O fim (previsível) da Obamania na Europa: ‘de facto também vamos odiar Obama‘ por David Aaronovitch in Times

It amuses me that some of those who criticise the present US Administration for its Manichaeism - its division of the world into good and evil - themselves allocate all past badness to Bush and all prospective goodness to Obama. As the ever-improving myth has it, on the morning of September 12, 2001, George W. and America enjoyed the sympathy of the world. This comradeship was destroyed, in a uniquely cavalier (or should we say cowboyish) fashion, through the belligerence, the carelessness, the ideological fixity and the rapacity of that amorphous and useful category of American flawed thinker, the neoconservative. They just threw it away.

But there isn't anything that can't be fixed with a sprinkling of genuine fairy dust. What Bush lost, Obama can find. Where the Texan swaggered, the Chicagoan can glide. Emotional literacy will replace flat iteration, persuasion will supplant force as the preferred means of achieving what needs to be achieved, empathy will trump narcissism. Those who hate America may find their antipathy waning, those who were alarmed by unilateralism will warm to softer, moral leadership. A new dawn will break, will it not?

Some on the Left are getting their count-me-outs in already, realising that Mr Obama is, after all, a big-game hunter, a full-trousered American candidate. They, I think, are more realistic than those who manage on one day to laud the Democrat as not being a real politician, and on the next to praise him for his sensible left-trimming when seeking the party's nomination and his equally sensible centre-hugging once it was in the bag. I say the antis are more realistic because, eventually, we will hate or ridicule Mr Obama too - provided, of course, that he is elected and serves two full terms.

George W.Bush, of course, represents a particular kind of offence to European sensibilities. He blew out Kyoto, instead of pretending to care about it and then not implementing it, which is what our hypocrisies require. He took no exquisite pains to make us feel consulted. He invaded Iraq in the name of freedom and then somehow allowed torturers to photograph each other in the fallen dictator's house of tortures. He is not going to run Franklin Roosevelt a close race for nomination as the second greatest president of the US.

But even if he had been a half-Chinese ballet-loving Francophone, he would have been hated by some who should have loved him, for there isn't an American president since Eisenhower who hasn't ended up, at some point or other, being depicted by the world's cartoonists as a cowboy astride a phallic missile. It happened to Bill Clinton when he bombed Iraq; it will happen to Mr Obama when his reinforced forces in Afghanistan or Pakistan mistake a meeting of tribal elders for an unwise gathering of Taleban and al-Qaeda. Then the new president (or, if McCain, the old president) will be the target of that mandarin Anglo-French conceit that our superior colonialism somehow gives us the standing to critique the Yank's naive and inferior imperialism.

Often those who express their tiresome anti-Americanism will suggest, as do some of the more disingenuous anti-Zionists with regard to anti-Semitism - that they, of course, are not anti-American, and that no one really is. But, coming as I do from an Anti-American tradition that wasn't afraid to proclaim itself, I think I know where the corpses are interred. For example, the current production of Bernstein's Candide at the English National Opera is a classic of elite anti-Americanism, in which we are invited to laugh at the philistine invocation of “Democracy, the American Way and McDonald's”. The laughter that accompanied this feeble satire showed our proper understanding that we, the audience, had a proper concept of democracy, and would never soil ourselves with an Egg McMuffin.

The true irony went way above the sniggerers' heads, which was that Leonard Bernstein was the American cultural import that we were, at that very moment, enjoying. But the prejudice is that American culture has had a negative influence on the world, tabloidising our journalism, subverting the gentle land of Ealing with the violent pleasures of Die Hard 10 and commercialising our most intimate lives. And so we have ever complained; my father, back in the early Fifties, once wrote an entire communist pamphlet about the terrible effect of Hollywood and jazz on the land of Shakespeare and Elgar.

This week you could hear the author Andrew O'Hagan on Radio 4, reading from his collection of self-conscious essays, The Atlantic Ocean, in which - despite his own claims - every impact of American life on Britain is somehow configured negatively. He writes of an exported popular culture “born in the suburbs of America” and defined as “Spite as entertainment. Shouting as argument. Dysfunction as normality. Desires as rights. Shopping as democracy.” This in the country that has sent Big Brother, Pop Idol, Wife Swap and Location, Location, Location over the Atlantic in the other direction, while taking delivery of Curb Your Enthusiasm and The Wire.

I should admit that I am irked by O'Hagan's dismissal of the “idiots who supported that bad and stupid war (ie, Iraq)” and am willing to match my idiocy against his intelligence in any debating forum that he cares to name. More interesting, though, is the desire to blame America. For all that O'Hagan claims that the US has lost its purchase on the world's affections, it remains the chosen destination for the most ambitious of the planet's migrants. For all that he claims that this change in sentiment is recent, I can't help recalling those - the most honest - who commented, in journals he writes for and on the very day after September 11, that the Americans had had it coming.

In part I think that anti-Americanism is linked to a view of change as decline. The imagination is that dynamic capitalism, associated with the US, is destroying our authentic lives, with our own partly willing connivance. It is a continuing and - at the moment - constant narrative, uniting left and right conservatives, which will usually take in the 19th- century radical journalist William Cobbett (conveniently shorn of his anti-Semitism), and end with an expression of disgust over the Dome, the Olympics or Tesco. Just as bird flu is a disease from out of the East, runaway modernity is a scourge originating to the West.

So Barack Obama, en fête around the world, will one day learn that there is no magical cure for the envy of others. What makes America the indispensable power (and even more indispensable in the era of the new China), is precisely what makes anti-Americanism inevitable.

OBS: Artigo originalmente publicado a 22/07/08
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/comment/columnists/david_aaronovitch/article4374704.ece
JPTF 2008/11/07

Remake mediático: A 13 de Setembro de 2001 éramos ‘todos americanos‘, a 6 de Novembro de 2008 ‘somos todos Obamas‘...

Dejà vu! Aujourd'hui, nous sommes américains (parte 2). Na política, tal como no cinema, o segundo filme normalmente é pior do que é primeiro, desde logo porque o argumento e o desenlace se tornam, desde o início, bastante previsíveis para o espectador mais atento... Para quem não se recorde da parte 1 deste remake mediático a que estamos a assistir actualmente na imprensa portuguesa e internacional, reproduz-se aqui o ‘filme original‘ (não legendado em português) publicado há 7 anos atrás, na edição de 13/09/2001 do jornal Le Monde, por Jean-Marie Colombani. Aceitam-se apostas até quando seremos ‘todos Obamas‘.

‘Dans ce moment tragique où les mots paraissent si pauvres pour dire le choc que l'on ressent, la première chose qui vient à l'esprit est celle- ci : nous sommes tous Américains ! Nous sommes tous New-Yorkais, aussi sûrement que John Kennedy se déclarait, en 1962 à Berlin, Berlinois. Comment ne pas se sentir en effet, comme dans les moments les plus graves de notre histoire, profondément solidaires de ce peuple et de ce pays, les Etats-Unis, dont nous sommes si proches et à qui nous devons la liberté, et donc notre solidarité. Comment ne pas être en même temps aussitôt assaillis par ce constat : le siècle nouveau est avancé.

La journée du 11 septembre 2001 marque l'entrée dans une nouvelle ère, qui nous paraît bien loin des promesses et des espoirs d'une autre journée historique, celle du 9 novembre 1989, et qu'une année quelque peu euphorique, l'an 2000, que l'on croyait pouvoir se conclure par la paix au Proche-Orient, avait fait naître.

Un siècle nouveau s'avance donc, technologiquement performant, comme le montre la sophistication de l'opération de guerre qui a frappé tous les symboles de l'Amérique : ceux de la surpuissance économique au coeur de Manhattan, de la "puissance" militaire au Pentagone, et enfin de la puissance tutélaire du Proche-Orient tout près de Camp David. Les abords de ce siècle sont aussi inintelligibles. Sauf à se rallier promptement et sans précautions au cliché déjà le plus répandu, celui du déclenchement d'une guerre du sud contre le nord. Mais dire cela, c'est créditer les auteurs de cette folie meurtrière de "bonnes intentions" ou d'un quelconque projet selon lequel il faudrait venger les peuples opprimés contre leur unique oppresseur, l'Amérique. Ce serait leur permettre de se réclamer de la ''pauvreté'', faisant ainsi injure aux pauvres ! Quelle monstrueuse hypocrisie. Aucun de ceux qui ont prêté la main à cette opération ne peut prétendre vouloir le bien de l'humanité. Ceux-là ne veulent pas d'un monde meilleur, plus juste. Ils veulent simplement rayer le nôtre de la carte.

La réalité est plus sûrement celle, en effet, d'un monde sans contrepoids, physiquement déstabilisé donc dangereux, faute d'équilibre multipolaire. Et l'Amérique, dans la solitude de sa puissance, de son hyper-puissance, en l'absence désormais de tout contre-modèle soviétique, a cessé d'attirer les peuples à elle ; ou plus précisément, en certains points du globe, elle ne semble plus attirer que la haine. Dans le monde régulé de la guerre froide où les terrorismes étaient peu ou prou aidés par Moscou, une forme de contrôle était toujours possible ; et le dialogue entre Moscou et Washington ne s'interrompait jamais. Dans le monde monopolistique d'aujourd'hui c'est une nouvelle barbarie, apparemment sans contrôle, qui paraît vouloir s'ériger en contre-pouvoir. Et peut-être avons-nous nous-mêmes en Europe, de la guerre du Golfe à l'utilisation des F16 par l'armée israélienne contre les Palestiniens, sous-estimé l'intensité de la haine qui, des faubourgs de Djakarta à ceux de Durban, en passant par ces foules réjouies de Naplouse et du Caire, se concentre contre les Etats-Unis.

Mais la réalité, c'est peut-être aussi celle d'une Amérique rattrapée par son cynisme : si Ben Laden est bien, comme semblent le penser les autorités américaines, l'ordonnateur de la journée du 11 septembre, comment ne pas rappeler qu'il a lui-même été formé par la CIA, qu'il a été l'un des éléments d'une politique, tournée contre les Soviétiques, que les Américains croyaient savante. Ne serait-ce pas alors l'Amérique qui aurait enfanté ce diable ?

En tout état de cause, l'Amérique va changer. Profondément. Elle est comme un grand paquebot, glissant longtemps sur une même trajectoire. Et lorsque celle-ci est infléchie, elle l'est durablement. Or même si le langage est galvaudé, les Etats-Unis viennent de subir un choc sans précédent. Sans remonter à la toute première agression sur son territoire, celle de 1812 où l'armée britannique détruisit la première Maison Blanche, l'épisode le plus proche qui s'impose est celui de Pearl Harbor. C'était en 1941, loin du continent, avec des bombardiers contre une flotte militaire : l'horreur de Pearl Harbor n'est rien en regard de ce qui vient d'arriver. Elle est au sens propre sans commune mesure : hier 2400 marins engloutis, aujourd'hui bien plus de civils innocents.

Pearl Harbor avait marqué la fin d'un isolationnisme, ancré au point d'avoir résisté même à la barbarie de Hitler. Quand en 1941, Charles Lindbergh faisait une tournée de conférences en Europe pour plaider contre toute implication américaine, une large partie de l'opinion outre-Atlantique rêvait déjà d'un repli sur l'espace latino-américain, laissant l'Europe à ses ruines et à ses crimes. Après Pearl Harbor tout a changé. Et l'Amérique a tout accepté, le plan Marshall comme l'envoi de GI's sur tous les points du globe. Vint ensuite la déchirure vietnamienne, qui a débouché sur une nouvelle doctrine, celle de l'emploi massif et rare de la force, accompagné du dogme du "zéro mort" américain comme cela fut illustré pendant la guerre du Golfe. Tout cela est désormais balayé : nul doute que tous les moyens seront utilisés contre des adversaires restés à ce jour insaisissables.

La nouvelle donne qui s'esquisse dans le sang comporte à ce stade au moins deux conséquences prévisibles. Toutes deux ont trait aux alliances : c'en est bel et bien fini d'une stratégie tout entière conçue contre la Russie alors soviétique. La Russie, du moins dans sa partie non islamisée, va devenir le principal allié des Etats-Unis. Mouvement que le président Poutine a saisi dès le soir du drame. Peut-être en est-ce fini aussi d'une alliance que les Etats-Unis avaient esquissée dès les années trente et solidement établie dans les années 1950 avec l'intégrisme musulman sunnite, tel qu'il est défendu notamment en Arabie saoudite et au Pakistan. Aux yeux de l'opinion américaine et de ses dirigeants, l'islamisme, sous toutes ses formes, risque d'être désigné comme le nouvel ennemi. Certes, le réflexe anti-islamiste avait déjà donné lieu, aussitôt après l'attentat d'Oklahoma City contre un immeuble fédéral, à des déclarations ridicules, sinon odieuses. Mais, cette fois, la haine inextinguible qui nourrit ces attentats tout comme le choix des cibles et le caractère militaire de l'organisation nécessaire limitent le nombre des auteurs possibles.

Au-delà de leur apparente folie meurtrière, ces derniers obéissent malgré tout à une logique. Il s'agit évidemment d'une logique barbare, d'un nouveau nihilisme qui répugne à une grande majorité de ceux qui croient en l'islam, dont la religion n'autorise pas plus le suicide que le christianisme ; à plus forte raison le suicide couplé au massacre des innocents. Mais il s'agit d'une logique politique qui par la montée aux extrêmes veut obliger les opinions musulmanes à "choisir leur camp", contre ceux qui sont couramment désignés comme "le grand Satan". Ce faisant, leur objectif pourrait bien être d'étendre et de développer une crise sans précédent dans l'ensemble du monde arabe.

A long terme, cette attitude est évidemment suicidaire. Parce qu'elle attire la foudre. Et qu'elle peut l'attirer sans discernement. Cette situation commande à nos dirigeants de se hisser à la hauteur des circonstances. Pour éviter aux peuples que ces fauteurs de guerre convoitent et sur lesquels ils comptent d'entrer à leur tour dans cette logique suicidaire. Car on peut le dire avec effroi : la technologie moderne leur permet d'aller encore plus loin. La folie, même au prétexte du désespoir, n'est jamais une force qui peut régénérer le monde. Voilà pourquoi, aujourd'hui, nous sommes américains‘.

http://www.lemonde.fr/opinions/article/2007/05/23/nous-sommes-tous-americains_913706_3232.html
JPTF 2008/11/06

‘Mercados afundam-se enquanto investidores ponderam a presidência de Obama‘ in China Daily, 6 de Novembro de 2008

A case of postelection nerves sent Wall Street plunging Wednesday as investors absorbing a stream of bad economic news wondered how a Barack Obama presidency will help the country weather a possibly severe recession. Volatility returned to the market, with the Dow Jones industrials falling nearly 500 points and all the major indexes tumbling more than 5 percent.

The market was expected to give back some gains after a six-day runup that lifted the Standard & Poor's 500 index more than 18 percent. But investors lost some of their recent confidence about the economy and began dumping stocks again; light volume helped exaggerate the price swings.

And in Asia, stock markets tumbled Thursday, following Wall Street lower as US presidential election euphoria gave way to worries about the global economy and company profits.

apan's Nikkei stock average retreated 6.5 percent to 8,899.14, and Hong Kong's Hang Seng Index lost 7.5 percent to 13,727.50

South Korea's benchmark Kospi index broke a five-session winning streak to dive 7.6 percent. Markets in Singapore, Australia and the Chinese mainland also dropped sharply.

The pullback was in line with weakness on Wall Street, where investor optimism surrounding the election of Democrat Barack Obama as president quickly evaporated in the face of gloomy economic news. The U.S. service sector, the largest component of America's gross domestic product, contracted sharply in October as new orders and employment fell.

"I think what is happening in the market is a continuation of really the last few weeks," said Subodh Kumar, global investment strategist at Subodh Kumar & Associates in Toronto. "The markets are still incorporating the slowdown in the global economy."
Worries about the financial sector intensified after Goldman Sachs Group Inc. began to notify about 3,200 employees globally that they have been lost their jobs as part of a broader plan to slash 10 percent of the investment bank's work force, a person familiar with the situation said. The cuts were first reported last month. Goldman fell 8 percent, while other financial names like Citigroup Inc. fell 14 percent.

Commodities stocks also fell after steelmaker ArcelorMittal said it would slash production because of weakening demand. Its stock plunged 21.5 percent.

Although the market expected Obama to win the election, as the session wore on investors were clearly worrying about the weakness of the economy and pondered what the Obama administration might do to help it. Analysts said the market is already anxious about who Obama selects as the next Treasury Secretary, as well as who he picks for other Cabinet positions

Analysts said investors were also uneasy in advance of the Labor Department's October employment report, to be issued on Friday. Economists on average expect a 200,000 drop in payrolls, according to Thomson/IFR. Employers have been slashing jobs after a freeze-up in the credit markets crippled many companies' ability to get financing.

Late-day selling by hedge funds helped deepen the market's losses during the last hour. More selling by the funds is expected to weigh on the market ahead of a Nov. 15 cutoff for shareholders to notify fund managers of their intent to cash out investments before year-end.

According to preliminary calculations, the Dow fell 486.01, or 5.05 percent, to 9,139.27.

The S&P 500 index fell 52.98, or 5.27 percent, to 952.77. Through the six sessions that ended Tuesday, the index, the one most closely watched by market professionals, rose 18.3 percent.

The Nasdaq composite index fell 98.48, or 5.53 percent, to 1,681.64, while the Russell 2000 index of smaller companies fell 31.33, or 5.74 percent, to 514.64.

http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2008-11/06/content_7178541.htm
JPTF 2008/11/06

Rússia também festeja eleição de Obama... com anúncio de instalação de mísseis em Kalininegrado in EU Observer, 6 de Novembro de 2008

The European Commission has put pressure on EU capitals to approve next week the resumption of talks on a new EU-Russia partnership treaty, put on ice due to Russia's military presence in Georgia.

"These negotiations should continue, first because this would allow the EU to pursue its own interests with Russia, and secondly because this is the best way to engage with Russia on the basis of a unified position," the commission stated on Wednesday (5 November).

Brussels says that the next negotiating sessions should be agreed as soon as Monday (10 November), when 27 EU foreign ministers gather for their regular monthly meeting.

The move cannot be seen as a gift to Russia, external relations commissioner Benita Ferrero-Waldner said, AFP reports. "This does not mean business as usual because we cannot accept the status quo in Georgia."
Talks on an EU-Russia strategic deal were postponed on 1 September until Russian troops withdraw from Georgia's territory to positions held before the short war over South Ossetia in August.

Some post-Communist countries such as Lithuania and Poland - strong allies of Georgia in the conflict - claim that Moscow has not lived up to its committment.

Russian troops have withdrawn from the zones adjacent to South Ossetia and Abkhazia, but they continue to operate in the Akhalgori district and the upper Kodori valley - zones inside the breakaway regions, but previously controlled by Georgian authorities. Russia is also building up troops inside the rebel-held zones and has refused to let OSCE monitors back into South Ossetia.

Earlier this week, Lithuanian and Polish presidents - Valdas Adamkus and Lech Kaczynski - issued a joint statement, expressing deep concern over the lack of will on the Russian side.

Russian threat

Meanwhile, Moscow has renewed its threat to deploy Iskander missiles in Kaliningrad - the Russian enclave between Lithuania and Poland - in response to US plans to place components of a missile shield in central Europe.

"What we've had to deal with in the last few years - the construction of a global missile defence system, the encirclement of Russia by military blocs, unrestrained NATO enlargement ...The impression is we are being tested to the limit," Russian president Dmitry Medvedev said on Russian TV.

The Czech Republic has described the threat as "unfortunate," while Poland said it was "a new political step."

But the timing of Mr Medvedev's address suggests another message, coming just hours after US president-elect Barack Obama gave his victory speech and taking the European Commission by surprise after its recommendation.

The Russian move could be seen as an attempt to gain greater respect from the incoming US administration as well as to revive the EU's internal rift over the controversial project.

OBS: Artigo originalmente publicado com o título ‘Brussels seeks Russia talks amid missile threat‘
http://euobserver.com/9/27053
JPTF 2008/11/06

‘Para o vencedor os despojos — um mundo cheio de problemas‘ in Times, 5 de Novembro de 2008

The problems that will confront Barack Obama beyond the United States make a nonsense of the metaphor of an in-tray. That suggests bureaucratic neatness, a stack of problems waiting for attention that can be dispatched one after the other.

Instead, he will inherit a worldwide map of problems that demand more time, military commitment and money than America can possibly deploy. It is wrong to lay all of those problems at the door of George W. Bush. Many were there before his presidency – Iran, North Korea, the Israeli-Palestinian deadlock, to name just three.

But it is still true that President-elect Obama will take on a challenge different in nature from recent predecessors. The US is engaged in two live wars and Afghanistan is getting worse just as Iraq gets better. More than that, he takes over at a point when US leadership is questioned. In the US’s foreign policy, it has suffered the greatest blow since Vietnam to its reputation for military success and its claim to legitimacy. In economic policy, its recent decisions and even its principles of economic organisation have been challenged.

Around the world, people expect him to change this. The expectations are impossibly high, as the President-elect has already acknowledged. In Europe, many of those who have cheered him seem to expect a US president who will use all of the US’s power and financial weight to solve the world’s problems, regardless of its own interest. They will be disappointed.

Iran
Iran has been strengthened as a regional force by US struggles in Iraq. It has not walked out of the Nuclear NonProliferation Treaty, but nor has it given an inch to pressure from the European Union and the United Nations Security Council in its determination to enrich uranium. It says this is for nuclear fuel but the US and EU argue that it conceals military aims. The notion of a military strike on Iran’s nuclear sites, either by the US or Israel, looks as dangerous as ever. It would be unlikely to do permanent damage and would provoke retaliation on Israel and in Iraq and Afghanistan. Mr Obama could decide to negotiate with Iran – a route President Bush ruled out on principle. There is common interest in stability in Iraq and Afghanistan. However, it might take a change of Iranian president to make progress. The fall in the oil price helps to weaken Iran’s hand.

Middle East
Israel is heading for an election, and Palestinian leadership is split between Hamas and Fatah, so conditions for progress are not ideal. The old basis for hope is still valid: that most Palestinians and Israelis would settle for a two-state solution. There is new urgency: the spread of Israeli West Bank settlements and of Palestinian extremism will be increasingly hard to reverse. The Gulf’s wealth may play a greater role in US corporate finance, and politics, than in the past.

Iraq and Afghanistan
The fall in violence in Iraq has given the US a glimpse of the exit. So has the desire of Nouri al-Maliki, the Prime Minister, to set a date for US troops to go home. But the conflict in Afghanistan is worsening and the next president must decide whether a troop “surge” would help as it did in Iraq.

Before a Nato summit in April, Mr Obama will ask allies for more troops for Afghanistan: it will be hard to deny him completely.

North Korea
North Korea’s on-off agreement to freeze its nuclear weapons work cannot be neglected, though it is more China’s problem to solve than that of the US. The issue is a crisis just as some other fire blazes.

China
The country that has most wrongfooted the US since the fall of the Soviet Union is China. Identical interests in securing energy supplies have led many to predict a clash, but China’s decisions to sign up to international rules and trade talks show that it will work with others. The US faces the same choice. The last two years of President Bush showed a change of tone: more conciliatory, keener on the UN, free of the insults the early Bush team showered on old allies. Mr Obama won’t meet all the world's hopes, but a change of tone would go a long way.

Russia
The first decision is over tone, not actions, but is hard to get right. Vladimir Putin, the Russian Prime Minister, who is gauging the extent of Central and Eastern Europe’s commitment to the US may try to test Mr Obama’s clarity.

Pakistan
After Afghanistan, Pakistan should come next. But it may not. One of the weaknesses of US foreign policy has been the neglect of Pakistan, a country that slips off the agenda and out of news reports. Facing a deepening mood of anti-Americanism, which blends easily into militancy, Pakistan’s leaders need help in demonstrating the value of US support. That means money, spent visibly. The US will need to be more sophisticated than during President Musharraf’s military rule in backing leaders who are good for Pakistan’s democracy, not just those who support US aims.

Africa
Mr Bush won little credit for the money and time he poured into Africa, because of his damaging objection to some contraceptive programmes and nonsensical promotion of abstinence. But the need for a US role is clear, in aid and perhaps in the Democratic Republic of Congo’s new turmoil.

http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/us_and_americas/us_elections/article5084585.ece
JPTF 2008/11/05

‘Barack Obama: o novo Jimmy Carter‘ por Greg Guma in ZMag

Since Barack Obama emerged as the Democrat's choice for president, the national mood has frequently been compared to the late 1960s, another time when an unpopular war polarized the nation. A recent ad for Republican candidate John McCain makes this explicit, starting off with clips of 60s protesters and "flower" children before warning that hope can be a slippery slope. But the dynamics in 2008 may have more in common with 1976, when a GOP discredited by Watergate, Richard Nixon's resignation (under the threat of impeachment) and his pardon by Gerald Ford was defeated by a newcomer to national politics, Jimmy Carter.

Carter, an obscure but charming agribusinessman, became Georgia's governor in 1970 with the support of an Atlanta establishment in need of someone who could talk populism while remaining in tune with corporate interests. Similarly, Obama looks like an "anti-establishment" politician but has played ball during most of his career with the Chicago political establishment. He ran for the state and US Senate as an outsider while operating like an insider, supported by Mayor Richard Daley and the city's wealthy Gold Coast.

By the mid-70s, Carter was the darling of Eastern opinion-makers, meeting with David Rockefeller and lauded as a leader of the "New South." In 1973, he was recommended for membership in the newly formed Trilateral Commission, a private international group that brought together leaders from the North America, Western Europe and Japan. Joining Carter on the North American section of the Commission were Rockefeller, Time Magazine Editor Hedley Donovan, corporate lawyers Cyrus Vance and Warren Christopher, Bendix Corporation chairman W. Michael Blumenthal, IBM20director Harold Brown, UAW president Leonard Woodcock, and eight other business, union, and political figures. Zbigniew Brzezinski, a close friend of Rockefeller, became director of the Commission.

Carter subsequently used Commission sources for much of his presidential campaign strategy. A key document produced during this period was The Crisis of Democracy, co-authored by Brzezinski associate Samuel Huntington, who advised Carter during the campaign and subsequently coordinated security planning for Carter's National Security Council. Brzezinski became National Security Advisor.

Huntington advised that a successful Democratic candidate for president would have to emphasize energy, decisiveness, and sincerity while coming across as an outsider. But the real lesson of the 1960s, he added, was that political parties "could be easily penetrated, and even captured, by highly motivated and well-organized groups with a cause and a candidate."

The appeal of Carter to the establishment was a combination of charm, an "interesting" family, traditional values, and his outsider image. But they knew he was essentially a "centrist" eager to be all things to all people, as Laurence Shoup explained in The Carter Presidency and Beyond. The same can be said of Obama.

Like Obama, Carter went from local curiosity to national phenomenon in less than four years, during a period when the public lost faith in the presidency and other national institutions. By 1975 The New York Times was regularly publishing pro-Carter editorials, articles and columns. Time Magazine was even more enthusiastic, in one feature describing him as looking "eerily like John Kennedy from certain angles" - and hammering the point home with a cover rendering. The drumbeat continued right through primary season with coverage that belittled competitors like Fred Harris, a real populist, with headlines like "Radicalism in a Camper." Carter meanwhile received cover hypes like "Taking Jimmy Seriously." The rest of the mainstream media soon came on board.

Why was it happening? As Brzezinski recently noted in an interview, there is no need to believe in hidden conspiracies. Groups like the Trilateral Commission and Council on Foreign Relations don't conceal their intentions, he noted; you can easily find out what they hope to see happen. Huntington's diagnosis and prescriptions were blunt, and remain relevant. The authority of government depends on confidence and trust, he explained, and when these decline both participation and polarization increase. "If the institutional balance is to be redressed between government and opposition, the decline in presidential power has to be reversed..."

Describing the surge in democratic aspirations as a form of "distemper," Huntington advised that some of the problems "stem from an excess of democracy." It's just one way to exert authority, he argued, and sometimes should be overridden by "expertise, seniority, experience and special talents." He also explained that "the effective operation of a democratic political system usually requires some measure of apathy and noninvolvement on the part of some individuals and groups." People sometimes make too many demands, thus making democracy a threat to itself, he wrote. The basic prescription was to restore respect for authority, particularly in the presidency as an institution, and lower the general level of expectations about what government can do.

When Carter became president, he packed his administration with members of the center and liberal wings of the Eastern establishment. At least 27 high level officials were members of the Trilateral Commission and Council on Foreign Relations, including Vice President Walter Mondale, Vance, Brzezinski, Blumenthal, Christopher, Brown, and Donovan. Pointing to an "alarming deterioration" in international relations and the threat of "long-term disaster," Brown - as Secretary of Defense - prescribed leadership that would persuade people "to make sacrifices of individual and group advantages in order to produce long-term benefits of international economic and political partnership abroad." Carter's job was to restore trust and "renovate" the domestic and international system while leaving its basic structure intact. The fact that he failed in many respects is beside the point.

Now that Obama is the presumptive Democratic nominee, it's becoming apparent that his administration would have many things in common with Carter's. The leader of his foreign policy team is Susan Rice, an assistant Secretary of State for African affairs in the Clinton administration and, more to the point, a current member of the Trilateral Commission's North American Group. Until recently, Trilaterial member James Johnson was on Obama's vice presidential vetting team. He stepped down after questions surfaced about loans he received from Countrywide Financial Corp., a key player in the U.S. housing crisis.

Other North American Trilateral members in Obama's inner circle include Brzezinski, former Clinton Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, Michael Froman of Citigroup, and former Congressman Dick Gephardt, along with Dennis Ross, Middle East envoy for Clinton and the first President Bush, and James Steinberg. Additional Trilateral members of team Obama include Warren Christopher and Clinton National Security Advisor Anthony Lake.

According to a recent New York Times article, Ross, who accompanied Obama to the Middle East in July, is often asked by Rice and Lake for help in framing Obama's comments on Iran and Israel. Steinberg, a Dean at the University of Texas and member of both the Commission and CFR, authored a white-paper titled, "Preventive War, A Useful Tool." In this telling essay, he wrote, "Unilateralism is not the only alternative... regional organizations and a new coalition of democratic states offer ways to legitimize the use of force when the council fails to meet its responsibilities." The problem, he says, isn't the Bush doctrine of "preventive force but that it too narrowly conceives of its use."

The renewed prominence of Brzezinski - architect of the "secret" war in Afghanistan three decades ago - along with the appointment of James Rodney Schlesinger, CIA director and Secretary of Defense during the 1970s, to lead a senior-level task force on nuclear weapons suggests that the process of moving from a neo-con to a Trilateral approach is already underway. The prospect of a military showdown with Iran would decrease during an Obama presidency, but confrontations with Pakistan, China and Russia become more likely.

Faced with such harsh realities, some conclude that an Obama presidency is still preferable to the disaster that is likely with John McCain. O thers contend that the evidence reinforces the need for a third party alternative. Both arguments have merit. Despite Carter's surrender to Trilateral logic, his presidency was a necessary reprieve from morally and ideologically bankrupt Republican rule. And it's certainly vital to look beyond the two-party monopoly, however long the road may be. But the truth is that, in Obama, a worried establishment has found the vessel through which they hope to restore international and domestic stability.

What do they hope to accomplish? Part of the agenda was revealed during an April meeting of the Trilateral Commission in Washington, DC. During panel discussions, the "suggestions" included increased foreign aid - especially for Africa, paying back UN dues, intervention on behalf of "financial institutions under stress," and a more liberal immigration approach. On the other hand, there was much rationalizing about the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.

And what does Obama say? While he pledges to end the war in Iraq, he wants to leave behind a "residual" force of about 50,000 troops. He says his administration will emphasize diplomacy, yet describes Iran as a terrorist state and pledges to use "all elements of American power" to deal with it. "If we must use military force," Obama told the American-Israeli Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), "we are more likely to succeed, and will have far greater support at home and abroad, if we have exhausted our diplomatic efforts."

As far as Afghanistan and Pakistan are concerned, he wants to send at least 10,000 more U.S. troops to reinforce the 36,000 already there, taking unilateral military action inside Pakistan if necessary, whether its government agrees or not. "This is a war that we have to win," Obama explains. In Berlin last week, he called on Europe to provide more troops to defeat the Taliban and Al Qaeda. The size of the US military is likely to grow during an Obama presidency, and the projection of US force, combined with diplomatic carrots and sticks, will certainly continue.

Still, Obama's Trilateral-influenced vision embraces reforms that may bring some relief from the theocratically-infused Bush approach. Supreme Court appointments will be more centrist, the health care system may improve, and some of the worst abuses of the Bush years could be rolled back. These are not insignificant changes, and the pragmatic wing of the establishment, rapidly shifting in Obama's direction, seems to recognize that relief is essential if trust in government is to be restored.

As Huntington noted more than 30 years ago, "democratic distemper" makes allies nervous and enemies adventurous. "If American citizens challenge the authority of the American government, why shouldn't unfriendly governments?" So, Obama - like Carter - can be useful in calming things down and re-establishing confidence in the legitimacy of the current political order. In short, he can reinforce the argument that "the system" still works. For those who want real change, he's bound to be a disappointment. But perhaps, along the road to inevitable disillusionment, at least he may do a bit to ease the pain.

OBS: artigo publicado originalmente no ZMag a 28/07/08
http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/18288
JPTF 2008/10/05

O lado divino das eleições norte-americanas: O ‘messias‘ Barack Obama chega a 4 de Novembro a Washington D.C.

Já conhecíamos a crença messiânica da parte mais radical de certos grupos cristãos evangelistas, anti-aborto, anti-mães solteiras, anti-casamento dos homossexuais, anti-teoria da evolução das espécies de Darwin, etc., e o seu pecado mortal de apoiarem o partido Republicano e a administração de George W. Bush. A grande novidade desta campanha eleitoral é que os republicanos estão em sérios apuros para manterem o seu domínio nesta matéria. O Partido Democrata está em ascensão nas bençãos divinas e, mais importante do que isso, tem o seu próprio messias. Notoriamente este tem mais perfil para o cargo do que o já fora de prazo John McCain. Recorda-se que a idade para para ser messias se situa entre entre os 30 e os 40 anos e, entre e outros requisitos, ser bom comunicador ajuda muito a converter os incrédulos. Quem já sentiu o apelo do novo ‘messias‘ foi o radical líder da Nação do Islão, Louis Farrakhan (ver vídeo no Youtube). A avaliar também pelos apoios da revista de The Economist e do jornal Financial Times, esperam-se grandes milagres económicos e financeiros nos próximos quatro anos. Inshallah!

JPTF 2008/11/02

Estudo do Pew Research Center: parcialidade e falta de objectividade predominam na cobertura eleitoral dos media

The media coverage of the race for president has not so much cast Barack Obama in a favorable light as it has portrayed John McCain in a substantially negative one, according to a new study of the media since the two national political conventions ended.

Press treatment of Obama has been somewhat more positive than negative, but not markedly so.

But coverage of McCain has been heavily unfavorable -- and has become more so over time. In the six weeks following the conventions through the final debate, unfavorable stories about McCain outweighed favorable ones by a factor of more than three-to-one -- the most unfavorable of all four candidates -- according to the study by the Pew Research Center's Project for Excellence in Journalism.

For Obama during this period, just over a third of the stories were clearly positive in tone (36%), while a similar number (35%) were neutral or mixed. A smaller number (29%) were negative.

For McCain, by comparison, nearly six-in-ten stories studied were decidedly negative in nature (57%), while fewer than two-in-ten (14%) were positive.

McCain did succeed in erasing one advantage Obama enjoyed earlier in the campaign -- the level of media exposure each candidate received. Since the end of August, the two rivals have been in a virtual dead heat in the amount of attention paid, and when vice presidential candidates are added to the mix the Republican ticket has the edge. This is a striking contrast to the pre-convention period, when Obama enjoyed nearly 50% more coverage.

Much of the increased attention for McCain derived from actions by the senator himself, actions that, in the end, generated mostly negative assessments. In many ways, the arc of the media narrative during this phase of the 2008 general election might be best described as a drama in which John McCain has acted and Barack Obama has reacted.

As for Alaska Gov. Sarah Palin, her coverage had an up and down trajectory, moving from quite positive, to very negative, to more mixed. Driving that tone toward a more unfavorable light were the probing of her public record and her encounters with the press. Little of her trouble came from coverage of her personal traits or family issues. In the end, she also received less than half the coverage of either presidential nominee, though about triple that of her vice presidential counterpart, Joe Biden.

The findings suggest that Palin's portrayal in the press was not the major factor hurting McCain. Her coverage, while tilting negative, was far more positive than her running mate's.

These are some of the findings of the study, which examined 2,412 campaign stories from 48 news outlets, during six critical weeks of the general election phase from the end of the conventions through the final presidential debate. Tone was examined on a subset of this sample, 857 stories from 43 outlets, from those campaign stories that were focused on one of the candidates. Marion Just of Wellesley College served as a consultant on the study. The Project is funded by the Pew Charitable Trusts.

Among the findings:

Coverage of Obama began in the negative after the conventions, but the tone switched with the changing direction of the polls. The most positive stories about him were those that were most political -- focused on polling, the electoral map and tactics.
For McCain, coverage began positively, but turned sharply negative with McCain's reaction to the crisis in the financial markets. As he took increasingly bold steps in an effort to reverse the direction of the polls, the coverage only worsened. Attempts to turn the dialogue away from the economy through attacks on Obama's character did hurt Obama's media coverage, but McCain's was even more negative.
Coverage of Palin, in the end, was more negative than positive. In all, 39% of Palin stories carried a negative tone, while 28% were positive and 33% were neutral. Contrary to what some critics have suggested, little of the coverage was about Palin's personal life (5%).
Democratic vice presidential nominee Joe Biden was nearly the invisible man. His coverage enjoyed just one large moment, the vice presidential debate, which also provided the only positive or neutral contribution to his coverage. Aside from that week, the limited coverage he did receive was far more negative than Palin's, and nearly as negative as McCain's.
The economy was hardly a singular lens through which the media perceived the race. Though it was the No. 1 campaign topic overall, in five out of the six weeks analyzed, other topics drew more media attention, and the economy accounted for not much more of the campaign newshole (18%) than did assessments of the candidates in the four debates (17%).
Horse race reporting, once again, made up the majority of coverage, but less so than earlier in the contest or in previous elections. Since the conventions ended, 53% of the newshole studied has focused on political matters, particularly tactics, strategy and polling -- twice the coverage focused on policy (20%). The focus on tactics and horse race increased in the last three weeks as both campaigns became more negative in their rhetoric.
Tone is an elusive and yet unavoidable question when examining the role of the news media. Who got better coverage, and why?

To examine tone, the Project takes a particularly cautious and conservative approach. Unlike some researchers, we examine not just whether assertions in stories are positive or negative, but also whether they are essentially neutral. This, we believe, provides a much clearer and fairer sense of the tone of coverage than ignoring those balanced or mixed evaluations. Second, we do not simply tally up all the evaluative assertions in stories and compile them into a single measure. Journalists and audiences think about press coverage in stories or segments. They ask themselves, is this story positive or negative or neutral? Hence, the Project measures coverage by story, and for a story to be deemed as having a negative or positive tone, it must be clearly so, not a close call. For example, the negative assertions in a story must outweigh other assertions by a margin of at least 1.5 to 1 for that story to be deemed negative.

One question likely to be posed is whether these findings provide evidence that the news media are pro-Obama. Is there some element in these numbers that reflects a rooting by journalists for Obama and against McCain, unconscious or otherwise? The data do not provide conclusive answers. They do offer a strong suggestion that winning in politics begets winning coverage, thanks in part to the relentless tendency of the press to frame its coverage of national elections as running narratives about the relative position of the candidates in the polls and internal tactical maneuvering to alter those positions. Obama's coverage was negative in tone when he was dropping in the polls, and became positive when he began to rise, and it was just so for McCain as well. Nor are these numbers different than those we have seen before. Obama's numbers are similar to what we saw for John Kerry four years ago as he began rising in the polls, and McCain's numbers are almost identical to those recorded eight years ago for Democrat Al Gore.

What the findings also reveal is the reinforcing -- rather than press-generated -- effects of media. We see a repeating pattern here in which the press first offers a stenographic account of candidate rhetoric and behavior, while also on the watch for misstatements and gaffes. Then, in a secondary reaction, it measures the political impact of what it has reported. This is magnified in particular during presidential races by the prevalence of polling and especially daily tracking polls. While this echo effect exists in all press coverage, it is far more intense in presidential elections, with the explosion of daily tracking polls, state polls, poll aggregation websites and the 24-hour cable debate over their implications. Even coverage of the candidate's policy positions and rhetoric, our reading of these stories suggests, took on the cast of horse race coverage.

http://pewresearch.org/pubs/1001/campaign-media
JPTF 2008/10/29

‘A ascensão dos Obamacons‘ in The Economist, 27 de Outubro de 2008

IN “W.”, his biopic about his Yale classmate, Oliver Stone details Colin Powell’s agonies during George Bush’s first term. Throughout the film Mr Powell repeatedly raises doubts about the invasion of Iraq—and is repeatedly overruled by the ghoulish trio of Dick Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld and Karl Rove. In one of the final scenes, with his direst warnings proving correct, Mr Powell turns to Mr Cheney and delivers a heartfelt “Fuck you”.

The real Colin Powell used more diplomatic language in endorsing Barack Obama on October 19th, but the impact was much the same. Mr Obama is a “transformational figure”, he mildly said, and his old friend John McCain had erred in choosing a neophyte as a running-mate. But you would have to be naive not to see the endorsement as a verdict on the Bush years.

Mr Powell is now a four-star general in America’s most surprising new army: the Obamacons. The army includes other big names such as Susan Eisenhower, Dwight’s granddaughter, who introduced Mr Obama at the Democratic National Convention and Christopher Buckley, the son of the conservative icon William Buckley, who complains that he has not left the Republican Party: the Republican Party has left him. Chuck Hagel, a Republican senator from Nebraska and one-time bosom buddy of Mr McCain has also flirted heavily with the movement, though he has refrained from issuing an official endorsement.

The biggest brigade in the Obamacon army consists of libertarians, furious with Mr Bush’s big-government conservatism, worried about his commitment to an open-ended “war on terror”, and disgusted by his cavalier way with civil rights. There are two competing “libertarians for Obama” web sites. CaféPress is even offering a “libertarian for Obama” lawn sign for $19.95. Larry Hunter, who helped to devise Newt Gingrich’s Contract with America in 1994, thinks that Mr Obama can free America from the grip of the “zombies” who now run the Republican Party.

But the army has many other brigades, too: repentant neocons such as Francis Fukuyama, legal scholars such as Douglas Kmiec, and conservative talk-show hosts such as Michael Smerconish. And it is picking up unexpected new recruits as the campaign approaches its denouement. Many disillusioned Republicans hoped that Mr McCain would provide a compass for a party that has lost its way, but now feel that the compass has gone haywire. Kenneth Adelman, who once described the invasion of Iraq as a “cakewalk”, decided this week to vote for Mr Obama mainly because he regards Sarah Palin as “not close to being acceptable in high office”.

The rise of the Obamacons is more than a reaction against Mr Bush’s remodelling of the Republican Party and Mr McCain’s desperation: there were plenty of disillusioned Republicans in 2004 who did not warm to John Kerry. It is also a positive verdict on Mr Obama. For many conservatives, Mr Obama embodies qualities that their party has abandoned: pragmatism, competence and respect for the head rather than the heart. Mr Obama’s calm and collected response to the turmoil on Wall Street contrasted sharply with Mr McCain’s grandstanding. Much of Mr Obama’s rhetoric is strikingly conservative, even Reaganesque. He preaches the virtues of personal responsibility and family values, and practises them too. He talks in uplifting terms about the promise of American life. His story also appeals to conservatives: it holds the possibility of freeing America from its racial demons, proving that the country is a race-blind meritocracy and, in the process, bankrupting a race-grievance industry that has produced the likes of Jesse Jackson and Al Sharpton.

How much do these Obamacons matter? More than Mr McCain would like to think. The Obamacons are manifestations of a deeper turmoil in the Republican rank-and-file, as the old coalition of small-government activists, social conservatives and business Republicans falls apart. They also influence opinion. This is obvious in the case of Mr Powell: Mr Obama is making liberal use of his endorsement to refute the latest Republican criticism that he is a “socialist”. But it is also true of lesser-known scribblers. At least 27 newspapers that backed Mr Bush in 2004 have endorsed Mr Obama.

Moreover, the revolt of the intellectuals is coinciding with a migration of culturally conservative voters—particularly white working-class voters—into Obamaland. Mr Obama is now level-pegging or leading among swing-groups such as Catholics and working-class whites. A recent Washington Post-ABC poll shows him winning 22% of self-described conservatives, a higher proportion than any Democratic nominee since 1980.

Don’t blame the rats
The more tantalising question is whether the rise of the Obamacons signals a lasting political realignment. In 1980 the rise of the neocons—liberal intellectuals who abandoned a spineless Democratic Party—was reinforced by the birth of working class “Reagan Democrats”. Is the Reagan revolution now going into reverse? There are reasons for scepticism. Will libertarians really stick with “Senator Government”, as Mr McCain labelled Mr Obama in the best slip of the tongue of the campaign? Will economic conservatives cleave to a president who believes in “spreading the wealth around”?

Much depends on how Mr Obama governs if he wins, and how the Republicans behave if they lose. Mr Obama talks about creating an administration of all the talents. He promises to take the cultural anxieties of Reagan Democrats seriously. For their part, hard-core Republicans are handling their party’s travails abysmally, retreating into elite-bashing populism and denouncing the Obamacons as “rats” who are deserting a sinking ship. If the Republican Party continues to think that the problem lies with the rats, rather than the seaworthiness of the ship, then the Obamacons are here to stay.
http://www.economist.com/world/unitedstates/displayStory.cfm?source=most_recommended&story_id=12470555
JPTF 2008/10/27

‘Índice Dow Jones sofreu a maior quebra diária após voto de rejeição da Câmara dos Representantes‘ in CNN, 29 de Setembro de 2008

U.S. lawmakers in the House of Representatives on Monday voted against the biggest proposed government intervention in the U.S. economy since the Great Depression of 1929.

Government officials, Treasury chiefs and political leaders from both sides of the political divide thought they had agreed Sunday on the details of a $700 billion rescue plan that would prop up the nation's ailing financial system - and be supported in the House of Representatives.

As it became apparent the vote was lost, the Dow plunged and closed about 690 points down.

Republicans and Democrats blamed each other for the result - 205 to 228 against the bailout.

President George W. Bush was "very disappointed," his spokesman, Tony Fratto said. Bush will be meeting with his advisors and will be calling congressional leaders, Fratto added.

Before the vote, Bush said the plan was of "tremendous importance to all Americans."

He said it would address "the root causes of the financial crisis" and "restore strength and stability to the U.S. financial system."

A four-hour debate included impassioned pleas for and against the measure from Democrats and Republicans alike. Even some of those arguing the legislation must be approved were quick to point out problems with it.

But the vote began with both Democratic and Republican leadership telling their members the only way to protect the economy from a spreading credit crunch was to vote for the difficult to swallow measure.

After the defeat, Republican leaders accused Nancy Pelosi, the Democratic speaker of the House, of giving a "partisan speech" which "poisoned" Republican support.

Pelosi said the $700 billion "is a number that is staggering, but tells us only the costs of the Bush administration's failed economic policies."

But Barney Frank, the top Democrat on the House Financial Services Comnmittee, demanded: "Because somebody hurt their feelings, they decided to punish the country?"

When leading House Republicans signed on to the proposal Sunday after earlier reservations, the bill was expected to pass.

Governments, markets and businesses around the world were watching developments in Washington closely amid fears that failure to tackle the crisis on Wall Street could have disastrous repercussions for the entire global economy.

Markets tumbled again on Monday, affected by uncertainty earlier in the day over the U.S. bailout plan and fresh anxiety over the longterm consequences of so-called "toxic debts" which have already brought many established financial names to their knees.

On Wall Street, the Dow Jones plunged 730 points as it became apparent the bailout was rejected. It recovered slightly to about 500 points down but closed at 690 down according to preliminary figures.

Light, sweet crude oil for November fell $10.52, or 8.9%, to $96.37 on the New York Mercantile Exchange.

European and Asian markets were closed by the time the bailout was rejected.

In Europe, London's FTSE 100 closed down about 4.16 percent, Paris' CAC-40 was down 4.9 percent and Frankfurt's DAX fell 3.87 percent.

In Asia, Hong Kong's benchmark Hang Seng Index shed 4.31 percent to 17,876.41 while Tokyo's Nikkei closed down 1.3 percent at 11,743.61.

In other developments Monday, federal regulators said they had brokered a deal for Wachovia, the fourth largest bank in the U.S., to sell its banking assets to Citigroup. Shares in Wachovia crashed on Friday amid concerns over its exposure to subprime mortgage debt.

The UK's Bradford & Bingley mortgage lender became the second British bank to be taken into public ownership as a consequence of the fallout from the credit crunch.

Troubled Dutch-Belgian insurance giant Fortis also received an 11.2 billion euros ($16.4 billion) lifeline to protect it from insolvency over the weekend from the governments of Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg.

The U.S. bailout bill, released Sunday and endorsed by Bush after days of intense negotiations, is based on Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson's request for authority to purchase bad debts from financial institutions so banks can resume lending to enable credit markets, now virtually frozen, to resume operating normally.

Concerns among some politicians over potential costs to taxpayers led to several amendments inserted to protect them from risk while giving them a chance to share in any profits if companies on Wall Street benefit from the plan.

Pelosi said Sunday the provisions added by Congress -- which include a restriction on salary packages for senior executives whose companies benefit from the rescue plan -- will protect taxpayers from having to foot the bill for the bailout.

The aim of the rescue plan, which Paulson has been pushing since September 18, is to unfreeze the credit markets -- short-term lending among banks and corporations. The core of the problem is bad real estate loans that led to record foreclosures when the housing bubble burst and home prices declined.

In the past two weeks, the banking world and Wall Street have been reordered by a wave of collapses and corporate mergers.

The U.S. government has already intervened to protect key mortgage lenders Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and insurance giant AIG. Investment bank Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy while Merrill Lynch was forced to sell itself to Bank of America.

http://edition.cnn.com/2008/BUSINESS/09/29/us.congress.bailout.deal/index.htmlJPTF 2008/09/29

A ascensão do resto: o mundo pós-americano, de Fareed Zakaria

No seu mais recente livro The post-American World, acabado de publicar nos EUA pela W. W. Norton (um ensaio de 288 páginas), Fareed Zakaria, editor de ascendência indiana da revista Newsweek, traça um retrato prospectivo do mundo nas próximas décadas do século XXI. Sem grande surpresa, a sua antevisão é um mundo ‘pós-americano‘ marcado pela ‘ascensão do resto‘ (leia-se do mundo não ocidental). Apesar das angústias da ‘superpotência solitária‘ (a expressão é de Samuel P. Huntington) e das incertezas e riscos existentes, que este antecipa e discute, a sua visão está imbuída de um certo optimismo - resta saber se a evolução futura o confirmará. Algumas das ideias centrais do livro estão condensadas no artigo Fareed Zakaria para a Foreign Affairs de Maio/Junho de 2008, intitulado The Future of American Power:How America Can Survive the Rise of the Rest.
JPTF 2008/05/10