A ‘Política Externa da Turquia face ao Ocidente revisitada‘ in Mural Internacional, ano III, nº 1 (junho 2012)

A subida ao poder do AKP (Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi/Partido da Justiça e do Desenvolvimento) em 2002 – partido que governa a Turquia há uma década –, trouxe, progressivamente, uma visível aproximação Médio Oriente árabe-islâmico. Paralelamente, assistiu-se a uma deterioração das relações com Israel e a tensões ocasionais com alguns dos aliados tradicionais, nomeadamente com os EUA. Assim, nos últimos anos, temos assistido a um amplo debate nos meios ligados à política internacional, sobre o significado desta aproximação da Turquia ao Médio Oriente. Será esta sinal de um abandono da orientação de política externa pró-ocidental, que caracterizou o Estado fundado por Atatürk a partir de 1945, através de uma nova configuração motivada por influências ideológicas islamistas? Ou será que estamos perante uma abordagem de política externa pragmática e realista, motivada por imperativos económicos e de segurança, sendo basicamente similar àquela que encontramos frequentemente no passado otomano da Turquia? São estas as questões às quais se procura responder no artigo. Para o efeito, é efetuada uma breve passagem em revista da política externa do Império Otomano/Turquia face ao Ocidente, europeu e norte-americano, o que permitirá, depois, avaliar a mesma numa perspetiva histórico-política alargada. (Ver aqui o artigo completo.)

‘Para qualquer parte do mundo que se olhe, a religião é importante‘ afirma Tony Blair

 “Do we want societies that are open to those who are different, who have different faiths and cultures than our own; or do we want, in the face of insecurity and economic crisis, to close down, to look after “our own” first and foremost? And if we want open ones, what are the conditions for such openness to prevail?
“It is true of Mexico...it is also true of the Middle East.  There are three elements in play.  However, they are operating within a region in which religion occupies a vital, if not determining space in society.  Ask how important is religion in the lives of people in Europe, and the answer is around 30-35%.  In the Middle East it is 90-95%.  If you don’t understand religion in the Middle East, you don’t understand the Middle East. So as these recent changes transform the Middle East region, the way religion affects that transformation is profoundly significant.
“The missing bit of Middle East policy is inter-faith.  Why?  Because if the concern is that Islam feels disrespected by the West, the answer is to engage in a dialogue that proves it isn’t. This begins in school, should be analysed and debated in university and should be grounded in political, social and cultural exchange.
“The reason religion is important is that it is about so much more than religion.  It is about history, culture, tradition, belonging, identity and meaning.  It is about the philosophy of life.  It is about the spirit not the flesh.  If the Middle East produces political change, without social change that is based on an open mind towards others, then it will have been a revolution half formed and unfinished and the economic change, so vital to advancing the position of the people, will likewise fall short.
“Globalisation is accelerating all these trends.  When I am asked to define the leading characteristic of today’s world, I say: its speed of change.  Movements, swirls of opinion, waves of change arise, build momentum and come crashing down against our preconceived positions or notions with bewildering velocity.  We adjust or we are swept away.”
The Tony Blair Faith Foundation partners with Tecnológico de Monterrey as part of its Faith and Globalisation Initiative which is a network of leading universities on every continent. The course at Tecnológico de Monterrey is now in its second semester, and the number of students has increased by nearly one hundred – from 195 to 284. The Initiative undertakes academic teaching and research to develop a deeper understanding of the relationship between faith and globalisation.  The results help emerging leaders understand how faith motivates people, and analyses the impact of religion on the modern world.

Ver artigo completo na TonyBlairFaithFoundation

Os ‘danos colaterais‘ dos ficheiros WikiLeaks

As recentes revelações do site WikiLeaks têm potencialmente várias implicações significativas para a diplomacia norte-americana e para os seus aliados (naturalmente também para os inimigos dos EUA – veja-se, por exemplo, os casos das revelações sobre os programas nucleares do Irão e da Coreia do Norte e dos receios que estes geram a nível do Médio Oriente e do Sudeste Asiático). Para uma parte significativa da opinião pública internacional provavelmente até reforçam a convicção da perfídia da política externa norte-americana. Esta será delineada nos bastidores, através de  manobras mais ou menos obscuras e de espionagem, sendo largamente amoral, apesar do discurso oficial invocar cinicamente princípios e valores, como a democracia e os direitos humanos. Alguns encontrarão mesmo aí argumentos adicionais para sustentar teorias da conspiração sobre a actuação dos EUA em acontecimentos marcantes da história do século XX e início do século XXI (o ataque japonês a Pearl Harbour, o assassinato de John Kennedy, o 11 de Setembro...). Todavia,  o pior impacto para os EUA nem é tanto o de potenciar essa imagem negativa na opinião publica internacional, o que em si mesmo já não é pouco. Também não decorre de terem vindo a público alguns comentários mais ácidos, ou até jocosos, de diplomatas norte-americanos sobre dirigentes políticos de países aliados europeus e não europeus, os quais se encontram em vários telegramas diplomáticos. Nem resulta da revelação de manobras de bastidores para obter informações, eticamente questionáveis, e que, agora, acabaram por se tornar públicas. Na verdade estas manobras já se imaginam existir nalgum tipo de diplomacia e de "jogos de poder", não sendo a sua revelação  uma surpresa, a não ser para os que não têm qualquer ideia do que é a política internacional. Passado o furor revelações dos ficheiros WikiLeaks nos media, o impacto negativo mais duradouro e difícil de apagar, será, certamente, o que está associado, na percepção de amigos e aliados, a uma enorme falha de segurança. Esta não permitiu manter a confidencialidade sobre as informações recolhidas pelos seus meios diplomáticos e salvaguardar também os "informantes". (Curiosa é a forma relativamente simples como as informações reveladas pelo Wikileaks poderão ter sido obtidas por Julian Assange, o australiano que é o  rosto desta organização e se afirma dedicado à missão da “transparência”. Embora a origem não seja oficialmente conhecida, os mais de 250.000 ficheiros agora revelados poderão ter sido também subtraídos pelo jovem militar, Bradley Manning, já anteriormente detido por suspeita de ter sido responsável pelas revelações de documentos feitas no site WikiLeaks, relativas ao Afeganistão e ao Iraque). Assim, pelo menos nos tempos mais próximos, este ”vazamento de informações” na praça pública irá dificultar muito o trabalho dos seus diplomatas no terreno. Face a esta quebra de confiança na capacidade de sigilo diplomático da principal potência mundial, a recolha de muitas informações fundamentais para o trabalho político-diplomático tornar-se-à particularmente difícil, se não mesmo impossível nalgumas situações. Este é um “dano colateral” que a administração Obama terá  dificuldade em reparar e cujas consequências políticas e estratégicas podem ser grandes nos próximos anos.

A maior divulgação da história de documentos diplomáticos secretos feita Wikileaks

El País, en colaboración con otros diarios de Europa y Estados Unidos, revela el contenido de la mayor filtración de documentos secretos a la que jamás se haya tenido acceso en toda la historia. Se trata de una colección de más de 250.000 mensajes del Departamento de Estado de Estados Unidos, obtenidos por la página digital Wikileaks, en los que se descubren episodios inéditos ocurridos en los puntos más conflictivos del mundo, así como otros muchos sucesos y datos de gran relevancia que desnudan por completo la política exterior norteamericana, sacan a la luz sus mecanismos y sus fuentes, dejan en evidencia sus debilidades y obsesiones, y en conjunto facilitan la comprensión por parte de los ciudadanos de las circunstancias en las que se desarrolla el lado oscuro de las relaciones internacionales. [...]

Ver notícia no El País

Olhar o Mundo na RTP-N

Um espaço de reflexão sobre os principais assuntos da semana, a nível internacional.

Márcia Rodrigues conduz este programa sobre a actualidade internacional onde os principais assuntos da semana serão abordados num ângulo, em regra, diferente da informação diária, que implica uma lógica mais sintética das notícias.

Ver vídeo

Direita populista radical com ganhos eleitorais na Suécia

A far-right party that blames Muslim immigrants for social ills won seats in Sweden's parliament for the first time on Sunday, marking the latest advance of anti-immigrant populism in Europe.

With votes counted from 99% of Swedish districts, the Sweden Democrats had won 5.7%, clearing the 4% threshold needed to enter Parliament and resulting in 20 seats in the 349-seat legislature.

The result is a shock for Sweden's political elites and many ordinary Swedes, who have long prided themselves on being one of the Western world's most tolerant and open societies.

"Today we have together written political history," said Jimmie Akesson, the 31-year-old leader of the Sweden Democrats.

The Sweden Democrats' populist campaign against immigration, particularly of Muslims, has underscored the spread of a pan-European backlash against liberal immigration policies, which is increasingly rattling the region's political establishment.

Swedish Prime Minister Fredrik Reinfeldt four-party Alliance won 172 seats, below the 175 needed to form a majority government and opening the possibility of minority rule after the left-leaning three-party Red-Green coalition won 157 seats. [...]

Ver notícia no Wall Street Journal

Protestos contra Obama (foto do jornal Guardian)

Violência no Quirguistão e um arco de crise

The already grim situation in the central Asian state of Kyrgyzstan has, around the southwestern cities of Osh and Jalalabad in particular, become desperate. On 10 June 2010 and the subsequent days, members of the Uzbek minority in the area have been targeted by Kyrgyz gangs who burned their homes, killed at least 118 people and wounded 1,485, while forcing tens of thousands to flee towards the border with Uzbekistan - which around 75,000 of them (at the time of writing) have been allowed to cross (see “Kyrgyzstan: violence in the south escalates”, Irin, 14 June 2010).

This unfolding human catastrophe has political roots in the crisis of the Kyrgyz state itself. The complex and multifaceted ingredients of the crisis cast a dark shadow over Kyrgyzstan’s future. In the context of poverty, insecurity and dysfunctional politics in the unsettled Ferghana valley - whose territory and population of 11 million is distributed between Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan - what is happening now in Kyrgyzstan has ominous implications for the wider region. For if Kyrgyzstan fails as a state, and inter-ethnic violence in the Ferghana valley is not contained, the resulting security vacuum in Kyrgyzstan could threaten the fragile stability of central Asia as a whole. [...]

Ver notícia no OpenDemocracy

Leituras: ‘Um Mundo Sem Europeus‘ de Henrique Raposo

‘Olhar para além das modas na geopolítica‘ in Financial Times

Beware fashions in geopolitics. They change as often as the hemlines on Paris catwalks.

The fast-shifting distribution of power in the world is feeding a burgeoning community of geopolitical seers. Change sharpens our appetite for certainty about the future. By and large, though, the myriad maps of a new global order are turning out to be as ephemeral as the couturiers’ spring collections.

Not so long ago, the competing ambitions of autocracies and democracies were set to shape the future. China and Russia would square up against the west. Washington rang with calls from pundits and policymakers for a global league of liberal democracies. As I recall, France’s Jacques Chirac and Germany’s Gerhard Schröder were mustard keen to side with the autocrats.

The predicted collision was always fanciful, not least because Beijing and Moscow are more plausible strategic rivals than allies. Nor is India, the world’s largest democracy, ever likely to join a US-dominated club of political pluralists.

Never mind. The great thing about fashion is that it moves on. Soon enough, we were told that democracy and autocracy would make their peace; the US and China would jointly rule the global roost. Europe, Russia and the rest would trail quaking in the wake of this all-powerful G2.

This theory had a fair run. It held sway until quite recently. Then came Barack Obama’s so-so visit to Beijing last autumn. There followed a series of Sino-American spats about everything from climate change and the renminbi to Google, the Dalai Lama and arms sales to Taiwan.

Fortunately this provided a seamless segue to the latest grand theory of the world, the future and the universe. Forget about the G2; the geopolitical landscape will be marked out in coming decades by competition rather than co-operation. For an aggressive Germany in the second half of the 19th century substitute an assertive China in the first half of the 21st. The international order will again be held in thrall to a struggle between a mature and a rising power.

The above, of course, is an abbreviated list. I might have mentioned also the fleeting but sure belief around the turn of the millennium that the US would be a permanent global hegemon. This was followed, in the wake of the terrorist attacks of September 2001, by the dismal certainty of an epoch-defining clash between the west and Islam.

I often wonder what happened to those predictions that the 21st century would belong to the soft power of a postmodern Europe? It seems only yesterday that the euro was being hailed as the currency to oust a feeble dollar. Now, or so it seems, the eurozone is breaking apart, courtesy of some dodgy book-keeping in Greece.

You will have seen by now what I am getting at. The greater the conviction of the soothsayers, the more likely they are to be wrong. If we should have learnt anything from the tumultuous changes of the post-cold war era, it is how hard it is to predict the way things will turn out. Sad to say, the economists who failed so dismally to spot any flaws in the financial system are not alone in their myopia.

Understanding present trends is not the same as knowing where they will lead. We know the world is changing faster than at any time in modern history – hence the pervasive sense of insecurity in western societies that have so long taken for granted their privileged status in the hierarchy of nations.

The biggest shifts – the rise of China, India, Brazil and the rest, and a shift in the centre of geopolitical gravity from the Atlantic to the Pacific – speak for themselves. So do the mega-trends: climate change, population growth, intensifying competition for resources and the ubiquity of modern communications technologies among them.

Much harder to fathom is how these changes will fit together: will they promote collisions or co-operation? Most likely both. But in what proportions? An optimist might see the planet’s rising temperature as a catalyst for the refurbishment of an outdated system of global governance. A pessimist – even a realist – might look instead to the prospect of new conflicts driven by resource scarcity.

The best in the crystal-ball gazing business understand all this. They eschew primary colours and prefer to paint the future in subtler hues. They delineate the direction of travel – from the changing balance of power between states to the worldwide trends mentioned above – but draw only tentative conclusions.

The US National Intelligence Council has done this well for many years. Its latest survey, Global Trends 2025, was published more than a year ago. It has weathered well the fads and fashions since.

A study published last month by Britain’s Ministry of Defence (spooks and the military pay close attention to all this stuff) peers further into the future. Global Strategic Trends – Out to 2040 declares that it wants to inform “without being constrained by the latest good idea, fashionable trend or received wisdom”.

True to its word, its analysis usefully measures the implications of the way the world is going against the potential for dislocations. Thus it is quite possible China will boast the world’s largest economy by 2030 or so; it is also plausible, as its leaders never stop telling themselves, that China’s progress will hit the buffers of political and social unrest. It is often forgotten that China is in a race to get rich before it gets old.

The US does not look quite the waning power of fashionable fancy. It has geography and demography on its side – a friendly neighbourhood and a growing population that is ageing less fast than that of rivals. It has a big technological edge, a culture of enterprise and innovation, first-rate universities and a stable, if infuriating, political system.

It is not at all hard to paint a picture of the future that has the US and China fighting it out for the title of superpower-in-chief. It is equally true that the biggest losers would be, yes, the US and China. Their interdependence is inescapable. Both need the preservation of a relatively stable international order.

Human nature being what it is, competition may indeed triumph over self-interested co-operation. If so, the really big struggles in coming decades will be between order and disorder and between governance and anarchy. On the other hand, Beijing and Washington might just end up on the same side after all.

http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/efaccb08-1cc9-11df-8d8e-00144feab49a.html?nclick_check=1

‘Cientistas envolvidos no escândalo dos emails escondem informação ambiental‘ in Times

The university at the centre of the climate change row over stolen e-mails broke the law by refusing to hand over its raw data for public scrutiny.

The University of East Anglia breached the Freedom of Information Act by refusing to comply with requests for data concerning claims by its scientists that man-made emissions were causing global warming.

The Information Commissioner’s Office decided that UEA failed in its duties under the Act but said that it could not prosecute those involved because the complaint was made too late, The Times has learnt. The ICO is now seeking to change the law to allow prosecutions if a complaint is made more than six months after a breach.

The stolen e-mails , revealed on the eve of the Copenhagen summit, showed how the university’s Climatic Research Unit attempted to thwart requests for scientific data and other information, and suggest that senior figures at the university were involved in decisions to refuse the requests. It is not known who stole the e-mails.

Professor Phil Jones, the unit’s director, stood down while an inquiry took place. The ICO’s decision could make it difficult for him to resume his post.

Details of the breach emerged the day after John Beddington, the Chief Scientific Adviser, warned that there was an urgent need for more honesty about the uncertainty of some predictions. His intervention followed admissions from scientists that the rate of glacial melt in the Himalayas had been grossly exaggerated.

In one e-mail, Professor Jones asked a colleague to delete e-mails relating to the 2007 report by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.

He also told a colleague that he had persuaded the university authorities to ignore information requests under the act from people linked to a website run by climate sceptics.

A spokesman for the ICO said: “The legislation prevents us from taking any action but from looking at the emails it’s clear to us a breach has occurred.” Breaches of the act are punishable by an unlimited fine.

The complaint to the ICO was made by David Holland, a retired engineer from Northampton. He had been seeking information to support his theory that the unit broke the IPCC’s rules to discredit sceptic scientists.

In a statement, Graham Smith, Deputy Commissioner at the ICO, said: “The e-mails which are now public reveal that Mr Holland’s requests under the Freedom of Information Act were not dealt with as they should have been under the legislation. Section 77 of the Act makes it an offence for public authorities to act so as to prevent intentionally the disclosure of requested information.”

He added: “The ICO is gathering evidence from this and other time-barred cases to support the case for a change in the law. We will be advising the university about the importance of effective records management and their legal obligations in respect of future requests for information.”

Mr Holland said: “There is an apparent Catch-22 here. The prosecution has to be initiated within six months but you have to exhaust the university’s complaints procedure before the commission will look at your complaint. That process can take longer than six months.”

The university said: “The way freedom of information requests have been handled is one of the main areas being explored by Sir Muir Russell’s independent review. The findings will be made public and we will act as appropriate on its recommendations.”

http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/environment/article7004936.ece

Francis Fukuyama: ‘Obama enganou-se sobre o significado da sua eleição‘ in Le Figaro

LE FIGARO. - Quel bilan faites-vous de la première année de la présidence Obama ?

Francis FUKUYAMA. - Obama s'est sans doute trompé sur la signification de son élection. La grande majorité qu'il a rassemblée en 2008 voulait moins faire bouger les lignes de la politique américaine vers la gauche, comme cela avait été le cas sous Roosevelt, qu'exprimer un vote de protestation à l'encontre de George W. Bush. De nombreux électeurs indépendants, centristes, qui votaient habituellement républicain lui ont donné leur vote. Or, Obama a lancé immédiatement d'ambitieuses réformes sociales. Le plan de relance, le sauvetage de l'industrie automobile, puis le chantier de la santé ont poussé bien des gens à conclure qu'il ne pratiquait pas la politique «au-delà des partis» qu'il avait promise. C'est la raison pour laquelle il rencontre si rapidement tant de résistance.

Les analystes ont pourtant beaucoup souligné pendant la campagne ce désir de changement qui traversait la société américaine : or, vous dites que cette société n'est pas prête pour de grands chamboulements ?

Oui, c'est ce que je pense. Le vote de la jeunesse n'a pas été aussi large qu'on l'a dit. Une grande partie des électeurs d'Obama est en réalité venue du centre. Mais peut-être cette erreur d'analyse du président va-t-elle finalement permettre à notre pays d'opérer une transformation majeure. Si le président arrache la réforme de la santé au Congrès, il aura accompli une tâche majeure. Les gens réaliseront qu'elle apporte de vrais bénéfices et que leurs peurs sont infondées.

Les grandes réformes ne vont-elles pas souvent à contre-courant ?

C'est vrai. Mais on a tort de comparer le contexte dans lequel se situe Obama à celui de 1932. Roosevelt avait un vrai mandat pour un changement profond. Même chose pour Reagan, ce qui n'est pas le cas pour Obama.

N'y a-t-il aucune chance que la réforme Climat sur la réduction des émissions de CO2 passe cette année ?

Aucune, selon moi, avec ce Congrès. Même chose pour la réforme de l'immigration, qui est faisable, mais n'est pas possible actuellement. Arracher la réforme de la santé serait déjà un accomplissement formidable. Depuis cinquante ans, tous les présidents ont tenté de s'atteler à cette tâche.

Certains disent qu'Obama n'a pas le talent de Lyndon Johnson pour amadouer le Congrès…

Peut-être, mais il faut comprendre que le Congrès a beaucoup changé et que la vie politique est beaucoup plus polarisée aujourd'hui. Cette polarisation vient du fait que les différents électorats se nourrissent des chaînes d'information correspondant à leurs choix idéologiques. Elle s'explique aussi par la disparition des hommes de l'ère Reagan qui étaient des républicains centristes, moins extrémistes qu'aujourd'hui.

Qu'a accompli le président en politique étrangère ?

Il a fait ce qui était le plus facile à faire : changer le ton de la diplomatie américaine, montrer qu'elle ne compte pas sur la seule force militaire. Il a fait des ouvertures vers l'Iran et la Corée du Nord, dont il était prévisible qu'elles n'auraient pas grand succès. Mais cela va lui permettre de revenir à une politique plus dure. On ne peut pas parler pour l'instant de succès ou d'échecs. La politique afghane aurait pu être plus prudente mais elle n'est pas non plus déraisonnable. Personnellement, je ne suis pas pour un retrait d'Afghanistan mais je ne suis pas certain qu'il soit pertinent d'ajouter un grand nombre de troupes. Dans les années 1980, le fait que les démocrates aient réduit les effectifs de l'armée a poussé les militaires à être plus performants dans la formation de cadres locaux. Le risque de l'envoi de troupes supplémentaires est que les militaires américains ne ressentent pas clairement l'urgence sur place : nous avons dix-huit mois pour commencer à passer la main. S'il s'avère que c'est un échec, il faudra partir.

L'Afghanistan peut-il être le piège qui fasse échouer cette présidence ?

Pas à court terme. Le risque d'échec est grand sur l'Iran ou le Pakistan. Le risque d'une guerre dans le golfe Persique est une vraie possibilité, car il est probable que les Iraniens passeront ce que les Israéliens considèrent comme une ligne rouge. Une action militaire israélienne est une vraie option.

Les Américains n'ont-ils pas les moyens de dissuader Israël de frapper l'Iran ?

L'Administration Obama n'a certainement aucun intérêt à ce qu'une guerre avec l'Iran éclate, mais je ne pense pas qu'elle ait la capacité ni la volonté politique de stopper Israël. Cette Administration en est réduite à limiter les dégâts. Or, le dossier nord-coréen montre les limites des initiatives diplomatiques. Si l'Iran décide de poursuivre son programme nucléaire, nous aurons bien du mal à en gérer les conséquences militaires.

Cette impuissance ne révèle-t-elle pas le déclin de l'ordre américain et plus généralement occidental ?

Si la crise dégénère, c'est effectivement ce que cela démontrera. Mais si Obama n'est pas rattrapé par l'Iran ou le Pakistan, et passe sa réforme de la santé, il pourrait bien devenir un très grand président.

http://www.lefigaro.fr/international/2010/01/20/01003-20100120ARTFIG00069-obama-s-est-trompe-sur-la-signification-de-son-election-.php

Tratado de Lisboa: Portugal fica (ainda) mais irrelevante...

1989: o fim da ‘cortina de ferro‘

‘Decisão absurda de escolher Obama ridiculariza o Prémio Nobel da Paz‘ in Times

The award of this year’s Nobel peace prize to President Obama will be met with widespread incredulity, consternation in many capitals and probably deep embarrassment by the President himself.

Rarely has an award had such an obvious political and partisan intent. It was clearly seen by the Norwegian Nobel committee as a way of expressing European gratitude for an end to the Bush Administration, approval for the election of America’s first black president and hope that Washington will honour its promise to re-engage with the world.

Instead, the prize risks looking preposterous in its claims, patronising in its intentions and demeaning in its attempt to build up a man who has barely begun his period in office, let alone achieved any tangible outcome for peace.

The pretext for the prize was Mr Obama’s decision to “strengthen international diplomacy and co-operation between peoples”. Many people will point out that, while the President has indeed promised to “reset” relations with Russia and offer a fresh start to relations with the Muslim world, there is little so far to show for his fine words.

East-West relations are little better than they were six months ago, and any change is probably due largely to the global economic downturn; and America’s vaunted determination to re-engage with the Muslim world has failed to make any concrete progress towards ending the conflict between the Israelis and the Palestinians.

There is a further irony in offering a peace prize to a president whose principal preoccupation at the moment is when and how to expand the war in Afghanistan.

The spectacle of Mr Obama mounting the podium in Oslo to accept a prize that once went to Nelson Mandela, Aung San Suu Kyi and Mother Theresa would be all the more absurd if it follows a White House decision to send up to 40,000 more US troops to Afghanistan. However just such a war may be deemed in Western eyes, Muslims would not be the only group to complain that peace is hardly compatible with an escalation in hostilities.

The Nobel committee has made controversial awards before. Some have appeared to reward hope rather than achievement: the 1976 prize for the two peace campaigners in Northern Ireland, Betty Williams and Mairead Corrigan, was clearly intended to send a signal to the two battling communities in Ulster. But the political influence of the two winners turned out, sadly, to be negligible.

In the Middle East, the award to Menachem Begin of Israel and Anwar Sadat of Egypt in 1978 also looks, in retrospect, as naive as the later award to Yassir Arafat, Shimon Peres and Yitzhak Rabin — although it could be argued that both the Camp David and Oslo accords, while not bringing peace, were at least attempts to break the deadlock.

Mr Obama’s prize is more likely, however, to be compared with the most contentious prize of all: the 1973 prize to Henry Kissinger and Le Duc Tho for their negotiations to end the Vietnam war. Dr Kissinger was branded a warmonger for his support for the bombing campaign in Cambodia; and the Vietnamese negotiator was subsequently seen as a liar whose government never intended to honour a peace deal but was waiting for the moment to attack South Vietnam.

Mr Obama becomes the third sitting US President to receive the prize. The committee said today that he had “captured the world’s attention”. It is certainly true that his energy and aspirations have dazzled many of his supporters. Sadly, it seems they have so bedazzled the Norwegians that they can no longer separate hopes from achievement. The achievements of all previous winners have been diminished.

http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/us_and_americas/article6867711.ece

Leituras: Cox & Forum, Black & White World IV

‘O ataque dos BRIC‘: Brasil, Rússia, Índia e China ensaiam bloco contra o G7 in Courrier International

Le Brésil, la Russie, l’Inde et la Chine, pays désormais rassemblés sous l’acronyme "BRIC", se sont réunis pour la première fois en vue de tenir un langage commun face aux grands défis internationaux. Ils ont affirmé vouloir une réforme rapide du système financier mondial, même si la question d'une monnaie de réserve supranationale fait débat entre eux, et ont manifesté le souhait d'être plus influents et de se faire entendre davantage aux Nations unies. Le sommet qui a eu lieu le 16 juin dernier dans l’Oural, à Ekaterinbourg, la troisième ville de Russie, se voulait le contrepoids du sommet du G7 (groupe des sept pays les plus industrialisés) qui aura lieu dans un mois en Italie. Le ministre des Affaires étrangères brésilien, Celso Amorim, a donné le ton vendredi. "Le G7 est mort. Il ne représente plus rien. Je ne sais pas comment sera l’enterrement…", a-t-il confié à l'AFP. Les grands pays émergents représentent 25 % des terres habitables de la planète, 40 % de la population mondiale et 15 % du produit intérieur brut mondial. Ce sont en réalité des pays encore très pauvres, mais leur potentiel de croissance est de plus en plus important. Selon Goldman Sachs, qui a inventé l’acronyme BRIC en 2001, ces pays pèseront de plus en plus dans l’économie mondiale. Le PIB de la Chine, par exemple, dépassera celui des Etats-Unis d’ici à 2050. Aujourd’hui, les pays du BRIC pèsent pour 15 % dans le commerce mondial, un chiffre qui devrait augmenter au fil des années. Nandan Unnikrishnan, chercheur à l'Observer Research Foundation de New Delhi et qui a l’oreille des autorités indiennes, met en exergue ce qui unit les quatre pays. Il évoque aussi les relations tumultueuses entre l’Inde et la Chine, les deux moteurs asiatiques du BRIC.

LE TEMPS Le BRIC est-il un concept viable ?
NANDAN UNNIKRISHNAN Les quatre pays ont de nombreuses préoccupations communes : les réformes de la gouvernance mondiale, la mise en place d’une nouvelle architecture financière avec un système de régulation, la démocratisation du Fonds monétaire international pour refléter le véritable poids économique de chaque pays membre, des réformes à apporter à l’ONU et au Conseil de sécurité. Ces revendications ne doivent pas laisser penser que le BRIC est une nouvelle version des pays non-alignés. Les quatre pays ne sont pas identiques. Les économies brésilienne et russe sont fondées sur l’exploitation et l’exportation des matières premières, alors que l’Inde et la Chine sont des importateurs. Dans le domaine industriel, la Russie et le Brésil ont déjà des secteurs très avancés, notamment l’aviation, que la Chine et l’Inde voudraient développer.

La Chine et l’Inde peuvent-elles vraiment s’entendre ?
Les relations entre les deux pays sont très complexes et représentent un défi. Ils souffrent de l’héritage de la colonisation. Les frontières ont été découpées de façon arbitraire. Elles ont donné lieu à une guerre entre les deux pays en 1962. Le différend n’est toujours pas réglé. Une commission y travaille, mais elle ressemble davantage à un chien qui dort et qu’il ne faut pas réveiller. Il s’agit d’une question difficile, c’est pourquoi il faudra encore beaucoup de temps pour la résoudre. Le plus important, c'est que les possibilités d’une nouvelle guerre sont pratiquement inexistantes.

Y a-t-il des points de convergence ?
Les deux pays sont des économies émergentes. Le commerce entre eux ne cesse d’augmenter : il se monte aujourd’hui à plus de 45 milliards de dollars. Nous avons beaucoup de positions communes dans les forums internationaux, notamment dans les négociations commerciales du cycle de Doha. Le fait que nos diplomates s’entendent nous aide à construire une relation de confiance. Construire cette confiance est un objectif majeur.

Les pays du BRIC ne sont-ils pas concurrents dans le commerce international ?
Absolument. Pas seulement dans la conquête des marchés, mais aussi dans la course aux matières premières. Nous avons tous un grand besoin d’énergie ou d’acier. Le Brésil, la Chine et l’Inde se concurrencent, notamment en Afrique. Il y a aussi une vraie concurrence dans le développement des voies maritimes : Pékin et Delhi tentent de s’assurer l’accès aux ports en Asie et en Afrique.

Comment expliquez-vous qu’il y ait plusieurs plaintes commerciales déposées à l’OMC entre le Brésil, l’Inde et la Chine ? Récemment, l’Inde a d’ailleurs interdit l’importation de différents produits chinois ?
C’est de bonne guerre. Lorsque les enfants font leurs dents, ils cherchent toujours à mordre. Il ne s’agit pas de problèmes fondamentaux. Il faut voir le nombre de choses que nous faisons déjà ensemble.
Des entreprises chinoises investissent en Inde. Des entreprises indiennes produisent en Chine.

http://www.courrierinternational.com/article/2009/06/18/bresil-russie-inde-chine-l-attaque-des-bric
JPTF 2009/06/19

A (im)previsível bomba nuclear da Coreia do Norte

‘ASEAN: um gigante com pés de barro‘ in Courrier International

L'instabilité chronique dans plusieurs pays membres affaiblit l'organisation régionale pourtant ambitieuse. L'annulation du dernier sommet en Thaïlande en est la meilleure illustration.

L'ajournement du sommet de Pattaya [au sud de Bangkok] entre les dix membres de l'Association des nations de l'Asie du Sud-Est (ASEAN) et les dirigeants japonais, chinois et sud-coréens n'est pas qu'un camouflet cuisant pour le gouvernement thaïlandais. C'est aussi un terrible revers pour ceux qui espéraient que la coopération aide à juguler la crise économique mondiale en Asie. L'incident pourrait en outre servir de catalyseur et entraîner de nouveaux développements dans l'instabilité politique que traverse depuis longtemps maintenant la Thaïlande [voir CI n° 963, du 16 avril 2009].

Le fiasco thaïlandais a aussi mis fin aux espoirs de l'ASEAN de faire de ce rendez-vous, auquel sont également conviés des responsables indiens, australiens et néo-zélandais, l'événement annuel de la coopération panasiatique, sorte de G16 continental sur lequel les regards du monde entier auraient été braqués. L'ajournement vient rappeler à quel point nombre de pays d'Asie sont politiquement instables, et ce bien avant que l'impact de la récession se soit fait pleinement sentir. Si l'Indonésie a organisé, le 9 avril, des élections législatives qui se sont parfaitement déroulées – preuve des progrès remarquables accomplis par sa démocratie depuis le renversement du président Suharto il y a onze ans –, les tensions politiques en Malaisie ne sont toujours pas en voie de résolution, en dépit de la récente nomination d'un nouveau Premier ministre.

L'échec de la rencontre en Thaïlande a par ailleurs empêché que soit finalisé un accord sur la création d'un fonds de 120 milliards de dollars [94 milliards d'euros] visant à protéger les pays de la région des crises monétaires et à leur permettre de maintenir leur croissance économique sans s'inquiéter inutilement de leur balance des paiements. L'essentiel de cette somme aurait dû être versé par la Chine, la Corée du Sud et le Japon. Au bout du compte, le fonds sera très vraisemblablement créé, mais avant tout parce que les trois Etats du Nord-Est asiatique y trouvent chacun leur intérêt. Tous souhaitent en effet diminuer leur dépendance commerciale à l'égard d'un Occident affaibli et ont donc besoin de soutenir la croissance dans la région. Tous entendent utiliser leurs abondantes réserves pour s'acheter une influence politique. Tous veulent montrer que la coopération financière asiatique est une réalité dont le reste du monde doit prendre acte. Et la Corée, qui accueillera le prochain sommet du G20 [en accédant à la présidence du groupe en 2010], souhaite utiliser l'ASEAN comme plate-forme pour promouvoir sa propre influence dans le monde.

Voilà qui en dit plus sur les intérêts de ces trois pays que sur la véritable capacité de coopération de l'organisation panasiatique. Quoi que laissent penser les accords de libre-échange et autres textes ronflants, l'ASEAN n'a plus l'influence de l'époque où elle pouvait compter sur certains acteurs clés, des poids lourds tels l'Indonésien Suharto, le Singapourien Lee Kwan Yew et le Malaisien Mahathir Mohamad. L'actuel président de l'Indonésie Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono jouit sans doute de quelques bonnes références pour assumer un rôle moteur, mais cela n'est ni dans son caractère consensuel, ni dans l'intérêt d'une Indonésie essentiellement préoccupée par des enjeux intérieurs et peu désireuse de jouer un rôle sur la scène internationale. Du côté des autres pays membres, les Philippines sont pour l'heure relativement stables, mais souvent considérées comme un protagoniste en marge. Singapour a perdu de sa superbe tandis que le Vietnam a gagné une certaine ampleur, mais part de très loin.

Cette incapacité à coopérer est criante et s'est même traduite par une absence de front commun face à la Chine à propos des rivalités territoriales en mer de Chine méridionale [voir CI n° 961, du 1er avril 2009]. Ces derniers temps, les Philippines, le Vietnam et la Malaisie ont tous irrité Pékin avec leurs propres revendications territoriales, mais n'ont fait aucun effort pour résoudre les différends qui les opposent les uns aux autres. Les Philippines ont même signé avec la Chine un contrat d'exploration pétrolière enfreignant un accord de l'ASEAN.Les pays d'Asie du Sud-Est ont abordé la crise économique mondiale en position de force, avec de vastes réserves de devises étrangères et sans avoir créé de bulle spéculative majeure. Ces économies très ouvertes sur l'extérieur demeurent toutefois vulnérables face à une récession prolongée. Elles risquent en effet de souffrir de la chute du prix des matières premières et du ralentissement des transferts de fonds de leurs ressortissants travaillant à l'étranger. A présent, il leur est donc indispensable de rassembler le maximum de ressources additionnelles possibles. Par chance, les principaux détenteurs de devises étrangères se trouvent être leurs voisins. Toutefois, l'accès à ces fonds pourrait s'avérer improductif si l'instabilité politique décourageait l'investissement privé, minait la confiance des consommateurs et paralysait les processus décisionnels.

La Thaïlande, qui s'appuie pourtant sur une économie diversifiée, a déjà pâti des récentes luttes de pouvoirs. La situation pourrait encore s'aggraver alors que les "chemises rouges" pro-Thaksin entendent poursuivre leur mouvement, paralysant ainsi l'actuel gouvernement d'Abhisit Vejjajiva ainsi que l'avaient fait les "chemises jaunes" (anti-Thaksin) avec le gouvernement précédent. En Malaisie, le nouveau Premier ministre a pris ses fonctions avec une cote de popularité encore plus faible que son prédécesseur, tandis que le parti au pouvoir, discrédité par les soupçons de corruption, de meurtre et de ventes d'armes, essuyait une sévère défaite à des élections partielles [le 7 avril]. Dans ces deux pays, les questions fondamentales de gouvernance restent très disputées. Même s'il n'existe aucun risque de voir se répéter le scénario de la crise asiatique de 1997-1998, le fiasco du sommet de l'ASEAN de Pattaya montre clairement que les problèmes politiques de l'Asie du Sud-Est ne concernent pas seulement la région.

http://www.courrierinternational.com/imprimer.asp?obj_id=96773
JPTF 2009/04/18

‘A overdose fatal do Ocidente‘ por Gabor Steingart in Der Spiegel

The G-20 has agreed on plans to fight the global downturn. But its approach will only lay the foundation for the next, bigger crisis. Instead of "stability, growth, jobs," the summit's real slogan should have been "debt, unemployment, inflation."

Now they're celebrating again. An "historic compromise" had been reached, German Chancellor Angela Merkel said at the conclusion of the G-20 summit in London, while US President Barack Obama spoke of a "turning point" in the fight against the global downturn. Behind the two leaders, the summit's motto could clearly be seen: "stability, growth, jobs."

When the celebrations have died down, it will be easier to look at what actually happened in London with a cool eye. The summit participants took the easy way out. Their decision to pump a further $5 trillion (€3.72 trillion) into the collapsing world economy within the foreseeable future, could indeed prove to be a historical turning point -- but a turning point downwards. In combating this crisis, the international community is in fact laying the foundation for the next crisis, which will be larger. It would probably have been more honest if the summit participants had written "debt, unemployment, inflation" on the wall. The crucial questions went unanswered because they weren't even asked. Why are we in the current situation anyway? Who or what has got us into this mess?

The search for an answer would have revealed that the failure of the markets was preceded by a failure on the part of the state. Wall Street and the banks -- the greedy players of the financial industry -- played an important, but not decisive, role. The bank manager was the dealer that distributed the hot, speculation-based money throughout the nation.

But the poppy farmer sits in the White House. And during his time in office, US President George W. Bush enormously expanded the acreage under cultivation. The chief crop on his farm was the cheap dollar, which eventually flooded the entire world, artificially bloating the banks' balance sheets, creating sham growth and causing a speculative bubble in the US real estate market. The lack of transparency in the financial markets ensured that the poison could spread all around the world.

There are -- even in the modern world -- two things that no private company can do on its own: wage war and print money. Both of those things, however, formed Bush's response to the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, 2001. Many column inches have already been devoted to Bush's first mistake, the invasion of Baghdad. But his second error -- flooding the global economy with trillions of dollars of cheap money -- has barely been acknowledged.

No other president has ever printed money and expanded the money supply with such abandon as Bush. This new money -- and therein lies its danger -- was not backed by real value in the form of goods or services. The measure may have had the desired effect -- the world economy revived, at least initially. And US consumption kept the global economy going for years. But the growth rates generated in the process were illusionary. The US had begun to hallucinate.

The addiction to new cash injections was chronic. The US had allowed itself to sink into an abject lifestyle. It sold more and more billions in new government bonds in order to preserve the appearance of a prosperous nation. To make matters worse, private households copied the example of the state. The average American now lives from hand to mouth and has 15 credit cards. The savings rate is almost zero. At the end of the Bush era, 75 percent of global savings were flowing into the US.

The president and the head of the Federal Reserve, Alan Greenspan, knew about the problem very well. Perhaps the Americans even knew just how irresponsible their actions were -- at any rate, they did everything they could to hide them from the world. Since 2006, figures for the money supply -- in other words, the total number of dollars in circulation -- have no longer been published in the US. As a result, a statistic which is regarded by the European Central Bank as a key indicator is now treated as a state secret in the US.

Only on the basis of independent estimates can the outside world get a sense of the internal erosion of what was once the strongest currency in the world. These estimates report a steep rise in the amount of money in circulation. Since the decision to keep the figures confidential, the growth rate for the expansion of the money supply has tripled. Last year alone, the money supply increased by 17 percent. As a comparison, the money in circulation in Europe grew by a mere 5 percent during the same period.

But the change of government in Washington has not brought a return to self-restraint and solidity. On the contrary, it has led to further abandon. Barack Obama has continued the course towards greater and greater state debt -- and increased the pace. One-third of his budget is no longer covered by revenues. The only things which are currently running at full production in the US are the printing presses at the Treasury.

At the summit in London, delegates talked about everything -- except this issue. As a result, no attention was given to the fact that the crisis is being fought with the same instrument that caused it in the first place. The acreage for cheap dollars will now be extended once again. Only this time, the state is also acting as the dealer, so that it can personally take care of how the trillions are distributed.

The International Money Fund was authorized to double, and later triple, its assistance funds -- by borrowing more. The World Bank is also being authorized to increase its borrowing. All the participating countries want to help their economies through state guarantees, which, should they be made use of, would result in a huge increase in the national debt. The US is preparing a new, debt-financed economic stimulus package. Other countries will probably follow its example.

We live in truly historic times -- in that respect, German Chancellor Angela Merkel is right. The West may very well be giving itself a fatal overdose.

http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,druck-617224,00.html
JPTF 2009/04/04