"Organizações marroquinas criam uma 'frente nacional' para reclamar Ceuta e Melilla" in El Pais, 14 de Dezembro de 2007

La coalición durante una marcha por la "liberación" de ambas ciudades españolas en la que han participado medio centenar de personas.- Pretende defender la soberanía marroquí de los enclaves frente al "colonialismo español".

Dos organizaciones marroquíes han anunciado este viernes la creación de un frente nacional para defender la soberanía marroquí de las ciudades autónomas españolas Ceuta y Melilla, enclavadas en el norte de África. La presentación de la coalición ha tenido lugar en el marco de una marcha por la "liberación" de los enclaves españoles situados en el norte de África, que ha congregado a medio centenar de personas ante la frontera ceutí y el islote de Perejil.

El objetivo de la formación, creada por la Coordinadora de las Organizaciones de la Sociedad Civil en el Norte de Marruecos y el Comité para la Liberación de Ceuta y Melilla, será dar a conocer "la situación" de esas dos ciudades autónomas españolas y denunciar ante la opinión pública internacional lo que los creadores califican de "colonialismo español" en el norte de Marruecos.

El anuncio de esa coalición que agrupa a "partidos políticos, sindicatos y asociaciones de la sociedad civil" tuvo lugar en una conferencia de prensa celebrada en el marco la llamada "caravana de liberación y de desarrollo", que ha reunido a unas 50 personas. La marcha partió anoche de Nador, ha alcanzado esta mañana la frontera con Ceuta, para dirigirse después frente al islote de Perejil, y tiene previsto finalizar el próximo lunes en la frontera con Melilla.

"Pedimos a España un diálogo urgente y serio con nuestro Gobierno para retirar sus fuerzas y finalizar el colonialismo español en las dos ciudades", ha declarado Abdelmonen Chauki, representante de la Coordinadora de las

Organizaciones de la Sociedad Civil en el Norte de Marruecos.
Chauki ha asegurado que llevarán a cabo nuevas concentraciones hasta que las autoridades españolas dialoguen con las marroquíes sobre esos territorios. Los organizadores de la protesta han expresado, además, en nombre de toda la población marroquí, su voluntad de que se alcance "una solución política al conflicto" y su deseo de que "la retirada española" tenga lugar "de manera diplomática".

Los manifestantes, que ondearon tanto banderas marroquíes
como palestinas y portaban una pancarta en la que se podía leer "Juntos por la libertad de todas nuestras ciudades ocupadas", equipararon "la ocupación española sobre Ceuta y Melilla a la israelí sobre los territorios palestinos".

http://www.elpais.com/articulo/espana/Organizaciones/marroquies/crean/i/frente/nacional/i/reclamar/Ceuta/Melilla/elpepuesp/20071214elpepunac_20/Tes
JPTF 2007/12/14

"Lídere europeus assinam Tratado marcante" in BBC News, 13 de Dezembro de 2007 (por isso, convém não efectuar referendo)

EU leaders are preparing to sign a treaty in the Portuguese capital, Lisbon, that will greatly alter the way members govern themselves.

The treaty creates an EU president and a vastly more powerful foreign policy chief for the Union's 27 nations.

At the same time the document scraps veto powers in many policy areas.

It is a replacement for the EU constitution abandoned following French and Dutch opposition. EU leaders insist the two texts are in no way equivalent.

But the Lisbon treaty incorporates some of the draft constitution's key reforms, and several governments face domestic pressure over the document.

UK Prime Minister Gordon Brown has chosen not to attend the ceremony, citing a prior engagement in the British parliament.

However, he will sign the treaty separately, later on Thursday.

The UK's opposition Conservatives accused Mr Brown of "not having the guts" to sign the treaty, which is politically controversial in Britain, in public.

Having started this year with a celebration of its 50th birthday, the EU hopes the signing of the Lisbon treaty will end the serious mid-life crisis brought about by the death of the constitution, the BBC's Oana Lungescu reports.

There will be a lot of relief, said a senior European diplomat, but also some apprehension about what happens next.

Ireland is the only country planning to hold a referendum, but most voters there seem either undecided or indifferent.

Parliaments in Britain, the Netherlands and Denmark are also expected to give a turbulent reception to the 250-page text.

However, Germany, France and Poland have pledged to be among the first to ratify it, so that the new reforms can come into force in 2009 as planned.

Slimmed-down

The treaty is a slimmed-down version of the European constitution, with a more modest name and without any reference to EU symbols such as the flag and anthem.

It is meant to ease decision-making, by scrapping national vetoes in some 50 policy areas, including sensitive ones such as police and judicial co-operation.

There will also be a foreign policy chief, controlling a big budget and thousands of diplomats and officials, and a permanent EU president appointed for up to five years.

But some already fear that instead of giving Europe a strong single voice in the world, the new posts will only generate more rivalry, our correspondent adds.

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7141651.stm
JPTF 2007/12/13

"Piadas sobre a UE: uma história em cartoons da União Europeia" do jornal britânico Independent

Livro: "Os Últimos Dias da Europa. Epitáfio para um Velho Continente", Rio de Janeiro, Odisseia Editorial, 2007

Nas vésperas da assinatura do Tratado de Lisboa, um dúvida ocorre: quem está a antecipar melhor o futuro da Europa no século XXI? O europtimisno de Durão Barroso e José Sócrates, que prometem uma Europa mais unida e fortalecida e o seu regresso à cena mundial com o novo Tratado, ou o contrastivo europessimismo do historiador Walter Laqueur, que prognostica dias sombrios para os europeus e a sua passagem nas próximas décadas para o "museu da história"? Por contraponto com o discurso oficial, e para uma reflexão crítica sobre o que poderá ser a Europa num futuro não muito distante, vale a pena ler os Últimos Dias da Europa. Epitáfio para um Velho Continente, recentemente publicado em língua portuguesa, pela Odisseia Editorial do Rio de Janeiro.
JPTF 2007/12/11

Segundo advogado turco, Inter com "equipamento de cruzados" ofendeu o Islão in La Vanguardia, 11 de Dezembro de 2007

Tuve una terrible conmoción viendo el partido y me vino un profundo dolor en el alma", enfatiza el experto en derecho europeo Barış Kaşka a La Vanguardia.

Después de un año sin ser batido en competiciones europeas, el 27 de noviembre llegó la derrota para su equipo, el Fenerbahçe estambulí, a manos del Inter de Milán.

La superioridad del equipo italiano sobre el terreno de juego fue incontestable. Un 3-0 que impide al equipo de Roberto Carlos liderar el grupo G en la Liga de Campeones. Pero a Kaşka, según dice, no le hizo tanta mella el resultado como la camiseta que el Inter vistió en el estadio San Siro de Milán ante su equipo, con una enorme cruz roja sobre fondo blanco.

Su imagen ha dado la vuelta por varios medios turcos, acompañada casi siempre de otra: la de un templario, perteneciente a la orden de los legendarios monjes soldados fundada poco después de la cruel conquista de Jerusalén (1099) en la primera cruzada y que estaba, dice la leyenda, en posesión nada menos que del Santo Grial.

"Esta cruz me recordó a los días sangrientos del pasado", indica Kaşka. Así que el abogado del gabinete jurídico Turkoglu & Turkoglu, de Esmirna, al oeste de Turquía, no lo dudó dos veces y tras ver la derrota presentó una denuncia ante un juzgado que remitió a los comités disciplinarios de la UEFA y la FIFA, en Suiza, pidiendo la anulación de los tres puntos conseguidos por el Inter por "manifestar de forma explícita la superiodad racista de una religión", según recoge la propia denuncia.

La similitud entre ambas cruces, la del Inter y la de la orden del Temple, es sin duda llamativa. Tanto, que mereció el editorial "¿Cómo lo permitió la UEFA?", del célebre comentarista Mehmet Y. Yilmaz, un día después de la paliza italiana al Fener."¡Los tres goles de este Inter cruzado deberían ser borrados!" fue, por su parte, el titular elegido, categórico donde los haya, por la redacción de deportes del rotativo liberal Radikal.

El comienzo del declive de los templarios, su derrota ante Saladino en 1244, va acompañado del resurgir de un nuevo imperio: el otomano, también formado por abanderados de la fe. De la del islam. Durante los seis siglos posteriores, los otomanos estuvieron casi constantemente en guerra y comercio con los cristianos. Y, curiosamente, cuando el historiador Bernard Lewis habla de la instrumentalización de la fe por los primeros turcos llegados a Anatolia portadores de "una religión de guerreros, cuyo credo era un grito de guerra, cuyo dogma era una llamada a las armas", no se puede dejar de pensar en los cruzados, su espejo.

Después de todo, lo que quizá mayor dolor en el alma produjo a muchos aficionados del Fener fue ver cómo Ibrahimovic acometió el segundo gol en el minuto 66, cómo detuvo la pelota lanzada desde el lateral izquierdo con parsimonia antes de rematar a sangre fría sin moverse apenas. Porque lo hizo con temple, el vocablo legado por los templarios; con la fortaleza enérgica y valentía serena para afrontar las dificultades y los riesgos que muchos entrenadores bien desearían para sus equipos en partidos europeos. Y porque, aunque cruzado por un día, sus orígenes son musulmanes y sus ancestros, descendientes de aquel imperio otomano que se asentó en los Balcanes. Nacido en Malmö, su padre es bosnio musulmán y su madre, croata.
JPTF 2007/12/11
http://www.lavanguardia.es/lv24h/20071210/53416658257.html

Emblema da cidade de Milão e bandeira de Inglaterra devem também ser mudados para não ofender o "outro"?

A questão do Kosovo vista pela Rússia: "Era preciso desmembrar a Sérvia?" in Courrier International, 10 de Dezembro de 2007

por Alexeï Bogatourov

[...] Etait-il intelligent de détruire la Serbie ? Evidemment non. De même qu'il a été stupide de laisser la Géorgie éclater. Même fragile, une Géorgie unie aurait pu être plus réceptive aux discours russes. Encore aurait-il fallu, dès la fin des années 1980, prendre la peine de "chouchouter" ses dirigeants, capricieux, contents d'eux et (Chevardnadze mis à part) incapables de gérer un Etat. Il aurait fallu les persuader, les flatter, ruser, manœuvrer, leur offrir de l'aide. Nous avons négligé tout cela. Aujourd'hui, ce sont les Américains qui s'en chargent.

Les riches voisins occidentaux de la Serbie n'ont pas fait preuve de plus de sagesse à son égard. Ce pays, malgré toutes les difficultés qu'ont posées ses gouvernants dynastiques, a été un rempart européen dans les Balkans, la ligne avancée de contact avec l'Orient islamique. Les Serbes et les Monténégrins ne sont pas des gens de compromis, mais ils sont combatifs, excessivement courageux, et ils ont le sens du sacrifice. C'est ce qui leur a permis, même sans aide occidentale, de contenir la pression de la Sublime Porte ottomane sur l'Europe, aux frontières où se dessine le basculement ethnique. Une Serbie forte, en dépit de tous ses défauts, était dans les Balkans un facteur de cohésion, rôle que les autres pays de la région ne pouvaient jouer pour de nombreuses raisons, géopolitiques entre autres.

La "stratégie de démembrement de la Yougoslavie" que l'Allemagne a adoptée à la fin des années 1980 [en prenant l'initiative de reconnaître l'indépendance de la Slovénie et de la Croatie], suivie par les autres Etats de l'Union européenne, la Russie voisine (alors dirigée par Eltsine, avec Andreï Kozyrev en chef de la diplomatie) et les Etats-Unis, a tout bouleversé. La Serbie a dès lors commencé à être "grignotée" de toutes parts, perdant des terres peuplées de Serbes. La Croatie en a avalé une partie, la Bosnie, officiellement devenue un Etat musulman à hauteur d'un tiers, en a absorbé une autre. Après cela, le projet de "Grande Albanie", islamique elle aussi, est revenu sur le devant de la scène. Enlever définitivement le Kosovo à la Serbie pour le transformer en Etat indépendant constitue une étape supplémentaire dans la réalisation de ce projet.

L'Union européenne s'accommode de sa propre islamisation. Il y a des raisons à cela. Il y a trois ans, la Russie a trouvé le moyen de s'associer à l'Organisation de la conférence islamique (OCI). A l'époque, de nombreux pays de l'UE avaient exprimé leur perplexité à ce sujet. Aujourd'hui, l'UE elle-même pourrait rejoindre l'OCI. La prochaine entrée de la Turquie dans l'Union, l'absorption du "giron balkanique" et de ses enclaves islamiques, l'afflux d'immigrants en provenance de pays musulmans d'Afrique et d'Asie rendent irréversible l'islamisation des Etats européens.

Fatalité, sens de l'Histoire et paradoxe culturel. L'UE que les Russes voulaient rejoindre au début des années 1990, l'UE actuelle et celle qu'elle sera dans dix ou quinze ans n'ont rien à voir entre elles, que ce soit du point de vue de la culture, du mode de vie ou de la politique. Combien de temps encore Paris, Berlin et Londres continueront-ils par inertie à susciter chez les Russes un vrai désir d'adhérer aux valeurs européennes ? Autre grande question, les rapports de la Russie et de l'UE deviendront-ils plus chaleureux ou plus distants lorsque l'Europe se sera complètement "islamisée" ?
http://www.courrierinternational.com/article.asp?obj_id=80539

"A Jihad no Islão: entre o passado e o presente" in XVª Semana de Estudos das Religiões

Ver PDF da comunicação apresentada

"A ideologia do islamismo radical: o pensamento de Mawdudi e Qutb" in revista Segurança & Defesa, nº 3

Entre os diversos pensadores que mais contribuíram para a moderna ideologia islamista radical, no âmbito do mundo muçulmano sunita, dois nomes se destacam pela sua importância: o paquistanês Sayyid Abul´l-A´la Mawdudi (1903-1979) e o egípcio Sayyid Qutb (1906-1966). Começando pelo caso de Mawdudi, importa notar que estamos perante um personagem prolífico nos seus discursos e escritos, com um pensamento multifacetado, que se alterou bastante ao longo do tempo. Inquestionável é a importância ideológica da sua obra e do seu activismo político – foi fundador, em 1941, do Jamaat-i-Islami, literalmente o «Partido Islâmico», que pode ser considerado o arquétipo dos actuais partidos islamistas – deste antigo súbdito do Império Britânico da Índia. Ver texto integral do artigo.

"Multiculturalismo e segurança societal" in revista R:I nº 9

O multiculturalismo está cada vez mais no centro da agenda política nas sociedades abertas da Europa/Ocidente, devido à crescente heterogeneidade e diversidade cultural da população. No último ano, acontecimentos dramáticos e extremamente mediatizados como os atentados terroristas no metro de Londres, em 7 de Julho, e os distúrbios e turbulência social verificada em França, a partir de 27 de Outubro e prolongando-se pelo mês de Novembro, reforçaram esta tendência, pela associação, correcta ou incorrectamente efectuada, ao “multiculturalismo de emigração”. Neste contexto político, o objecto deste artigo é a análise das relações que se podem estabelecer entre o multiculturalismo e a segurança societal, quer ao nível da discussão teórico-académica (com particular incidência no campo da Filosofia Política), quer ao nível de algumas evidências empíricas que se podem observar em sociedades europeias (Reino Unido e França) e da América do Norte (Canadá), associadas sobretudo às comunidades muçulmanas que vivem nesses países. Em particular, procura-se avaliar em que medida o multiculturalismo comporta um risco de ruptura da coesão societal, por erosão das instituições, práticas e valores que suportam e estabilizam as sociedades abertas e pluralistas. Ver texto integral do artigo.

"A memória otomana nos conflitos dos Balcãs" in revista Nação & Defesa nº 112

A violência das guerras da ex-Jugoslávia nos anos 90 do século XX e a complexidade étnico-religiosa das suas populações, mostraram a existência de uma Jugoslávia e de uns Balcãs num registo histórico bastante diferente da island of peace da União Europeia. Na maioria das análises efectuadas pelos media e pelos académicos das Relações Internacionais prevaleceu uma tendência para leituras a-históricas ou interpretações à luz da actual história europeia/ocidental, pouco esclarecedoras sobre as raízes mais profundas desses conflitos. Um dos aspectos mais surpreendentemente negligenciado foi o das implicações das instituições sociais e religiosas e da governação política otomana, na realidade dos países balcânicos do século XX. Assim, neste artigo, o autor analisa os principais traços do «cunho otomano» que moldou os Balcãs durante quase meio milénio, com especial destaque para o sistema de governação dos millet e o estatuto dos dhimmi e as consequências sociais e políticas que daí resultaram para esta região da Europa. Ver texto integral do artigo.

"Chipre: o reecontro da Europa com a ‘questão do Oriente‘" in revista História nº 77

A 3 de Julho de 1990 o governo da Kypriaki Dimokratia/República de Chipre presidido por Georgios Vassiliou solicitou formalmente a sua adesão às Comunidades Europeias. Na sequência deste pedido, e após diversas hesitações e diligências prévias de aproximação, foram finalmente abertas negociações de adesão (1998). Estas, após uma fase negocial marcada por alguma turbulência, acabaram por ser concluídas com sucesso já nos primeiros anos do século XXI (2003). Deste modo, a República de Chipre é hoje um dos dez novos membros que integram a actual União Europeia (UE), desde o último alargamento efectuado a 1 de Maio de 2004. Mas, o pedido de adesão da República de Chipre e sua entrada na UE, marcaram, também, pela primeira vez, o envolvimento directo europeu nos territórios históricos da «questão do Oriente», pela integração, para já ainda parcial, dum território e duma população estreitamente ligados aos problemas resultantes da dissolução do Império Otomano e à formação do seu principal Estado sucessor, a República da Turquia. Ver texto integral do artigo.

"Império Otomano 1915-1917: o que aconteceu aos arménios? in História nº 68

Poucos acontecimentos na história dos último século têm gerado tanta controvérsia como o destino das populações arménias na fase final do Império Otomano, durante os anos de 1915-1917, num período em que decorriam as hostilidades da I Guerra Mundial. Gwynne Dyer sintetizou bem este problema num artigo publicado em 1976 na Middle Eastern Studies sugestivamente intitulado Turkish ´Falsifiers´ and Armenian ´Deceivers´, onde referia que «qualquer historiador que tenha de lidar com os últimos anos do Império Otomano, mais cedo ou mais tarde vai encontrar-se a desejar desesperadamente que a neblina se dissipe sobre os
arménios otomanos do final do século XIX e início do século XX, especialmente sobre as deportações e os massacres de 1915». Infelizmente, apesar de já terem decorrido quase três décadas desde que Gwynne Dyer fez esta observação, e quase um século sobre os
acontecimentos, o ar parece não estar ainda totalmente límpido, permanecendo uma irritante neblina que dificulta qualquer tentativa imparcial de traçar os contornos exactos dos
acontecimentos. Ver texto integral do artigo.

Cartoon de Riber na revista Courrier International

"Merkl ataca Mugabe em Lisboa" in Guardian, 9 de Dezembro de 2007

German Chancellor Angela Merkel directly confronted Robert Mugabe over human rights abuses in front of European and African leaders in Portugal yesterday, putting the Zimbabwean leader under the spotlight at a summit that has been overshadowed by the despot's presence.

Prime Minister Gordon Brown boycotted the meeting in Lisbon, the first European Union-Africa summit in seven years, because a ban on Mugabe travelling to Europe was lifted to allow him to be there.

Merkel said that the world could not stand by while human rights were 'trampled underfoot'. 'Nothing,' she said, 'can justify the intimidation of those holding different views and hindering freedom of the press.'

She added: 'I appreciate that some African states have tried to solve the crisis in Zimbabwe, but time is running out. The situation of Zimbabwe is damaging the image of the new Africa.'

South African President Thabo Mbeki, whose speech preceded Merkel's, avoided any mention of Zimbabwe, where he has tried to mediate between Mugabe and his opposition. Mbeki said leaders should work to ensure Africans 'escape from poverty'.

'We are fully conscious of the fact that good governance and respect for human rights are fundamental to the achievement of this objective,' he said.

The meeting, described as a 'summit of equals' by Portuguese Prime Minister Jose Socrates, was a forum for 70 leaders to meet and forge new partnerships between the world's largest trading bloc and its poorest continent.

Also making his voice heard this weekend was Libyan leader Muammar Gadaffi, who has set up base in a tent outside Lisbon. He called on Europe to compensate its former African colonies. 'The riches that were taken away must be given back somehow,' Gadaffi said in a speech. 'If we don't face up to that truth, we'll have to pay the price one way or another - through terrorism, emigration or revenge.'

Controversy over Mugabe, who is seen by many Africans as an independence hero, underlines the difficult relationship between Africa and the former colonial powers. 'The real significance of this summit must be to lay the foundations of a new partnership based on mutual respect,' said Ghana's President John Kufuor, chair of the African Union.

European leaders are realising they need a different approach as many African economies are growing more rapidly than in several decades, thanks to the commodities boom.

Huge Chinese investment in Africa has prompted concerns in Europe that it is losing out on opportunities. Some African states welcome Chinese economic involvement partly because it comes without the pressure for recognition of human rights attached to European aid deals. EU-Africa trade is at a sensitive juncture, as the EU is rushing to reach new agreements with developing nations as replacements for a World Trade Organisation waiver due to expire on 31 December.
http://observer.guardian.co.uk/world/story/0,,2224795,00.html
JPTF 2007/12/09

"O nuclear iraniano divide os EUA" in Times, 9 de Dezembro de 2007

For two days in London in February 2004, top American defence and intelligence officials huddled with senior officers from MI6. They were there to discuss Iraq’s missing weapons of mass destruction with General Ihor Smeshko, head of the Ukrainian secret service, but he also had some riveting information to pass on about Iran. The Iranian regime, Smeshko revealed, was pestering Ukraine, a postSoviet nuclear power, for access to its nuclear technology.

The meeting with MI6 had been arranged by John Shaw, who was the Pentagon’s deputy undersecretary for international technology security. “There was no doubt that the Iranians were focused on developing a nuclear weapons capability,” Shaw recalled last week. “It wasn’t about keeping the lights burning in Tehran.” American intelligence agencies startled the world last week by judging “with high confidence” that while Tehran continued to enrich uranium – which could be used for nuclear power or bombs – it had halted its nuclear “weaponisation” programme in 2003, before the MI6 meeting.

The declassified summary of the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Iran not only ran contrary to its insistence two years earlier that Iran was “determined” to develop nuclear weapons, but flew in the face of accepted facts among western intelligence agencies.President George W Bush, who warned recently that a nuclear-armed Iran could provoke a third world war, was left with a dollop of egg on his face.When Dick Cheney, the vice-president and leading Iran hawk, was briefed on the about-turn a couple of weeks ago, there was a “pretty vivid exchange” with intelligence officials in the White House, one participant told The New York Times.

According to an intelligence source, Cheney sought to block the NIE’s release, but was overruled. Vincent Cannistraro, the CIA’s former counterterrorism chief, believes the view expressed by Robert Gates, the defence secretary, and Condoleezza Rice, the secretary of state, was: “Whatever the intelligence shows, it shows – we won’t influence it, but it should be released.”In an interview last week, Cheney conceded that “there was a general belief that we all shared that it was important to put it out – that it was not likely to stay classified for long, anyway.” He added, “Everything leaks”, a wry admission of the in-fighting that has divided the Bush administration.

War with Iran now appears to be off the agenda and it will be difficult to persuade the international community to approve harsher United Nations sanctions against Iran. But was American intelligence really fooled for four years? Or is it being undermined from within? Some American officials believe the NIE’s findings could present a historic opportunity to open direct negotiations with Tehran. Robert Kagan, an influential neoconservative writer, argued that “with its policy tools broken, the Bush administration can sit around isolated for the next year. Or it can seize the initiative, and do the next administration a favour, by opening direct talks”. But other neoconservatives and Iran hawks mounted a ferocious counterattack, insisting the report was payback by a trio of antiBush former state department officials, who opposed the Iraq war and sanctions on Iran.

David Wurmser, Cheney’s former Middle East adviser, charged: “One has to look at the authors of this report to judge how much it can really be banked on.” The “guilty men” were named as Thomas Fingar, Kenneth Brill and Vann Van Diepen, all now in top US intelligence posts, who had seethed at Bush policies for years and were said to have executed a triumphant revenge. One “very senior intelligence official” who was privy to the same classified information on Iran described the NIE’s conclusions as “a piece of crap”, according to Jed Babbin, a senior defence official under the first President George Bush. “The ‘high confidence’ that Iran had halted its nuclear weapons programme was not justified by the data he had seen,” Babbin said.

Yet there was an infusion of new information about Iran that persuaded all 16 American intelligence agencies to back the NIE. Israeli sources told The Sunday Times that a key part of the jigsaw was supplied by General Ali Reza Asghari, 63, a former Iranian deputy defence minister who is believed to have defected after disappearing from his hotel room in Istanbul in February. The Iranian regime accused Washington of kidnapping him, but western intelligence sources say he is in America of his own accord. His debriefing was so secretive that information went directly to the director of the CIA, rather than to senior officials. “People who would normally know, and should know, are completely out of the loop,” said one informed source.

American intelligence agencies also received a trove of information last summer, including intercepts of Iranian phone calls by GCHQ, the British listening station, which suggested that Iranian military officials were angered by a decision in late 2003 to halt a project to design nuclear weapons. The suspicion that the revelations might be a complex hoax were discounted. After the report was released, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Iran’s president, exulted that a “fatal blow” had been delivered to America’s war party. Yet some American intelligence experts remain baffled by the black and white picture presented by the NIE. Former CIA official Paul Pillar, who helped to compile the 2005 NIE on Iran, believes the difference with the 2007 report has been greatly exaggerated. “It’s described as a dramatic 180-degree reversal but it’s not.

The key ‘pacing element’ about when Iran is going to get a nuclear weapon is the uranium enrichment issue and that hasn’t changed,” he said. As before, the NIE suggests “with moderate confidence” that the Iranians could be capable of producing enough highly enriched uranium for a nuclear weapon by 2010-2015. “You can differ with the president on his policy direction but the issue remains the same,” said Pillar. He maintains that the intelligence community has “shot itself in the foot” by oversimplifying the debate.
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/middle_east/article3022188.ece
JPTF 2007/12/09

Cartoon de David Simons na revista The Economist

Prognósticos sombrios para a Europa: Livro "Declínio e Queda" de Bruce Thornton, Nova Iorque, Encounter Books, 2007

Once a colossus dominating the globe, Europe today is a doddering convalescent. Sluggish economic growth, high unemployment, an addiction to expensive social welfare entitlements, a dwindling birth-rate among native Europeans, and most important, an increasing Islamic immigrant population chronically underemployed yet demographically prolific – all point to a future in which Europe will be transformed beyond recognition, a shrinking museum culture riddled with ever-expanding Islamist enclaves.

Decline and Fall tells the story of this decline by focusing on the larger cultural dysfunctions behind the statistics. The abandonment of the Christian tradition that created the West’s most cherished ideals–a radical secularism evident in Europe’s indifference to God and church–created a vacuum of belief into which many pseudo-religions have poured. Scientism, fascism, communism, environmentalism, multiculturalism, sheer hedonism – all have attempted and failed, sometimes bloodily, to provide Europeans with an alternative to Christianity that can show them what is worth living and dying for.

Meanwhile a resurgent Islam, feeding off the economic and cultural marginalization of European Muslims, knows all too well not just what is worth dying for, but what is worth killing for. Crippled by fashionable self-loathing and multicultural fantasies of multicultural inclusiveness, Europeans in the face of this threat have met this threat with capitulation instead of strength, appeasement and apologies instead of the demand that immigrants assimilate.

As Decline and Fall shows, Europe’s solution to these ills–a larger and more powerful European Union – simply exacerbates the problems, for the EU cannot address the absence of a unifying belief that can spur Europe even to defend itself, let alone to recover its lost grandeur. As these problems worsen, Europe will face an unappetizing choice between two somber destinies: a violent nationalistic or nativist reaction, or, more likely, a long descent into cultural senescence and slow-motion suicide.
http://www.encounterbooks.com/books/decline/
JPTF 8/12/2007

Uma leitura estimulante durante a Cimeira UE-África: o "Livro Verde" de Kadhafi

O "Livro Verde" de Muammar Kadhafi - ou Muammar Al Qathafi, na transliteração do árabe preferida pelo autor -, que inclui reflexões sobre a democracia (parte 1), sobre a solução do problema económico (parte 2) e uma base social para a terceira teoria universal (parte 3), é uma leitura estimulante durante esta Cimeira UE-África. Está acessível numa tradução gratuita em língua inglesa em http://www.mathaba.net/gci/theory/gb.html. Para os que pensam que este é avesso à modernidade e às novas tecnologias - sobretudo depois de o terem visto instalado numa tenda de beduínos no Forte de São Julião da Barra em Lisboa -, aconselha-se a leitura da sua página pessoal, "Al-Gathafi Speaks", em http://www.algathafi.org/html-english/index.html, onde este fala dos problemas de África e do mundo.
JPTF 2007/12/06

"Não perguntem à CIA o que se passa em Teerão" in Telegraph, 5 de Dezembro de 2007

por David Blair

If generals are fated to prepare for the last war, intelligence agencies always bear in mind the last time they were proved wrong. The ghosts of Iraq's non-existent weapons of mass destruction haunt America's latest National Intelligence Estimate on Iran's nuclear programme.

Having wildly overestimated Saddam Hussein's devotion to poison gas and germ warfare, the 16 intelligence outfits dotted around Washington are treating Iran's nuclear ambitions with a newfound and zealous scepticism.

They have also developed an engaging candour about the gaps in their knowledge. "We do not know," reads the considered judgment of every US spy agency, "whether it [Iran] currently intends to develop nuclear weapons."

But that is the key question - indeed, the only question that matters. The goal of intelligence agencies is to discover the capabilities and intentions of their targets. In principle, nailing down their capabilities is the simpler task. Either Iran has a nuclear weapons programme or it does not. In theory, any facilities it may possess can be uncovered and their activities tracked.

Yet, in the final analysis, the thoughts, aims and priorities of the Islamic Republic's key policy-makers are of far greater importance. If Iran did halt a nuclear weapons programme in 2003, as America's spy agencies now say, this might have been a tactical move designed to fend off international pressure.

The long-term aim of Teheran's regime might still be to build nuclear weapons, perhaps after a suitable pause designed to evade tighter economic sanctions and escape a US military strike. If the strategic goal remains unchanged, Iran will go about acquiring the means to make a bomb once it becomes expedient. Capabilities follow from intentions.

The inescapable verdict is that no safe conclusion can be drawn from the National Intelligence Estimate. Even the headline finding that Iran froze a nuclear weapons programme four years ago - and that it remains frozen - is qualified in the nuance of the text. There is a crucial difference between conclusions delivered with "high confidence" and those worthy only of "moderate confidence".

Thus Washington believes with "high confidence" that Iran stopped its weapons programme for "several years" in 2003, but only has "moderate confidence" that this represented a "halt to Iran's entire nuclear programme". In other words, Teheran may have shut down some facilities and kept others open. As for whether it has restarted its weapons programme, the spies answer reassuringly in the negative - but only with "moderate confidence". The problem for President George W Bush is that his agencies keep changing their story. In 2005, the National Intelligence Estimate concluded Iran was "determined" to build a bomb. That finding has been contradicted. This week's judgment could also be overturned.

Hidden behind the work of every intelligence agency is the fact that they have their own capabilities and intentions to worry about. During the long saga over Iraq's weapons of mass destruction, it became clear that spies on both sides of the Atlantic succumbed to "group-think". They all believed that Saddam had amassed poison gas and canisters filled with deadly germs. Every piece of evidence that emerged from inside Iraq was filtered through this prism. The intelligence agencies fanned one another's pre-existing beliefs and in the process they infected their political masters. Everyone told everyone else what they wanted to hear. Jacques Chirac, who knew that French spies agreed with their British and American counterparts on Iraq, said that the world's intelligence agencies were "intoxicating" one another.

Most dangerously of all, the spies gave the politicians intelligence which justified their policies. In a leaked memorandum recording a meeting of senior British officials in 2002, Sir Richard Dearlove, the then head of MI6, said that the "facts and the intelligence" were being "fixed around the policy" of the Bush administration.

Despite the lessons of Iraq, there are signs of the same tendency at work in Washington today. Both the State Department, under Condoleezza Rice, and the Pentagon, under Robert Gates, are united in believing that a military strike on Iran would be disastrous.

Miss Rice fears the diplomatic consequences, while Mr Gates worries about an overstretched military machine already waging wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Both understand that if Iran were attacked, it would retaliate by creating mayhem in Iraq, reversing the fall in violence and rendering the "surge" of extra troops an irrelevance.

So the National Intelligence Estimate represents a coup for both. They hope it will ensure that the Bush administration will go out of business in January 2009 without having bombed Iran. When the spies formed their judgments, did they completely close their minds to the fact that they were doing such a favour for Miss Rice and Mr Gates?

Of America's 16 intelligence agencies, the CIA has the highest profile. Steve Kappes, its deputy director, is a Farsi-speaking specialist on Iran. He is, incidentally, something of a dove when it comes to policy towards Iran. But does the CIA really possess a real and effective presence inside the country? The experience of Iraq suggests otherwise.

Six years on, the CIA is still demoralised by the defeat represented by September 11. In order to prevent enemy agents from penetrating its ranks, the agency has developed elaborate security procedures governing recruitment and promotion. This makes it far harder for the CIA to operate effectively.

Before September 11, co-ordination between the array of intelligence outfits was woeful. There is little to suggest that it has improved, and the creation of a new director of national intelligence, supposedly with an oversight role, has simply added another layer of bureaucracy.

So a group of fallible intelligence agencies have delivered a provisional judgment, possibly with the subliminal aim - however repressed - of pleasing their political masters. Meanwhile, the central question remains unanswered: what are the intentions of Iran's leaders? The spies do not know - and nor, for the moment, does anyone else.
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/opinion/main.jhtml;jsessionid=4OHE0KBAWI0MTQFIQMGCFGGAVCBQUIV0?xml=/opinion/2007/12/05/do0505.xml
JPTF 2007/12/05