Arquipélago das Senkaku/Diaoyu: as ilhas da discórdia entre a China e o Japão (será que valem uma guerra?)

Capitalismo ‘made in China‘: estudantes universitários obrigados a trabalhar na FoxConn para produção do novo iPhone 5

Thousands of students in an east China city are being forced to work at a Foxconn plant after classes were suspended at the beginning of the new semester, it has been revealed.

Students from Huai'an in Jiangsu Province were driven to a factory in the city run by Taiwan's Foxconn Technology Company after the plant couldn't find sufficient workers for the production of Apple's much-anticipated iPhone 5, they said in online posts.

A student majoring in computing at the Huaiyin Institute of Technology said 200 students from her school had been driven to the factory.

They started work on the production line last Thursday and were being paid 1,550 yuan (US$243.97) a month for working six days a week, she said.

But they had to pay hundreds of yuan for food and accommodation, she said in an online post under the name of mengniuIQ84.

Several other students from at least five colleges backed up what she said, saying they were being forced to work for 12 hours a day.

Badly disrupted

A Jiangsu Institute of Finance and Economy student called Youyoyu said students from departments of law, English and management were all working at the plant.

A Huai'an University student posting under the name of Dalingzhuimengnan said Foxconn was badly in need of 10,000 workers but students were looking forward to returning to classrooms to continue their academic studies which had been seriously disrupted.

MengniuIQ84 wrote that the authorities had ordered the schools to send students to assist Foxconn but said that the factory neither informed parents nor signed agreements with students.

One or two schools had canceled their internship programs with Foxcon after media exposure and pressure from the public, she said, but her institute had no plans to do so and had even punished students who had tried to leave the factory. [...]


Ver notícia no ShanghaiDaily.com

Quando o Ocidente abre mão dos seus valores: ‘O consenso de Pequim. Legitimando o autoritarismo na nossa época‘

Quando a China não existia para a economia global: ‘Os donos do mundo - Alemanha, EUA, Japão‘ (1992) de Georges Valence

Leituras: ‘Quando a China governar o mundo‘ de Martin Jacques

União Europeia nega existência de guerra comercial com a China

Business between the EU and China is running as usual, despite highly-public trade differences between the two economic powerhouses, the Danish trade minister has said.

"I wouldn't say that [EU-China trade relations] are deteriorating, I think they are just more in the open now," Pia Olsen Dyhr, whose country currently holds the rotating EU chairmanship, told EUobserver in an interview on Thursday (16 March).

Her comments come two days after the EU joined the US and Japan in a fresh complaint to the World Trade Organisation (WTO) over China's restrictions on the export of so-called rare earth elements, used in the manufacture of high-tech devices.

"China has been a member of the WTO for 10 years now and some member countries are testing how it is implementing the rules," she said. "That is why we see these cases arising. In the beginning they had a transition period but that is running out."

The complaint over rare earth exports came on top of a delay last week of a multi-billion-euro Chinese order of European-made Airbus jets, seen as retaliation against a new EU tax on airlines' carbon emissions. [...]

Ver notícia no EUObserver

‘A ascensão do capitalismo de estado‘ in The Economist

Over the past 15 years striking corporate headquarters have transformed the great cities of the emerging world. China Central Television’s building resembles a giant alien marching across Beijing’s skyline; the 88-storey Petronas Towers, home to Malaysia’s oil company, soar above Kuala Lumpur; the gleaming office of VTB, a banking powerhouse, sits at the heart of Moscow’s new financial district. These are all monuments to the rise of a new kind of hybrid corporation, backed by the state but behaving like a private-sector multinational.

State-directed capitalism is not a new idea: witness the East India Company. But as our special report this week points out, it has undergone a dramatic revival. In the 1990s most state-owned companies were little more than government departments in emerging markets; the assumption was that, as the economy matured, the government would close or privatise them. Yet they show no signs of relinquishing the commanding heights, whether in major industries (the world’s ten biggest oil-and-gas firms, measured by reserves, are all state-owned) or major markets (state-backed companies account for 80% of the value of China’s stockmarket and 62% of Russia’s). And they are on the offensive. Look at almost any new industry and a giant is emerging: China Mobile, for example, has 600m customers. State-backed firms accounted for a third of the emerging world’s foreign direct investment in 2003-10.

With the West in a funk and emerging markets flourishing, the Chinese no longer see state-directed firms as a way-station on the road to liberal capitalism; rather, they see it as a sustainable model. They think they have redesigned capitalism to make it work better, and a growing number of emerging-world leaders agree with them. The Brazilian government, which embraced privatisation in the 1990s, is now interfering with the likes of Vale and Petrobras, and compelling smaller companies to merge to form national champions. South Africa is also flirting with the model.

This development raises two questions. How successful is the model? And what are its consequences - both in, and beyond, emerging markets? [...]

Ver artigo na revista The Economist

A estratégia chinesa do yuan arruina as finanças do Ocidente

Mi-2007 éclatait la crise des pays occidentaux. Mi-2009, ceux-ci sortaient de leur récession mais ne se débarrassaient pas pour autant de la crise qui restait la leur. Mi-2011, leur situation vient même de rebondir sous forme d'une crise conjointe de leurs finances publiques qui menace maintenant de les faire rechuter en récession...

En face, la Chine manifeste une santé insolente : trente-troisième année d'affilée sans récession, une croissance du produit intérieur brut (PIB) à 10 % l'an depuis vingt ans, un chômage qui ne cesse de reculer, des réserves de change, qui, tout compté, dépassaient déjà 4 500 milliards de dollars (3 165 milliards d'euros) à la fin du mois de juin 2011...

Ce contraste s'explique par l'énorme sous-évaluation du yuan infligée par la Chine à ses partenaires et rivaux. Grâce à un contrôle des changes draconien qui n'est accessible qu'aux Etats totalitaires, la Chine maintient le yuan à 0,15 dollar et à 0,11 euro, quand, selon le Fonds monétaire international (FMI) et l'ONU, il devrait valoir 0,25 dollar et 0,21 euro !

Les pays occidentaux sont restés totalement passifs face au cours du yuan que leur dicte la Chine. Depuis que, en 2001, ils ont admis la Chine à l'Organisation mondiale du commerce (OMC), armée de son contrôle des changes, ils se sont privés, il est vrai, de la seule arme qui pourrait la faire céder : les représailles douanières.

Il en a résulté à la fois une désindustrialisation majeure des pays occidentaux et une industrialisation intense de la Chine.

La main-d'oeuvre en Chine étant la moins chère au monde, les entreprises qui y sont basées s'emparent de parts croissantes du marché mondial tandis que les multinationales occidentales viennent concentrer leurs investissements productifs sur le territoire chinois. Ce qui renforcera encore les parts du marché mondial captées par la Chine...

Ver artigo no Le Monde

Quando a China se tornar o nº 1

How will it feel when China becomes the world’s largest economy? We may find out quite soon. A few weeks ago, the International Monetary Fund issued a report that suggested China would be number one within five years.

The projection that the Chinese economy will be larger than that of the US by 2016 included adjustments for the domestic purchasing power of the two countries’ currencies. Some regard this interpretation of IMF data as a dubious move that artificially boosts the size of the Chinese economy. But even using real exchange rates does not defer the day when America is knocked off its perch by very much. A projection by The Economist, made just before Christmas, foresaw China becoming number one in 2019.The ascent of China will change ideas of what it means to be a superpower. Over the course of the American century, the world has got used to the idea that the world’s largest economy was also the world’s most obviously affluent nation. The world’s biggest economy housed the world’s richest people.
As China emerges as an economic superpower, the connection between national and personal affluence is being broken. China is both richer and poorer than the western world. It is sitting on foreign reserves worth $3,000bn. And yet, measured at current exchange rates, the average American is about 10 times as wealthy as the average Chinese.
The relative affluence of US society is one reason why China will not become the world’s most powerful country on the day that it becomes the largest economy. The world’s habit of looking to the US as the “sole superpower” also makes it likely that America’s political dominance will outlast its economic supremacy. America has an entrenched position in global institutions. It matters that the United Nations, the IMF and the World Bank are all situated in the US – and that Nato is built around America.
The US military has a global reach and a technological sophistication that China is nowhere near matching. The US is also ahead on soft power. China, as yet, has no equivalents to Hollywood, Silicon Valley or “the American dream”. [...]

Ver notícia no Financial Times

O Japão redefine a sua estratégia militar face à ameaça da China e Coreia do Norte

Japan, which shares a maritime border with China, said Beijing's military build-up was of global concern.
Japan will also strengthen its missile defences against the threat from a nuclear-armed North Korea.
The policy document has been approved by the cabinet and will shape Japan's defence policy for the next 10 years.
Japan is changing its defence policy in response to the shifting balance of power in Asia, analysts say.
Defences will be scaled down in the north, where they have been deployed since the Cold War to counter an invasion from Russia.
The military focus will now be in the far-southern islands of Japan, closer to China.
Japan is concerned by China's growing naval might and increased assertiveness in the East China and South China seas.
"China is rapidly modernising its military force and expanding activities in its neighbouring waters," the new guidelines said.
"Together with the lack of transparency on China's military and security issues, the trend is a concern for the region and the international community."
Relations between Japan and China deteriorated sharply in September, after collisions between a Chinese trawler and Japanese patrol boats near a chain of disputed islands in the East China Sea.

Ver notícia na BBC [...]

O prémio Nobel da Paz e a cadeira vazia, cartoon de Vador

A China à compra compra do mundo

In theory, the ownership of a business in a capitalist economy is irrelevant. In practice, it is often controversial. From Japanese firms’ wave of purchases in America in the 1980s and Vodafone’s takeover of Germany’s Mannesmann in 2000 to the more recent antics of private-equity firms, acquisitions have often prompted bouts of national angst.

Such concerns are likely to intensify over the next few years, for China’s state-owned firms are on a shopping spree. Chinese buyers—mostly opaque, often run by the Communist Party and sometimes driven by politics as well as profit—have accounted for a tenth of cross-border deals by value this year, bidding for everything from American gas and Brazilian electricity grids to a Swedish car company, Volvo.

There is, understandably, rising opposition to this trend. The notion that capitalists should allow communists to buy their companies is, some argue, taking economic liberalism to an absurd extreme. But that is just what they should do, for the spread of Chinese capital should bring benefits to its recipients, and the world as a whole. [...]

Ver notícia no The Economist

Como parar uma guerra cambial

In recent weeks the world economy has been on a war footing, at least rhetorically. Ever since Brazil’s finance minister, Guido Mantega, declared on September 27th that an “international currency war” had broken out, the global economic debate has been recast in battlefield terms, not just by excitable headline-writers, but by officials themselves. Gone is the fuzzy rhetoric about co-operation to boost global growth. A more combative tone has taken hold. Countries blame each other for distorting global demand, with weapons that range from quantitative easing (printing money to buy bonds) to currency intervention and capital controls.
Behind all the smoke and fury, there are in fact three battles. The biggest one is over China’s unwillingness to allow the yuan to rise more quickly. American and European officials have sounded tougher about the “damaging dynamic” caused by China’s undervalued currency. Last month the House of Representatives passed a law allowing firms to seek tariff protection against countries with undervalued currencies, with a huge bipartisan majority. China’s “unfair” trade practices have become a hot topic in the mid-term elections.
A second flashpoint is the rich world’s monetary policy, particularly the prospect that central banks may soon restart printing money to buy government bonds. The dollar has fallen as financial markets expect the Federal Reserve to act fastest and most boldly. The euro has soared as officials at the European Central Bank show least enthusiasm for such a shift. In China’s eyes (and, sotto voce, those of many other emerging-market governments), quantitative easing creates a gross distortion in the world economy as investors rush elsewhere, especially into emerging economies, in search of higher yields. [...]

Ver artigo no The Economist

A China oferece apoio financeiro à Grécia

Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao offered Greece a major vote of confidence on a visit to the debt-ridden European nation, saying China will continue to buy Greek bonds and announcing the creation of a $5 billion fund to help Greek shipping companies buy Chinese ships.
The remarks represent some of China's most substantive support for the euro zone amid the region's debt troubles, and reflect the Asian giant's growing willingness to wield its economic clout to obtain wider international influence. Mr. Wen's Athens visit kicks off a week of intensive Chinese-European diplomacy, with the premier heading to Italy and Turkey as well as to summit meetings with European Union leaders in Brussels. "We hope that by intensifying cooperation with you, we can be of some help in your endeavor to tide over difficulties at an early date," Mr. Wen said Sunday in a speech to the Greek parliament. "China will not reduce its euro-bond holdings and China supports a stable euro." China has long had economic interests in Greece, primarily in its shipping industry, and it runs a substantial trade surplus with the European country. China's relations with Greece have come into focus in recent months as Greek officials actively lobbied the Asian nation to support its economy. Athens is desperate for investment as the country claws its way out of a deep recession and a debt crisis that drove it to the brink of bankruptcy in May. [...]

Ver notícia no WSJ

Uma guerra comercial com a China?

No one familiar with the Smoot-Hawley tariff of 1930 should relish the prospect of a trade war with China -- but that seems to be where we're headed and is probably where we should be headed. Although the Smoot-Hawley tariff did not cause the Great Depression, it contributed to its severity by provoking widespread retaliation. Confronting China's export subsidies risks a similar tit-for-tat cycle at a time when the global economic recovery is weak. This is a risk, unfortunately, we need to take.

In a decade, China has gone from a huge, poor nation to an economic colossus. Although its per capita income ($6,600 in 2009) is only one-seventh that of the United States ($46,400), the sheer size of its economy gives it a growing global influence. China passed Japan this year as the second-largest national economy. In 2009, it displaced Germany as the biggest exporter and also became the world's largest energy user.

The trouble is that China has never genuinely accepted the basic rules governing the world economy. China follows those rules when they suit its interests and rejects, modifies or ignores them when they don't. Every nation, including the United States, would like to do the same, and most have tried. What's different is that most other countries support the legitimacy of the rules -- often requiring the sacrifice of immediate economic self-interest -- and none is as big as China. Their departures from norms don't threaten the entire system.

China's worst abuse involves its undervalued currency and its promotion of export-led economic growth. The United States isn't the only victim. China's underpricing of exports and overpricing of imports hurt most trading nations, from Brazil to India. From 2006 to 2010, China's share of world exports jumped from 7 percent to 10 percent.

One remedy would be for China to revalue its currency, reducing the competitiveness of its exports. American presidents have urged this for years. The Chinese acknowledge that they need stronger domestic spending but seem willing to let the renminbi (RMB) appreciate only if it doesn't really hurt their exports. Thus, the appreciation of about 20 percent permitted from mid-2005 to mid-2008 was largely offset by higher productivity (aka, more efficiency) that lowered costs. China halted even this when the global economy crashed and has only recently permitted the currency to rise. In practice, the RMB has barely budged. [...]

Ver notícia no Rear Clear Politics

China: do comunismo ao capitalismo (enriquecer é glorioso)

A China está próximo de se tornar a segunda economia mundial

A senior Beijing official’s reference to China as the “world’s second-largest economy” has sparked excited speculation that Asia’s new powerhouse may have already reached a long-looming milestone by surpassing Japan.

China’s rapid recent growth has made it increasingly likely that its gross domestic product, in US dollar terms, will be larger this year than Japan’s. However, the vagaries of international currency movements mean such a result is far from assured.

Observers eagerly awaiting what will be a symbol of shifting global economic power on Friday seized on a remark by Yi Gang, director of the State Administration of Foreign Exchange, about China’s growth prospects. [...]

Ver notícia no Financial Times

‘A geografia do poder chinês‘, por Robert D. Kaplan

The English geographer Sir Halford Mackinder ended his famous 1904 article, "The Geographical Pivot of History," with a disturbing reference to China. After explaining why Eurasia was the geostrategic fulcrum of world power, he posited that the Chinese, should they expand their power well beyond their borders, "might constitute the yellow peril to the world's freedom just because they would add an oceanic frontage to the resources of the great continent, an advantage as yet denied to the Russian tenant of the pivot region." Leaving aside the sentiment's racism, which was common for the era, as well as the hysterics sparked by the rise of a non-Western power at any time, Mackinder had a point: whereas Russia, that other Eurasian giant, basically was, and is still, a land power with an oceanic front blocked by ice, China, owing to a 9,000-mile temperate coastline with many good natural harbors, is both a land power and a sea power. (Mackinder actually feared that China might one day conquer Russia.) China's virtual reach extends from Central Asia, with all its mineral and hydrocarbon wealth, to the main shipping lanes of the Pacific Ocean. Later, in Democratic Ideals and Reality, Mackinder predicted that along with the United States and the United Kingdom, China would eventually guide the world by "building for a quarter of humanity a new civilization, neither quite Eastern nor quite Western." [...]

Ver artigo na Foreign Affairs

‘Tensões na Coreia: a responsabilidade da China‘ in Guardian

Relations between the two Koreas are at their worst for decades. The North says it has abrogated its non-aggression agreement with the South, trade links have been cut, shipping lanes closed, and the armed forces of both sides are on alert. The United States and South Korea are to conduct joint exercises, the traditional signal of readiness to act together in the event of real hostilities. Since a South Korean warship sank in March, almost certainly after being hit by a North Korean torpedo, the North has not offered a convincing denial of responsibility, nor an explanation, nor an apology. Now comes this tirade of threats and accusations.

If the incident was the result of an act of insubordination by a junior or a senior officer, or group of officers, that might have been privately conveyed to South Korea, but no such message has been passed on. Yet the idea that the Northern leadership ordered the attack is hard to accept, since the regime's decisions have always in the past had an element of rationality. In this case, nobody can discern what North Korean purpose the attack could possibly serve. While we do not understand the origins of this sudden deterioration, the consequence is clearer. Outside powers must restrain the parties, and, in particular, China must restrain North Korea, since it is the only country that has any real leverage in Pyongyang.

While Hillary Clinton got no public commitment of that kind during her talks in Beijing, it seems likely the Chinese will indeed apply some pressure. But Sino-American co-operation is not full-hearted, since the two countries differ so profoundly on the future of the Korean peninsula. Kim Jong-il is ageing and ailing. Change, possibly of the terminal kind, cannot be that far away. There is no international plan for dealing with the collapse of the regime, should that take place, and, equally, there is no consensus on how to cope should it survive in more or less its present form. China may well think its interests are best served by the continued division of the peninsula, while the US, Japan and other American allies would want a reunification dominated by the more successful and prosperous South. China is believed to have made preparations for putting in troops, while there are no doubt also some American military plans to go with sketchy ideas about a UN-brokered transition and reunification, but there has been no co-ordination.

This is a very feeble framework within which to contain one of the most volatile relationships on the planet. Beyond the immediate crisis, there is an urgent need to achieve a greater degree of international agreement on how to deal with dramatic and unsettling events that may be just around the corner.

http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2010/may/26/south-north-korea-china-editorial