economics, Greece "failed to internalize the logic of the euro zone—which is fiscal discipline.

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704548604575097800234925746.html?mod=WSJEUROPE_hpp_LEFTTopStories