‘Uma resposta exagerada: Israel cai na armadilha‘ in Der Spiegel

The pro-Palestinian organizers had described the fleet with which they had hoped to break through the Israeli sea blockade of the Gaza Strip on Monday morning as a "humanitarian aid convoy." But as the Israeli army stormed the largest ship, the Mavi Marmara, the activists they encountered were in no way exclusively docile peaceniks. Some of the "peace activists" received the Israelis with crow bars and sling shots. Some of the self-professed

"human rights activists" reportedly even tore the weapons from soldiers and began to shoot.

That's not what a peaceful protest looks like.

But the reaction from Israel, a state which proclaims to adhere to the rule of law, was far from appropriate. Regardless how prepared to engage in violence the organizers of the ship convoy might have been: With at least 15 dead, all on the side of the activists, and more than 30 injured, some seriously, one thing is certain: Israel carelessly threw one of the most important principles of the application of military violence overboard: the proportionality of military force. [...]

Ver comentário completo no Der Spiegel

http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,697834,00.html

Leituras: ‘Um Mundo Sem Europeus‘ de Henrique Raposo

‘Tensões na Coreia: a responsabilidade da China‘ in Guardian

Relations between the two Koreas are at their worst for decades. The North says it has abrogated its non-aggression agreement with the South, trade links have been cut, shipping lanes closed, and the armed forces of both sides are on alert. The United States and South Korea are to conduct joint exercises, the traditional signal of readiness to act together in the event of real hostilities. Since a South Korean warship sank in March, almost certainly after being hit by a North Korean torpedo, the North has not offered a convincing denial of responsibility, nor an explanation, nor an apology. Now comes this tirade of threats and accusations.

If the incident was the result of an act of insubordination by a junior or a senior officer, or group of officers, that might have been privately conveyed to South Korea, but no such message has been passed on. Yet the idea that the Northern leadership ordered the attack is hard to accept, since the regime's decisions have always in the past had an element of rationality. In this case, nobody can discern what North Korean purpose the attack could possibly serve. While we do not understand the origins of this sudden deterioration, the consequence is clearer. Outside powers must restrain the parties, and, in particular, China must restrain North Korea, since it is the only country that has any real leverage in Pyongyang.

While Hillary Clinton got no public commitment of that kind during her talks in Beijing, it seems likely the Chinese will indeed apply some pressure. But Sino-American co-operation is not full-hearted, since the two countries differ so profoundly on the future of the Korean peninsula. Kim Jong-il is ageing and ailing. Change, possibly of the terminal kind, cannot be that far away. There is no international plan for dealing with the collapse of the regime, should that take place, and, equally, there is no consensus on how to cope should it survive in more or less its present form. China may well think its interests are best served by the continued division of the peninsula, while the US, Japan and other American allies would want a reunification dominated by the more successful and prosperous South. China is believed to have made preparations for putting in troops, while there are no doubt also some American military plans to go with sketchy ideas about a UN-brokered transition and reunification, but there has been no co-ordination.

This is a very feeble framework within which to contain one of the most volatile relationships on the planet. Beyond the immediate crisis, there is an urgent need to achieve a greater degree of international agreement on how to deal with dramatic and unsettling events that may be just around the corner.

http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2010/may/26/south-north-korea-china-editorial

Leituras: ‘A Fuga dos Intelectuais‘ de Paul Berman

‘O acordo nuclear do Irão levanta receios‘ in Wall Street Journal

A new Iranian offer to ship out about half of its nuclear fuel—in a surprise deal brokered by Brazil and Turkey—posed a fresh obstacle to U.S.-led efforts to punish Iran for its nuclear program, and underlined U.S. difficulties in affirming its global leadership amid the assertiveness of smaller powers.

Tehran agreed to the proposal during a weekend meeting between President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and the leaders of Turkey and Brazil—two developing economies aiming to wield more clout on the diplomatic stage, often by opposing the U.S. "Diplomacy emerged victorious," Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva said on Brazilian radio. "It showed that it is possible to build peace and development with dialogue."

The Obama administration said it had "serious concerns" about the new offer, a weaker version of one that Iran negotiated last October with a broader group of countries to avoid sanctions—but which Tehran's government declined to approve.

For instance, in the previous agreement Iran would have halted its efforts to enrich uranium to a level of more than 3%-4%. In the new offer, Iran isn't called upon to stop its higher enrichment, now at 20%. (Weapons-grade uranium is enriched to 90%.) Though Iran would still ship out the same amount of fuel to be enriched elsewhere for its use in medical research, it has more of the fuel now—so it would keep more.

U.S. and European diplomats worried Tehran's renewed fuel-swap plan could upend progress toward enacting new sanctions on Iran's program through the United Nations Security Council.

Iran "must demonstrate through deeds—and not simply words—its willingness to live up to international obligations or face consequences, including sanctions," White House spokesman Robert Gibbs said in a statement.

Ver notícia no Wall Street Journal

A crise do euro neutralizada, cartoon de Bertrams

‘Combatendo os ciber belicistas‘ in Wall Street Journal

A recent simulation of a devastating cyberattack on America was crying for a Bruce Willis lead: A series of mysterious attacks—probably sanctioned by China but traced to servers in the Russian city of Irkutsk—crippled much of the national infrastructure, including air traffic, financial markets and even basic email. If this was not bad enough, an unrelated electricity outage took down whatever remained of the already unplugged East Coast.

The simulation—funded by a number of major players in network security, organized by the Bipartisan Policy Center, a Washington-based think tank, and broadcast on CNN on a Saturday night—had an unexpected twist. The American government appeared incompetent, indecisive and confused (past government officials, including former Secretary of Homeland Security Michael Chertoff and former Deputy Secretary of State John Negroponte, were recruited to play this glamorous role on TV). "The U.S. is unprepared for cyberwar," the simulation's organizers grimly concluded.

The past few months have been packed with cyber-jingoism from former and current national security officials. Richard Clarke, a former cybersecurity adviser to two administrations, says in his new book that "cyberwar has already begun." Testifying in Congress in February, Mike McConnell, former head of the National Security Agency, argued that "if we went to war today in a cyberwar, we would lose." Speaking in late April, Director of Central Intelligence Leon Panetta said that "the next Pearl Harbor is likely to be a cyberattacking going after our grid."

The murky nature of recent attacks on Google—in which someone tricked a Google employee into opening a malicious link that eventually allowed intruders to access parts of Google's password-managing software, potentially compromising the security of several Chinese human rights activists—has only added to public fears. If the world's most innovative technology company cannot protect its computers from such digital aggression, what can we expect from the bureaucratic chimera that is the Department of Homeland Security? [...]

Ver notícia integral no Wall Street Journal

Leituras: ‘Ciberguerra‘ de Richard A. Klark e Robert K. Knake

O uso do PowerPoint está a empobrecer o pensamento estratégico? ‘Quando percebermos isto a guerra está ganha‘ in New York Times

O mês passado, em Cabul, mostraram ao general Stanley McChrystal, chefe das forças dos EUA e da OTAN no Afeganistão, um diapositivo PowerPoint que pretendia representar a complexidade da estratégia militar dos EUA. Parecia uma tigela com esparguete.

"Quando percebermos esse diapositivo, a guerra está ganha", observou McChrystal secamente. A sala desatou a rir.

Depois deste episódio o diapositivo andou de mão em mão na internet como exemplo de ferramenta militar fora de controlo. Pela calada, como um rebelde, o PowerPoint insinuou-se no dia-a-dia dos comandantes militares, atingindo o nível de uma quase obsessão. A quantidade de tempo gasto com o PowerPoint - o programa de apresentação de diapositivos da Microsoft que gera tabelas, gráficos e identificadores de enumerações - tornou-o uma anedota constante no Pentágono, mas também no Iraque e no Afeganistão.

"O PowerPoint torna-nos estúpidos", declarou este mês, numa conferência militar realizada na Carolina do Norte, o general Games Matais, do corpo de fuzileiros e comandante das forças conjuntas (que falou sem recorrer ao PowerPoint). O general de brigada H. R. Mimastes, que proibiu as apresentações em PowerPoint quando chefiou a campanha, bem-sucedida, para tomar a cidade e Tal Afar, no Norte do Iraque, em 2005, falou nos mesmos moldes, equiparando o PowerPoint a uma ameaça interna.

"É perigoso porque pode levar-nos a imaginar que compreendemos e dá a ilusão de domínio", disse McMaster numa entrevista telefónica pouco depois. "Nem todos os problemas do mundo se podem resolver com marcas de enumeração."

Na perspectiva de McMaster, o maior defeito do PowerPoint não são imagens como a do esparguete (divulgada pela primeira vez por Richard Engel, da NBC), mas sim as listas rígidas com marcas de enumeração (por exemplo, numa apresentação sobre as causas de um conflito), que não têm em conta a interligação das vertentes política, económica e étnica. "Se isolarmos uma guerra de tudo isso, ela torna-se um mero exercício de tiro ao alvo", diz McMaster.

Os comandantes dizem que por detrás das piadas sobre o PowerPoint estão graves preocupações com a responsabilidade do programa no enfraquecimento do debate e do pensamento crítico e na falta de ponderação de muitas decisões. Além disso, o programa empata os oficiais de patente inferior - conhecidos por PowerPoint Rangers - na preparação quotidiana de diapositivos, sejam para uma reunião do estado-maior general em Washington, sejam para que um comandante de pelotão os apresente num plano de combate preparatório de uma operação num local remoto do Afeganistão.

O ano passado, quando um website militar - o Company Command - perguntou a um comandante de pelotão do Exército no Iraque, o tenente Sam Nuxoll, em que passava a maior parte do tempo, ele respondeu, "a fazer diapositivos em PowerPoint". Quando o website insistiu para obter uma resposta, o tenente garantiu que falava a sério.

"Tenho de fazer um storyboard, apoiado por imagens digitais, diagramas e resumos de texto, sobre praticamente tudo o que acontece", contou Nuxoll ao website. "Para organizar uma acção-chave há um storyboard; para conceder um micro-subsídio, há um storyboard."

Apesar dos relatos deste tipo, a "morte por PowerPoint", expressão utilizada para descrever a sensação de entorpecimento provocada por um briefing com 30 diapositivos, parece ter vindo para ficar. O programa, que foi disponibilizado ao público pela primeira vez em 1987 e foi comprado pela Microsoft pouco depois, está profundamente enraizado na cultura militar, que passou a depender do PowerPoint para conferir ordem hierárquica a um mundo conturbado.

"Há muita resistência ao PowerPoint, mas não me parece que vá ser descartado nos tempos mais próximos", diz o capitão Crispin Burke, oficial de operações do exército em Fort Drum (Nova Iorque), que, com o pseudónimo Starbuck, escreveu um artigo sobre o PowerPoint no website Small Wars Journal em que citava o comentário de Nuxoll.

Durante uma chamada telefónica diurna, disse calcular que todos os dias passava uma hora a fazer diapositivos em PowerPoint. Numa primeira mensagem de correio electrónico, respondendo a um pedido de entrevista, escreveu: "Poderia estar livre hoje à noite, mas tenho de trabalhar até tarde (para mal dos meus pecados, a fazer diapositivos PPT)."

O secretário da Defesa Robert Gates passa em revista diapositivos PowerPoint impressos nas reuniões de comando matinais, embora insista em recebê-los de véspera, de maneira a poder lê-los com antecedência e reduzir o tempo dos briefings.

O general David Petraeus, responsável pela supervisão das guerras no Iraque e no Afeganistão, diz que assistir a briefings com PowerPoint é "pura agonia", apesar de gostar do programa por causa dos mapas e das estatísticas que mostram tendências. Ele próprio já fez umas quantas apresentações apoiadas em PowerPoint.

Em Cabul, McChrystal recebe dois briefings em PowerPoint por dia e mais três durante a semana. Mattis, apesar da sua visão crítica do programa, diz que um terço dos seus briefings são feitos com o PowerPoint.

Richard Holbrooke, representante especial da administração Obama para o Afeganistão e para o Paquistão, recebeu briefings em PowerPoint durante uma deslocação ao Afeganistão no Verão passado em três locais onde esteve - Kandahar, Mazar-i-Sharif e Base Aérea Bagram. Num quarto local, Herat, as forças italianas aí estacionadas não só brindaram Holbrooke com um briefing em PowerPoint como o acompanharam de um arrebatador tema orquestral.

No Outono passado, por ocasião da reapreciação da estratégia para o Afeganistão, realizada na sala de crise da Casa Branca, foram apresentados ao presidente Barack Obama diapositivos em PowerPoint, na sua maioria mapas e gráficos.

Os comandantes militares dizem que os diapositivos veiculam menos informações que as que podem ser incluídas contidas num relatório de cinco páginas e que dispensam o relator de polir a respectiva redacção de maneira a transmitir o seu teor de maneira analítica e convincente. Imagine-se os advogados a apresentarem os seus argumentos perante o Supremo Tribunal em diapositivos em vez de em relatórios jurídicos.

O ensaio de Burke publicado no Small Wars Journal citava também um ataque, muito divulgado, ao PowerPoint publicado na "Armed Forces Journal" o Verão passado, da autoria de Thomas Hammes, coronel dos fuzileiros na reforma, cujo título, "Marcas de enumeração imbecilóides", reforçava as críticas ao carácter vago das marcas de enumeração: "Acelerar a disponibilização de novas armas", por exemplo, não diz de facto quem as deve disponibilizar.

Ninguém pretende dizer que a culpa dos erros cometidos nas guerras em curso é do PowerPoint, mas o facto é que o programa se tornou famoso durante a preparação da invasão do Iraque. Como o livro "Fiasco", de Thomas Ricks (ed. Penguin Press, 2006) conta, o general David McKiernan, que chefiou as forças terrestres aliadas durante a invasão do Iraque em 2003, ficou frustrado por não conseguir que o general Tommy Franks, ao tempo comandante das forças dos EUA estacionadas no golfo Pérsico, desse ordens que indicassem explicitamente como queria que a invasão fosse conduzida e porquê. Em vez disso, o general Franks limitou-se a passar a McKiernan os vagos diapositivos PowerPoint que já mostrara a Donald Rumsfeld, o secretário da Defesa da altura.

Os oficiais superiores dizem que o programa é muito útil sempre que o objectivo seja não dar informações, como é o caso dos briefings destinados a repórteres.

As sessões de comunicação à imprensa são geralmente de 25 minutos, com cinco minutos no fim destinados a perguntas de quem ainda esteja acordado. Esse tipo de apresentações PowerPoint, diz Hammes, são conhecidas como "hipnotização de galinhas".

Ver artigo original do New York Times e a tradução publicada pelo Jornal i

‘Fantasmas ocidentais‘ cartoon de Herrmann

O que deveria ser o novo mapa da Europa in Economist

People who find their neighbours tiresome can move to another neighbourhood, whereas countries can’t. But suppose they could. Rejigging the map of Europe would make life more logical and friendlier.

Britain, which after its general election will have to confront its dire public finances, should move closer to the southern-European countries that find themselves in a similar position. It could be towed to a new position near the Azores. (If the journey proves a bumpy one, it might be a good opportunity to make Wales and Scotland into separate islands).

In Britain’s place should come Poland, which has suffered quite enough in its location between Russia and Germany and deserves a chance to enjoy the bracing winds of the North Atlantic and the security of sea water between it and any potential invaders.

Belgium’s incomprehensible Flemish-French language squabbles (which have just brought down a government) are redolent of central Europe at its worst, especially the nonsenses Slovakia thinks up for its Hungarian-speaking ethnic minority. So Belgium should swap places with the Czech Republic. The stolid, well-organised Czechs would get on splendidly with their new Dutch neighbours, and vice versa. [...]

Ver artigo no Economist

Leituras polémicas: ‘O Crepúsculo de um Ídolo. A Fabulação Freudiana‘

Votação do acordo com a Rússia sobre a frota no Mar Negro gera ‘caos no parlamento da Ucrânia‘ in BBC

Chaos has erupted in the Ukrainian parliament during a debate over the extension of the lease on a Russian naval base in Ukraine.

The chamber's speaker had to be shielded by umbrellas as he was pelted with eggs, while smoke bombs exploded and politicians brawled.

But the debate continued and the chamber ratified the lease extension.

Kiev has prolonged the lease on the Sevastopol base by 25 years in return for cheaper supplies of Russian gas.

The deal, which came amid rapidly improving ties between Russia and Ukraine following the election of Ukraine's pro-Russian President Viktor Yanukovych in February, has been bitterly opposed by Ukrainian pro-Western opposition politicians [...].

Ver notícia na BBC

‘Economia portuguesa: a importância de não ser a Grécia‘ in Economist

Forget slogans about golden beaches or vinho verde. What the Portuguese government wants the world to know is simpler: Portugal is not Greece. Far from having the next sovereign-debt crisis, as predicted by several economists, politicians are painting Portugal as a well-behaved member of the euro, in no way comparable to wayward, mendacious Greece.

Portugal is doing better than Greece in its budget deficit (9.4% of GDP in 2009, compared with 12.7%) and public debt (85% of GDP this year, against 124% in Greece). Unlike Greece, its public accounts are credible and it has a record of taking tough fiscal measures when necessary—between 2005 and 2007, it cut its budget deficit in half, from 6.1% of GDP to 2.6%. A four-year austerity programme to chop the budget deficit again, this time to 2.8% of GDP in 2013, has been adopted.

Again unlike Greece, the centre-left government of José Sócrates is a pioneer of reform. It has linked pensions to changes in life expectancy and introduced incentives for later retirement. According to the European Commission, age-related public spending will rise by only 2.9% of GDP in Portugal over the next 50 years, compared with a euro-area average of 5.1% and a startling 16% in Greece. Despite some public-sector protests, opposition to spending cuts is less noisy than in Greece.

So why are markets fretting over Lisbon’s debt burden (yields on two-year bonds have risen to 4.8%)? And why have such figures as Simon Johnson, a former IMF chief economist, and Nouriel Roubini, a New York economics professor once labelled Dr Doom, said that a Greek-style crisis could infect Portugal? [...]

Ver artigo no Economist

Leituras: Politicamente correcto. Uma História Semântica e de Cultura, de Geoffrey Hughes

‘Confusos sobre o Irão‘ in Washington Post

Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates was the focus of one of those curious Washington kerfuffles over the weekend in which a senior official makes headlines by saying what everyone knows to be true. According to the New York Times, Mr. Gates dispatched a secret memo to the White House in January pointing out that the Obama administration does not have a well-prepared strategy in place for the likely eventuality that Iran will continue to pursue a nuclear weapon and will not be diverted by negotiations or sanctions. Mr. Gates quickly denied that his memo was intended as a "wake-up call," as one unnamed official quoted by the Times called it. And that's probably true: It is evident to any observer that the administration lacks a clear backup plan.

President Obama's official position is that "all options are on the table," including the use of force. But senior officials regularly talk down the military option in public -- thereby undermining its utility even as an instrument of intimidation. Adm. Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, offered more reassurance to Iran on Sunday, saying in a forum at Columbia University that "I worry . . . about striking Iran. I've been very public about that because of the unintended consequences."

Adm. Mullen appeared to equate those consequences with those of Iran obtaining a weapon. "I think Iran having a nuclear weapon would be incredibly destabilizing. I think attacking them would also create the same kind of outcome," he was quoted as saying. Yet Israel and other countries in the region would hardly regard those "outcomes" as similar.

We are not advocating strikes against Iranian nuclear facilities. But the public signs of the administration's squishiness about military options are worrisome because of the lack of progress on its two-track strategy of offering negotiations and threatening sanctions. A year-long attempt at engagement failed; now the push for sanctions is proceeding at a snail's pace. Though administration officials say they have made progress in overcoming resistance from Russia and China, it appears a new U.N. sanctions resolution might require months more of dickering. Even then it might only be a shell intended to pave the way for ad hoc actions by the United States and European Union, which would require further diplomacy.

And what would sanctions accomplish? Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton told the Financial Times last week that "maybe . . . that would lead to the kind of good-faith negotiations that President Obama called for 15 months ago." Yet the notion that the hard-line Iranian clique now in power would ever negotiate in good faith is far-fetched. More likely -- and desirable -- would be a victory by the opposition Green movement in Iran's ongoing domestic power struggle. But the administration has so far shrunk from supporting sanctions, such as a gasoline embargo. that might heighten popular anger against the regime.

All this probably explains why Mr. Gates, in his own words, "presented a number of questions and proposals intended to contribute to an orderly and timely decision making process."

"There should be no confusion by our allies and adversaries," he added, "that the United States is . . . prepared to act across a broad range of contingencies in support of our interests." If allies and adversaries are presently confused, that would be understandable.

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/04/19/AR2010041904363_pf.html

‘O próximo problema global: Portugal‘, por Peter Boone e Simon Johnson

The bailout of Greece, while still not fully consummated, has brought an eerie calm in European financial markets.

It is, for sure, a huge bailout by historical standards. With the planned addition of International Monetary Fund money, the Greeks will receive 18 percent of their gross domestic product in one year at preferential interest rates. This equals 4,000 euros per person, and will be spent in roughly 11 months.

Despite this eye-popping sum, the bailout does nothing to resolve the many problems that persist. Indeed, it probably makes the euro zone a much more dangerous place for the next few years.

Next on the radar will be Portugal. This nation has largely missed the spotlight, if only because Greece spiraled downward. But both are economically on the verge of bankruptcy, and they each look far riskier than Argentina did back in 2001 when it succumbed to default.

Portugal spent too much over the last several years, building its debt up to 78 percent of G.D.P. at the end of 2009 (compared with Greece’s 114 percent of G.D.P. and Argentina’s 62 percent of G.D.P. at default). The debt has been largely financed by foreigners, and as with Greece, the country has not paid interest outright, but instead refinances its interest payments each year by issuing new debt. By 2012 Portugal’s debt-to-G.D.P. ratio should reach 108 percent of G.D.P. if the country meets its planned budget deficit targets. At some point financial markets will simply refuse to finance this Ponzi game.

The main problem that Portugal faces, like Greece, Ireland and Spain, is that it is stuck with a highly overvalued exchange rate when it is in need of far-reaching fiscal adjustment.

For example, just to keep its debt stock constant and pay annual interest on debt at an optimistic 5 percent interest rate, the country would need to run a primary surplus of 5.4 percent of G.D.P. by 2012. With a planned primary deficit of 5.2 percent of G.D.P. this year (i.e., a budget surplus, excluding interest payments), it needs roughly 10 percent of G.D.P. in fiscal tightening.

It is nearly impossible to do this in a fixed exchange-rate regime — i.e., the euro zone — without vast unemployment. The government can expect several years of high unemployment and tough politics, even if it is to extract itself from this mess.

Neither Greek nor Portuguese political leaders are prepared to make the needed cuts. The Greeks have announced minor budget changes, and are now holding out for their 45 billion euro package while implicitly threatening a messy default on the rest of Europe if they do not get what they want — and when they want it.

The Portuguese are not even discussing serious cuts. In their 2010 budget, they plan a budget deficit of 8.3 percent of G.D.P., roughly equal to the 2009 budget deficit (9.4 percent). They are waiting and hoping that they may grow out of this mess — but such growth could come only from an amazing global economic boom.

While these nations delay, the European Union with its bailout programs — assisted by Jean-Claude Trichet’s European Central Bank — provides financing. The governments issue bonds; European commercial banks buy them and then deposit these at the European Central Bank as collateral for freshly printed money. The bank has become the silent facilitator of profligate spending in the euro zone.

Last week the European Central Bank had a chance to dismantle this doom machine when the board of governors announced new rules for determining what debts could be used as collateral at the central bank.

Some anticipated the central bank might plan to tighten the rules gradually, thereby preventing the Greek government from issuing too many new bonds that could be financed at the bank. But the bank did not do that. In fact, the bank’s governors did the opposite: they made it even easier for Greece, Portugal and any other nation to borrow in 2011 and beyond. Indeed, under the new lax rules you need only to convince one rating agency (and we all know how easy that is) that your debt is not junk in order to get financing from the European Central Bank.

Today, despite the clear dangers and huge debts, all three rating agencies are surely scared to take the politically charged step of declaring that Greek debt is junk. They are similarly afraid to touch Portugal.

So what next for Portugal?

Pity the serious Portuguese politician who argues that fiscal probity calls for early belt-tightening. The European Union, the European Central Bank and the Greeks have all proven that the euro zone nations have no threshold for pain, and European Union money will be there for anyone who wants it. The Portuguese politicians can do nothing but wait for the situation to get worse, and then demand their bailout package, too. No doubt Greece will be back next year for more. And the nations that “foolishly” already started their austerity, such as Ireland and Italy, must surely be wondering whether they too should take the less austere path.

There seems to be no logic in the system, but perhaps there is a logical outcome.

Europe will eventually grow tired of bailing out its weaker countries. The Germans will probably pull that plug first. The longer we wait to see fiscal probity established, at the European Central Bank and the European Union, and within each nation, the more debt will be built up, and the more dangerous the situation will get.

When the plug is finally pulled, at least one nation will end up in a painful default; unfortunately, the way we are heading, the problems could be even more widespread.

http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/04/15/the-next-global-problem-portugal/

‘A China procura impor o seu ponto de vista sobre o mundo‘ in Courrier International

La Chine mène depuis quelques années une politique de développement de ses médias en langues étrangères en direction de la communauté étrangère en Chine et à l’étranger. Une version anglaise du Huanqiu Shibao, quotidien spécialisé dans l’information internationale, paraît ainsi depuis 2009 sous le nom de Global Times. Sensiblement différente de la publication en chinois, à tonalité volontiers nationaliste, elle en traduit cependant une partie du contenu. C’est le quatrième journal en langue anglaise en Chine. Le China Daily en a été le précurseur. Lancé à Pékin en 1981, il devait contribuer au développement des échanges économiques avec l’étranger. Il a été suivi par le Shanghai Daily en 1999, pour répondre aux besoins d’une communauté étrangère grandissante, et par le Shenzhen Daily, créé en 2001.

L’offensive médiatique concerne aussi la télévision, avec le lancement en août 2009 d’une chaîne en langue arabe. Emanation de la chaîne de télévision centrale CCTV, elle s’ajoute aux versions anglaise, française, espagnole et russe. Ces chaînes sont accessibles soit par Internet, soit par satellite dans le monde entier. Sur la Toile, la plupart des médias officiels, comme Xinhua Wang, de l’agence de presse Xinhua, Renmin Wang, de l’organe du Parti communiste chinois Renmin Ribao, China.com, du gouvernement, ou encore CRI Online, de Radio Chine Internationale, proposent depuis des années des contenus en anglais et en diverses langues étrangères, dont le français.

L’ensemble des opérations médiatiques récentes constitue une politique destinée à proposer au monde extérieur une “perspective chinoise sur l’information”. Il s’agit d’“expliquer la Chine au monde”, souligne le quotidien pékinois Xin Jingbao. Les autorités chinoises veulent clairement prendre place dans le concert médiatique mondial et y apporter une perspective chinoise, en particulier dans le traitement des informations sensibles pour le pouvoir central. Pékin avait fortement critiqué le traitement des émeutes au Tibet en mars 2008 par les médias occidentaux. Mais la presse chinoise avait été avare en informations et, surtout, les médias occidentaux n’avaient pas été autorisés à s’y rendre. Ayant entendu ces critiques, les autorités chinoises ont changé de méthode. Lors des affrontements meurtriers entre les différentes communautés ethniques au Xinjiang en juillet 2009, la presse officielle chinoise a été dépêchée en masse. Elle a ainsi pu fournir d’abondants articles et reportages qui ont été repris par le reste de la presse chinoise, mais aussi étrangère.

http://www.courrierinternational.com/article/2010/04/08/imposer-le-point-de-vue-chinois-sur-le-monde

‘Grécia lança solução para a disputa sobre o nome Macedónia‘ in EU Observer

A senior Greek official has indicated that Athens is ready to accept the name 'Northern Macedonia' for its northern neighbour, in a development that could bring an end to the 19-year-old title dispute that has hampered Skopje's EU membership ambitions.

"The name 'Northern Macedonia' fits with the settlement as envisaged" by Athens, Greek deputy foreign minister Dimitris Droutsas told national media on Monday (5 April).

Should Macedonian leader Nikola Gruevski reject this proposal "he will have to explain to the Macedonian people why he is depriving them of their European prospects," Mr Droutsas added.

Currently referred to as the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) in official terminology, Athens is strongly opposed to a shortening of the country's name to simply "Macedonia," a title already used by a northern province in Greece.

The jealous guarding of the regional name has lead Athens to campaign against international recognition of its northern neighbour under the title of Macedonia, an independent nation following the break-up of Yugoslavia in 1991.

The Greek administration also insists that the issue must be resolved before Skopje can enter into EU accession discussions, a process that requires unanimous support from the bloc's full complement of members.

An indication that a potential solution was being worked on came in late February when senior UN mediator Matthew Nimetz said Athens and Skopje shared grounds for resolving the dispute, suggesting any future name for FYROM could include a "geographical determinant." [...]

Ver notícia no EU Observer

‘Rebeldes maoístas mataram 40 soldados indianos em emboscadas‘ in BBC

At least 40 soldiers have been killed after Maoist rebels launched a series of attacks on security convoys in central India, police say.

Rebels first attacked paramilitary forces engaged in an anti-Maoist offensive in the Dantewada district of Chhattisgarh state early on Tuesday.

Police said that two subsequent rescue missions were then ambushed by rebels. Clashes are still ongoing, reports say.

Thousands have died during the rebels' 20-year fight for communist rule.

The Indian government recently began a major offensive against the rebels in several states.

Repeat ambushes

At least nine soldiers were also injured in the Chhattsigarh attacks. Officials say that the rebels initially attacked a convoy of the paramilitary Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) in the Talmetla area.

RK Vij, a spokesman for the CRPF, told a news channel that about 80 soldiers were attacked by some 1,000 rebels.

He said the convoy was returning to its camp after a military operation.

"The injured troops have been evacuated by helicopter. More reinforcements have been sent," Mr Vij said.

The rebels then attacked a convoy of troops which had been sent to rescue their colleagues. A third rescue party was also attacked by rebels, police said, adding that clashes were still ongoing.

It is unclear how many soldiers were killed in each attack.

The rebels have warned that such attacks would intensify unless the government halted its offensive against them.

Home Minister P Chidambaram has threatened to intensify the offensive if the rebels did not start talks by renouncing violence.

The Maoists have said they would agree to talks if four of their senior leaders now in jail were released and the offensive was halted.

Indian Prime minister Manmohan Singh has described the Maoist insurgency as India's "greatest internal security challenge".

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/8604256.stm